

compiled by Dominique Arel
Chair of Ukrainian Studies, U of Ottawa
www.ukrainianstudies.uottawa.ca
14 March 2014

1-KHPG.org: Halya Coynash, The Donetsk Scenario for Invading Ukraine
2-RFE/RL.org: The Meaning of Russian Troop Movements at Ukraine's Border

3-Statement of Concerned Scholars Regarding the Conflict in Ukraine
4-The Ukraine Decentralization Initiative

5-Dominique Arel: Is Ukraine a Political Actor?
6-Oleksandr Melnyk: The Turmoil in Eastern Ukraine

7-TOL: Halya Coynash, A Referendum Without a Ukraine Option
8-Ukrainska pravda: A Russian Law on Annexation [UKL translation]
9-Antifashist.com: Party of Regions MPs Threatened, Refused to Vote [UKL tr]
10-Yeshiva World News: Interview with the Chief Rabbi of Ukraine

11-Financial Times: Firtash Arrested in Austria
12-Bloomberg: Timothy Ash, Ukraine Economic Update, 11 March
13-Financial Times: Putin Ally Warns on Cost of Sanctions

14-New York Times: How Putin Went to War
15-Kyiv Post: SBU Detains a Russian Saboteur in Donetsk
16-Ukrainska pravda: Kharkiv Mayor for Ukrainian Statehood [UKL translation]
17-Ukrainska pravda: Visa-Free Regime and the Protection of Russians [UKL tr]
18-Estonian Public Broadcasting: Paet Says Leaked Call is Real, Disputes Context
19-A Facebook Exchange on the Sniper Controversy

20-New Republic: Julia Ioffe, Merkel Was Right: Putin Lost His Mind
21-Radio Svoboda: Vitaly Portnikov, A Historical Catastrophe [UKL translation]
22-Windows on Eurasia: 2/3 of Russians view Eastern Ukraine as Russian
23-Liga.net: Russian Intelligentsia In Defense of Ukraine [UKL translation]
24-Guardian: Dimitri Trenin, A Second Cold War Is Possible

25-Maria Popova: Comparing Maidan and the Orange Revolution
26-Frank Sysyn: Russian National Myths and the Ukrainian Crisis
27-Halyna Mokrushyna: Before And After Maidan
28-Monkey Cage Blog: Onuch and Sasse, The Euromaidan Protest Cycle

29-Petro Jacyk Post-Doctoral Fellowship (15 March Deadline)
30-Social Science Summer School in Ukraine: Lviv, 1-8 July 2014
31-Policy Workshop: Ukraine and Beyond, Carleton U, 31 March 2014

**Thanks to Nykolai Bilaniuk, Halya Coynash, Mayhill Fowler, Svitlana Frunchak, Paul Goble, Juliet Johnson, Roman Kyzyk, Daria Marcus, Oleksandr Melnyk, Halyna Mokrushyna, Liudmila

Morari, Harris Mylonas, Olga Onuch, Maria Popova, Peter Solomon, Natalia Stepaniuk, Frank Sysyn, Alisa Zavalova, and Roman Zurba**

#1

Donetsk Front in Putin's Dirty War

by Halya Coynash

Human Rights in Ukraine, 13 March 2014

When fists are flying, most press agencies play safe with words suggesting joint responsibility like “clashes” and “scuffles”. Video footage, reports from witnesses and civic organizations suggest a different, more sinister slant on Thursday's violence in Donetsk which left at very least one person dead, and more than 50 injured. Even more sinister is the report from the Russian Foreign Ministry which presents a totally different version with the conclusion spelled out that Russia may take action to “defend” its nationals.

Early Thursday evening between 500 and 1, 000 people gathered for a demonstration in support of Ukraine's territorial integrity and against war. They were heavily outnumbered by around 2, 000 pro-Russian demonstrators. The anti-war demonstrators were pelted with eggs and firecrackers, but there was no major trouble until the demonstrations ended.

Video footage, for example, here seems to confirm the accounts from witnesses, and Donetsk News, that the aggression came from the pro-Russian side:

<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iNqcwSwnybU>

Some of the anti-war demonstrators managed to get away, flanked by the Donetsk self-defence unit. Those 40 people were, however, defenceless against a crowd of nearly a thousand aggressive pro-Russian demonstrators, many of whom had come armed.

One female witness recounts how she was around 20 metres away and could only watch, frightened to move: “Maddened people with sticks, bars and knives hurtled from side to side, smashing up a police bus, beating people up. At one point everybody began running along Leninsky Prospect away from Macdonalds. The pro-Russians chased our people, threw them to the ground, kicked them. I've never seen anything like it. I wasn't even terrified for myself, but for those being kicked. You know that you can't help when ten guys are attacking somebody lying down.”

The Russian Foreign Ministry statement issued on March 14 claims that “peaceful demonstrators who had come out onto the city streets to express their attitude to the destructive position of those calling themselves the Ukrainian government were attacked by rightwing radical groups armed with shock pistols and bats who had begun arriving in the city the day before from different regions of the country. As a result of the confrontations there were a large number of people wounded, one person died”.

This version of events is refuted not only by witnesses, but by considerable video footage. It is also difficult to explain why the person killed and overwhelming number of people injured were those asserting Ukraine's territorial integrity and protesting against the military intervention in the Crimea.

The one named victim received fatal knife wounds. Dmitry (Dima) Chernyavsky was 22 and, according to an acquaintance, Denis, writing on Facebook, “a harmless, slightly shy young guy, no fighter, no radical. His mother was expecting him home today, but he didn't come.”

He seems to have been a member of the rightwing VO Svoboda party – “the enemy”, according to Russian propaganda. Claims that these are the fascist hordes whom Russia has to protect its nationals, as well as right-thinking (pro-Russian) Ukrainians from have been dismissed by

western countries and do not stand up to scrutiny. Unfortunately, however, the mass audience in Russia, and Ukraine's eastern oblasts have long been fed such lies and they don't even think to probe them. They don't ask, for example, why the propaganda claims that the "fascists" and "neo-Nazis" are those from the EuroMaidan movement and in power in Kyiv, and treats Pavel Gubarev, the self-proclaimed pro-Russian "people's governor" as a persecuted hero. The latter, together with many of his supporters are known for close ties to Russian neo-Nazi organizations.

Thursday's bloody confrontations will probably inspire a new round of reports in the western media about the supposed great divide between East and West. This is a ready-made feature and much easier than probing deeper, though in fact you don't need to delve very deep.

As well as the untrammelled propaganda on pro-Russian media sources, there have also been rumours deliberately circulated to heighten local fears and antagonism towards the new administration in Kyiv and EuroMaidan. The latest rumour claims that miners and others in the Donetsk oblast will have to pay up to 10% of their wages "for the restoration of Maidan".

Russia's leaders have received too many unpleasant surprises from Ukraine of late, and are not relying on propaganda alone. Large numbers of "Russian tourists" – of a specific age, athletic build and general thuggish appearance – have been brought into the Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts by the busloads.

They have doubtless found support from home-grown louts. Titushki or government hired thugs were used very actively by the Yanukovych regime against the EuroMaidan movement, and are almost certainly being given a role here. While the police are no longer actively taking sides, they are not reacting as strongly as they should.

According to Oleksandr Bukalov, head of the human rights organization Donetsk Memorial, "this all looks like a well-prepared scenario with the conclusion (for Putin) being that there is no order in the east, that people are not safe, and in order to avoid new deaths....".

The Russian statement leaves no room for doubt that this is the scenario planned. Its statement concludes with the claim that the government in Kyiv is not "disarming fighters, ensuring the population's safety and their legitimate right to hold rallies". "Russia recognizes its responsibility for the life of its compatriots and fellow nationals in Ukraine and reserves the right to take people under their protection".

The claims that direct or indirect military intervention is needed to "protect" people are all too familiar. Attempts to use this scenario in the Crimea, together with the request for "help" from the puppet government under Sergei Aksenov, have met with deserved scepticism by the West. It is no accident that this death and open violence has come just days before the Crimea's pseudo-referendum. There is strong evidence that it is all being orchestrated, and the closest scrutiny is urgently needed of what is proving to be a very dirty war.

#2

What Do Russian Troop Movements Near Ukraine's Border Signify?

by Ron Sinovitz

RFE/RL.org, 13 March 2014

Officials in Kyiv have warned that Russian military forces are massing on Ukraine's borders "in an offensive manner" and suggested they could be preparing for an invasion in the country's east.

What are the specific claims that Ukrainian officials have made about Russian military forces?

Andriy Parubiy, the secretary of Ukraine's National Security and Defense Council, said on March 12 that Russian troops are massing along Ukraine's borders for a possible invasion.

Parubiy said the troops are being deployed "in an offensive manner," and that the forces include more than 80,000 soldiers, "up to 270 tanks, 180 armored vehicles, 380 artillery systems, 18 multiple-launch missile systems, 140 combat aircraft, 90 combat helicopters," and 19 naval warships.

He added that the situation is "critical" not only in Crimea, "but along the entire northeastern frontier" -- with Russian troops in positions to seize eastern Ukrainian cities like Kharkiv and Donetsk, and to advance as far as Kyiv within two or three hours.

What is the evidence of such a buildup?

Photographs and videos, said to have been taken since March 10, have appeared on social media and in newspapers including Britain's "Daily Mail."

Tim Ripley, a military analyst for Jane's Defence Weekly, has reviewed the photographs and videos and concludes that it is too early to say whether Russia is, in fact, mobilizing for an invasion of eastern or northern Ukraine

"They show lots of Russian vehicles. But they only show small groups of vehicles - - 10, 15, or 20 at a time -- so it is difficult to conclude that they are showing a huge mass of thousands of tanks just a two hour drive from Kyiv," Ripley said. "They definitely show tanks and armored personnel carriers and other military equipment in places very close to the Ukrainian border. But to say they are an overwhelming mass concentration of forces for a major operation? You can't make that jump -- certainly not yet -- on the basis of the evidence floating around on the Internet and in the news media."

What about Kyiv's claim that 80,000 Russian troops are positioned "in an offensive manner" just across the border? What appears to be going on? Ripley says the Russian forces described by authorities in Kyiv are not beyond the ordinary number of forces normally stationed in the region.

"You can show some movement and some positioning of Russian equipment near the Ukrainian border, but that 80,000, it is probably correct to say those are the troops that are normally based there anyway in what is called the southern and western Russian military district bordering Ukraine," Ripley said.

"So to say they are massing is perhaps hyperbole. I mean, the key indicator to say there is a massing of troops would be a call up of reservists -- of former conscripts -- to fill out the Russian units. Because a lot of these units based in the south [of Russia] are not kept at full strength in peacetime."

What does the heightened activity of Russian forces near Ukraine's border suggest?

The Kremlin describes the increased military activity near the Ukrainian border as a training exercise.

The Russian Defense Ministry's website said on March 13 that about 8,500 troops are taking part in the drills, which include artillery and multiple-rocket launchers in its Southern Military District.

It says the exercise is aimed at improving the coordination between artillery, mechanized and tank units, paratroopers, and marines. The Defense Ministry did not say how long the exercise would last.

Until the Kremlin begins to call up reservists to fill out Russian forces -- or until a large number of conscripted troops are sent from other parts of Russia to the Ukrainian border region -- military experts like Ripley see Russian military posturing as a kind of psychological warfare campaign against Ukraine.

"The indicators suggest something is going on with movement of stuff. This is great psychological warfare against Ukraine, and a great act of intimidation to try and deter the Ukrainians from carrying out any military engagement against the occupation force in Crimea," Ripley said.

"You know, you hold a sort of hammer against the rear of the Ukrainian forces and you've got the Russian forces on the border making noises and driving around in public creating lots of impressions. The Ukrainians must be thinking, 'Well, if we go south to take on the Russians in Crimea, all those Russians will come in behind us.' It's a great psychological warfare exercise."

Would Russia be violating any international treaty obligations by massing the kind of forces described by Ukrainian officials?

Even by the standards of the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE), signed Warsaw Pact and NATO states in 1990, Russia would not be violating its international obligations by massing together the kind of force levels described by Ukrainian officials.

Under post-Soviet negotiations to update the CFE during the 1990s, limitations on the amount of military equipment that could be deployed in so called "flank zones" like Russia's border region with Ukraine were eased.

Some parts of Rostov Oblast -- where the Southern Military District is headquartered -- were removed completely from flank zone limitations. Meanwhile, the renegotiated agreement said Russian active units in the flank zone could hold no more than 700 tanks, 580 armored combat vehicles, and 1,280 artillery pieces.

The equipment numbers described by Kyiv do not appear to exceed the CFE's flank zone limitations.

Moreover, Russia suspended its implementation of the CFE treaty in December 2007 -- essentially withdrawing from the treaty -- less than a year before Russia's short war against Georgia in August, 2008.

The United States announced in 2011 that it also was suspending its reporting to Russia under the CFE treaty.

That essentially leaves Russia with the right under international law to position and deploy whatever forces it likes within its own territory.

#3

Statement of Concerned Scholars Regarding the Conflict in Ukraine

<http://concernedscholars.blogspot.ca/>

We, the undersigned, are scholars of Ukrainian and Russian affairs whose knowledge of and respect for the people of the region bring us together today. Although we hold diverse views regarding the origins, evolution, and likely outcome of the current crisis in Ukraine, we agree on the following five points:

- 1) The continued Russian occupation of Crimea cannot be supported by reference to international law, international norms, or interstate agreements. Russian troops in Ukraine should return to their barracks immediately and all parties should allow the OSCE to enter Crimea as a neutral observer. The use of troops in unmarked uniforms must cease.
- 2) No status referendum in Crimea can be considered legitimate under the current circumstances. Such referenda require, at minimum, the agreement of national and regional governments, a clear question, sustained public discussion of the ramifications of yes and no votes, and the option of international monitoring to ensure a free and fair process. They cannot be held under military occupation and should be considered only as a last resort after all other democratic avenues of resolution have failed.
- 3) In addition to early presidential elections, the acting Ukrainian government should call early parliamentary elections and invite international election observers to monitor the campaign and the vote.
- 4) Ukrainian authorities should adopt deliberately inclusive policies towards the linguistic, ethnic, and cultural groups of Ukraine in order to increase mutual trust and facilitate national reconciliation. Sustainable inclusion may require a newly elected Ukrainian government to introduce measures to increase political decentralization.
- 5) Interested parties around the world should avoid unnecessarily inflammatory, confrontational, and militaristic rhetoric in regards to the conflict. Such rhetoric inevitably raises tensions and endangers the lives and livelihoods of all people in the region.

We call upon all parties to work towards a peaceful, sustainable, and fair resolution to the current conflict in Ukraine.

Authors

Juliet Johnson, Department of Political Science, McGill University, Canada
Maria Popova, Department of Political Science, McGill University, Canada

Signed by 294 scholars from 30 countries as of 11 March.

#4

The Ukraine Decentralization Initiative

Timofiy Mylovanov, U of Pennsylvania
<https://sites.google.com/site/tmylovanov/ukraine-decentralization-initiative>

A Call for Debate on Political Decentralization in Ukraine
If done right, decentralization can be a great solution for Ukraine

Political and economic decentralization is the immediate systemic change needed for Ukraine to become a stable and healthy democracy. Democratic regional decentralization would have three important and distinct benefits for Ukraine's nascent democratic institutions.

1. It would be an effective guarantee that important local economic and social decisions are made by the people most affected by these decisions, rather than being dictated by whichever party comes to power in Kiev.
2. It would reduce the stakes in the conflict in national politics and help focus attention not on whether one region will impose its will on another, but on the urgent economic and political problems facing Ukraine.
3. A vibrant local democracy would do much to strengthen Ukraine's national political institutions and provide a forum where new local politicians can prove themselves, gain the trust of the people and get executive experience.

By contrast, the system currently in place, in which local officials are appointed by a centralized, national authority that often ignores broad interests, prevents any renewal or evolution of the political parties that act to integrate political elites at various levels of government, and does not offer sufficient protections or representation to regional interest groups.

Instead, political evolution can only express itself through recurrent national and regional mass protests and Maidans, and skirmishes over regional control. Such mass movements surface new political leaders who are subsequently overwhelmed by the entrenched system in place. Mass movements undermine the evolution of the democratic process, generate instability, and provide no assurances to losing or minority parties. Meanwhile new leaders succumb to corrupt reactionaries, and on occasion evolve into dictators themselves, creating the vicious cycle.

The view “done right, decentralization can be a great solution for Ukraine” is representative of the sentiment among many academics in Ukraine and in the West. A debate about the merits of decentralization and further institutional reform should be an important priority in these extraordinary times.

A succinct and spot-on perspective was offered by Roger Myerson, Nobel Laureate in Economics, 2007, on February 24, 2014. Dr. Myerson notes the importance of weakening the power of the center and the importance of local representation in the choice of regional leaders. The recent appointments of local governors in the east of Ukraine, intended to allay concerns in the regions, indicate that the Kyiv government recognizes the importance of decentralization for the future of united Ukraine:

“Democracy is about voters having a choice among alternative candidates whom they can trust to exercise power responsibly. When such trusted leadership is lacking, democracy is inevitably disappointing and fragile. A presidential election can give prestige to its winner, but it does nothing to develop the broader supply of trusted alternative candidates on which the success of democracy will ultimately depend. This essential supply of trusted democratic leadership can develop best in responsible institutions of local government where successful local leaders can prove their qualifications to become strong competitive candidates for higher office.

Do people in Ukraine feel frustrated by a scarcity of candidates who have developed good reputations for exercising power responsibly in elected office? In other countries, trusted candidates for national leadership are regularly found among governors and mayors who have proven their abilities by delivering better public services in the government of a province or a large city.

But the Constitutions of Ukraine have given the President the power to choose all provincial governors. The incumbent President is the national politician who would have the most to lose from the development of more trusted competitive candidates for national office. Under this constitutional system, we should expect provincial governors to be regularly chosen from among

the President's loyal supporters who are unlikely to develop any independent reputations of trust with the voters.

The transition to an independent democracy in Ukraine was never going to be easy, but I believe that this deeply flawed constitutional structure was also an important contributing factor that people should recognize and try to change. The best hope for developing trusted democratic leadership would be from decentralized local politics in which governors are ultimately responsible to the local voters within their province. Some who hope to gain national power might be tempted by the prospect of appointing dozens of supporters to powerful local offices throughout the country. But those who truly want to build a strong competitive democratic system in Ukraine should consider supporting constitutional reforms that would decentralize some share of responsible power to locally elected leaders in each province.

Locally elected councils already exist in each province of Ukraine. A constitutional reform to give these local councils the power to choose their own governors could be a vital step toward easing regional tensions and building stronger democracy in Ukraine”.

The merits of decentralization are clear, but any decentralization effort should be undertaken with great care. Careful implementation with rigorous debate is needed:

- decentralization must be implemented to serve to unite Ukraine and encourage a celebration of diversity of the Ukrainian nation;
- local authorities will be at risk of being corrupted by the vestigial establishment;
- local officials must be granted the authorities and resources needed to fulfill the responsibilities they are assigned;
- level at which decentralization should take place - roles and responsibilities of local, regional, and national authorities must be carefully delineated and socialized;
- safeguards to assure appropriate checks and balances between regional and national interests, as well as between various interest groups, must be in place to overcome the risk of dominance by one local authority or interest group, to which the country has become accustomed.

Signed by 98 scholars, including 36 from Ukraine.

#5

Is Ukraine a Political Actor?

by Dominique Arel
Chair of Ukrainian Studies
University of Ottawa, Canada

Prepared for the Roundtable
"Ukraine Under Russian Threat"
Chair of Ukrainian Studies, 12 March 2014

In the torrent of commentaries generated by the dangerously evolving Ukraine story, three narratives compete, or complement each other, in denying agency to Ukraine. In the first, the escalating crisis in Ukraine is presented as the result of American and/or European intervention in Ukraine, to pursue their geopolitical and economic interests. In the second, the collapse of the Russia-friendly Yanukovich regime as a result of an insurrection is seen as provoking Russia to secure its historic interests. In the third, Ukraine is presented as a profoundly, if not fatally, divided society that does not have the social capital to challenge, or resist, Russia. In other words, Ukraine is a pawn of Great Powers politics, a geographic appendage of Russia and it is not a nation. What these narratives negate is the possibility that the social forces that actually constitute Ukraine may be in a position to control their destiny, even in the face of unremitting pressure from a powerful neighbouring state.

The geopolitical argument is well known: NATO should never have been allowed to expand to the boundaries of Russia, which had the effect of fueling a sense of insecurity among Russian leaders, and offering NATO membership to Georgia and Ukraine in 2008 led to two military invasions — the second one (Crimea) with a six-year delay. EU eastward enlargement also had deleterious long-term consequences, in full view in the last three months (notwithstanding the fact that the EU tended to be presented as a benign actor during the initial NATO push in the late 1990s). EU enlargement has the effect of reorienting emerging domestic markets at the periphery to serve the needs of dominant economies. The neoliberal variation of the argument is that Europe seeks to expand its supply of cheap labor. In a nutshell, US and European interests — military and economic — are projected eastward at the expense of Russia's.

The flaw in this macro-argument is that the means by which the US and Europe seek to influence actors on the ground is assumed, but never demonstrated. During the Orange Revolution in 2004, it became known that US NGOs had previously offered training in non-violent resistance and political activism, as if this could explain the sustained mobilization of hundreds of thousands of demonstrators — EU and NATO-inclined — over a period of nearly three weeks. Throughout Euromaidan, the claim of European and American “interference” was heard insistently, even if the support was intangibly political and unaccompanied with concrete economic assistance. Conspiracy theory aside, there was no training of Maidan activists, no overt or covert financial aid, and the personalized financial sanctions and direct European mediation came at the very end. The question, as a matter of fact, is why Yanukovich let European mediators negotiate himself into oblivion? The larger question for the geopolitical perspective is how to reconcile these hard interests of Great Powers with their apparent inability to actually influence events as they unfolded on the ground.

The second narrative pertains to Russia's historic interests in Ukraine. For some, it is straightforward story of Russian imperialism: Russia has been ruling over the heart of Ukraine since the 17th century and does not want to let go. For others, it is a story of Russian identity: Russians define themselves as originating from Kyivan Rus' and there are sites of memory (Crimea certainly, but also Kyiv) that deeply resonates in Russian culture. For yet another constituency, it is a story of both Russian and Ukrainian identity: Russian-speaking Eastern Ukrainians accept the notion that Russia and Ukraine should stay close, as they share common memory and interests, and this implies that Russia should keep a certain degree of influence over Ukrainian external orientation. These clashing or overlapping perspectives have been around a long time, as they cut to the core of the Ukrainian-Russian identity encounter, but they as such provide us with little explanation as to why Russia-Ukraine relations have escalated to such an extent that the Russian military occupies Crimea and that Russia, as President Putin stated last week, reserves for itself the right to intervene militarily in Eastern Ukraine.

The missing link is the current nature of the political regime in Russia. It had become clear for years that presidential power in Russia is no longer checked by parliament, the court or the media. The latest revelation, as reported in the Russian and American press, is that the Crimean invasion — and the threat to Eastern Ukraine — was decided by an extremely small group of advisers, all former KGB officials from the Leningrad days, bypassing the formal security institutions of the state — the Security Council, the Foreign Ministry, the Ministry of Defense. President Putin has concentrated powers to such an extent that he essentially makes decisions of paramount importance without internal accountability, without even an internal debate among elites in the closed Russian system. One could make the case that such seminal personalized power has not been seen in Russia since the days of high Stalinism.

The point is that the means to realize Russia's perceived historic interests are determined by a single man in the most extreme fashion of breaking international post-war rules of behavior. Thus, the problem is not the claim of Russian interests in Ukraine, but destabilizing policies originating from one man who appears to have insulated himself from internal pressure at home. It has been said that the Western concerted response regarding the inviolability of the principle of territorial integrity rings hollow, in light of repeated violations of the sovereignty of other states by the

United States in Iraq or Pakistan (with the ongoing drone campaign). But this misses the extremely grave precedent that the annexation of Crimea is posing to the international order. The US overthrew a regime, an act almost unanimously condemned in Europe, but did not alter the boundaries of Iraq. The point is not about seeking to influence the domestic politics of a foreign state, which is standard fare in international politics in various degrees of intensity, but straight-out annexation of a territory belonging to another state, which has not been seen in Europe since World War II. For anyone with a modicum of understanding of mid-twentieth century European history, this precedent is highly unsettling and with consequences that no one, President Putin included, can anticipate. Equally unsettling are the delusional statements of the President, wholly disconnected from the empirical reality (such as: there are no Russian troops in Crimea, the Maidan front-line activists were trained in Poland and Lithuania, the Ukrainian government is run by fascists), and unchallenged by a domestic public or elite opinion kept in check. When foreign policy objectives are sought in imaginary grievances, we have left the realm of valid and long-standing regional interests to enter that of a regionally threatening autocracy.

The third narrative is about the alleged incomplete nature of the nation-building process in Ukraine. From the inside, this is actually the standard narrative of Ukrainian nationalism: the highest degree of national consciousness is to be found in Western Ukraine, to a lesser extent at the center, while Eastern Ukraine, as a result of decades, if not centuries, of “Russification” lacks behind and the “Little Russian” mentality, having internalized the Russian perspective on Ukraine, remains prevalent. From the outside, a similar view remains popular: Ukraine is an artificial construction, its regions having lived under different empires, and Ukraine is not a nation, or not yet a nation, because of greatly pronounced regional differences between East and West. Because of its deep ambivalence, torn between Russia and Europe, between Russian and Ukrainian culture, Ukraine lacks the social capital, the united sense of national solidarity, to withstand the tremendous pressure now applied by a resurgent Russia (a Russia, we should add, that brooks no political opposition to its expansionist project). For having studied and reflected upon Ukraine’s ethnic, linguistic, and regional makeup since my graduate student days, let me offer the following caveats to what I consider to be a misleading view of Ukraine as a weak nation.

First, the argument that Ukraine is in a state of incomplete nation-building assumes a finality that just does not reflect how nations come about and transform themselves. True, Eastern Ukrainians are ambivalent towards Russia while Western Ukrainians are not. No one knows what the threat of military intervention on Eastern Ukraine could lead to, not even Eastern Ukrainians themselves. What we know from comparative history is that military pressure on a state, to the point of occupation, very often divides populations, opening up deep social wounds that may take generations to heal. We also know from the contemporary —pluralist— experience of Western nations that ambivalence accompanies the expression of nationalist sentiment. The Québécois francophones have been ambivalent for forty years in their relationship with English Canada, the Scots remain ambivalent towards the British, the same applies with Catalans or Basques regarding the Spanish (or Castilian) identity.

True, Eastern and Western Ukrainians are divided, emotionally divided, over the meaning of the OUN-UPA insurrection and of the Red Army march to Berlin, but, to give two prominent examples, the Spaniards are equally emotionally divided over the meaning of the 1930s Civil War and the regional polarization in American politics, more pronounced than ever, has roots in the US Civil War. In comparative perspective, the regional and memorial divides in Ukraine are not particularly unique. What matters now is not the divisions per se, but how a state, any state, can withstand the threat of military intervention. An external intervention can create divisions, or divisions can come to the fore in ways that would never have been possible in peaceful times, but divisions themselves do not cause intervention.

The second aspect of the weak nation narrative is the ethnic angle. Invoking a claim that had not been heard in Europe since 1930s – a most worrisome claim due its horrific consequences back then – Russia has invaded Crimea ostensibly to protect ethnic Russians from imminent danger. A companion claim has been made regarding the so-called “compatriots”, or “Russian-speakers” in

Eastern Ukraine, often understood in Western media reporting as a claim targeting ethnic Russian minorities – sometimes presented as majorities – in the East. The Russian stance is the Ukrainian government has been illegitimately captured by Ukrainian extreme nationalists (“fascists”), endangering the Russian “compatriots” in Eastern Ukraine. In fact, ethnic Russians, as a socially or politically organized group, do not exist in Eastern Ukraine (with apparently some minor exceptions in Odessa). The socially relevant group is that of Russian-speakers, individuals preferring to use Russian in public, comprised of both Ukrainians and Russians, or literally of individuals that are both Ukrainian and Russian by lineage – a phenomenon that is not recorded on the census — and whose attachment to Ukraine as a united territory is currently under stress.

The unknown about Eastern Ukrainians is less their sense of national identity, which is ambivalent, but their potential for civic engagement. Eastern Ukraine has traditionally been a passive society and, with the exception of a miners’ strike at the height of perestroika, the first popular demonstrations, on either side of the political confrontation, in Eastern Ukraine have precisely occurred during or since Maidan. Eastern Ukraine is not the site of an incomplete ethnation, but more a site of an incomplete civic nation in the throes of overcoming its tradition of social obedience, first as a response to the Maidan insurrection and its powerful appeal to social justice (against corruption and police brutality), and now as a response to a looming military threat at the border. The disquieting effect of a society just opening up to public contestations is that the social vacuum tends to be filled by radical groups with little roots in society at large, and yet with the potential to perpetrate acts of long-lasting consequences. This is what we may be observing in places like Donetsk, Luhansk and Kharkiv, in an extremely fluid situation. On the one hand, aggressive pro-Russian demonstrations, seeking to imitate the seizure of government buildings done earlier by radical nationalists in Western Ukraine, and framed by the Ukrainian media as based in from Russia, although this remains to be verified. On the other, peaceful pro-Maidan demonstrations, but also the presence of radical nationalists, of the Pravyi sector type, acting as vigilantes. Intensifying pressure from Russia could provoke local violence in Eastern Ukraine. The developments remain uncertain not because Ukraine is not a nation, but because politics as a process of open contestation may be gaining Eastern Ukraine.

#6

The Turmoil in Eastern Ukraine

Oleksandr Melnyk

Doctoral Student, University of Toronto

Prepared for the roundtable “Ukraine Under Russian Threat”
Chair of Ukrainian Studies, 12 March 2014

Following the collapse of the Yanukovich regime and the start of the Crimean crisis, a number of eastern and southern Ukrainian cities had experienced a wave of protest activity under the slogans of restoring the legitimacy of the government through elections of “people’s governors”, federalization or unification with Russia. In some places these protests were accompanied by disturbances of public order and clashes with pro-Maidan/pro-Ukraine protestors, attempts at takeover of regional administrations and raising of Russian flags, demands of the referendum and appeals to Russia to introduce troops to Ukraine.

Such events--which in the Russian segment of the internet have been called a “Russian Spring”, took place most notably in Donetsk, Lugansk, Kharkiv, and Odessa. in Dnipropetrovsk, likely due to the position of the local elites, pro-Russian forces proved to be small and ultimately were dwarfed by much larger pro-Ukrainian and anti-war protests. A similar situation obtained in Kherson. In Odessa, anti-Maidan protests were large (at least several thousands of people strong), but peaceful, perhaps, in part due to the presence of smaller pro-Ukrainian demonstrations and the possibility of violent clashes. Moreover, local elites — most notably Igor Markov (Rodina) — have emphasized working within the legal framework.

In my comments I will briefly speak about the general contexts, actors on the ground, the positions of Ukrainian authorities and elites, and the role of Russian government. When speaking of the South-East, I will refer to 8 oblasts (Kharkiv, Lugansk, Donetsk, Dnipropetrovs'k, Zaporizhzhya, Kherson, Mykolaiv, Odessa), the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol.

Together these territories encompass close to 23 million people or about 48% of the total population of Ukraine. Out of roughly 23 million people, close to 14.5 million are ethnic Ukrainians (63%) and 6.9 million are Russians (30% of the combined population of these regions). In other words, south-eastern regions are home to approximately 83% of Ukraine's Russians who mostly reside in big cities.

The ratio of the Russian population ranges from 14% in Mykolaiv and Kherson regions to 72% in the city of Sevastopol. In the Donetsk region ethnic Russians account for 38% of the general population, in Lugans'k--36%; in Crimea--58%.

Everywhere Ukrainians and Russians combined to close to 95% of the total population, regardless of linguistic preferences. The exception is Crimea, where Crimea Tatars are a very significant minority.

Politically, South-Eastern regions have traditionally been the stronghold of the Party of Regions and the Communist Party of Ukraine, albeit the level of support has declined noticeably from 2007 to 2012.

During the 2012 Parliamentary elections, the support for the Party of Regions ranged from 35% in Dnipropetrovs'k, 40% in Kharkiv, 52% in Crimea, 57% in the Lugans'k region, 65% in the Donetsk region.

Russian nationalist parties have traditionally been politically marginal in Ukraine, in large part due to the fact that they occupied the same electoral niche as Communists and the Party of Regions. The Party of Regions in particular has been known to nip in the bud any attempts at alternative political organization, including in places such as Odessa and Crimea, where Russian nationalist forces (e.g. Russkoe edinstvo, Rodina etc) had potential to do much better than they have.

Several weeks prior to deposition of Viktor Yanukovich and Russia's intervention in Crimea (8-18 February), the KIIS conducted a poll on the attitudes towards the Ukrainian statehood, which produced the interesting results:

It turned out that the unification with Russia was supported by 41% in Crimea.

Donetsk: 33%

Luhans'k: 24%

Odessa: 24%

Zaporizhzhia: 16.7%

Kharkiv: 15.1%

Dnipropetrovs'k: 13.8%

Kherson: 4.2%

Mykolaiv: 3.7%

So it is not difficult to see that there is a direct correlation between the percentage of the Russian population and the percentage of people supporting unification with Russia in one state.

Who are the participants of the protests? Several individuals and organizations have come to the fore. Pavel Gubarev and "Narodnoe opochenie Donbassa" in Donetsk; Aleksandr Kharitonov and "Lugansk Guard", Arsen Klinchaev (Klinchaev was an aid to Oleksandr Efremov) and "Young Guard" (Lugansk); the already mentioned "Oplot" in Kharkiv; Odessa groups. The ideological profile, organizational structure and the size of these organizations and political profile of protest

participants requires serious research. There are reasons to believe that not all people who partook in anti-Maidan protests were motivated by interest to join Russia--the demands varied a lot--socio-economic, anti-NATO and anti-EU, pro-Russian (at least for some participants of demonstrations, exhibiting Russian flags was symbolic of support for better relations with Russia, rather than for unification, in the similar fashion that Maidan protestors brandished EU flags).

The Ukrainian media have represented the current pro-Russian protests as a product of activities of Russian special services and Russian "political tourists" There is likely truth to it. There is also evidence of presence among protesters of Russian citizens who arrived from Russian territory. But one should be careful not to downplay the importance of the local actors.

It is clear that Maidan protests were not supported by close to 50% of the population. The numbers were likely significantly higher in the cities of the south and the east. Moreover, they provoked anger at the Maidan --destruction of Lenin monuments, what they regard as biased media coverage. While anti-Maidan protests were often assembled by administrative means, some groups of these protesters were motivated ideologically, the "Oplot" from Kharkiv being the case in point. On the other hand, the size of recent protests in Odessa, Donetsk, Luhansk makes the argument about the protests being simply the case of Russian organizational activities is not very persuasive.

In understanding the reactions of the Ukrainian authorities to these developments in the south-east in the post-Yanukovich period, it is important to understand the peculiarities of political transition, which has yet to be completed. In the aftermath of the Revolution, oligarchs and important parts of regional elites ditched Yanukovich and his circles and re-oriented themselves and their clients towards towards the new powers that be and distanced themselves from separatist movements, as evidenced by the appointment of Taruta as governor of Donetsk region and Kolomyiskyi in Dnipropetrovs'k. Rinat Akhmetov expressed support for Ukraine's territorial integrity. Even the mayor of Kharkiv Hennadii Kernes has not openly spoken against the new government. In pursuit of these objectives, local elites likely facilitated and supported pro-Ukrainian anti-war protests in the aftermath of Russia's intervention in Crimea.

At the same time, some representatives of regional elites took positions similar to the ones voiced by anti-Maidan protests and even sponsored the creation of local "self-defence." Thus the head of the fraction of the Party of Regions in the parliament Oleksandr Efremov has been openly speaking in favor of federalization and protection of the Russian language.

At the same time, the overthrow of the Yanukovich regime has likely temporarily weakened the structure of the state, especially in the law enforcement segment. The replacement of police and security service officials proceeded slowly, lower level officials likely may sometimes be sympathetic to protests or otherwise unwilling to obstruct them. The gradual consolidation of the state apparatus, however, eventually translated into systemic attempts to eradicate separatist activities--arrests of Gubarev, Klinchaev, Dobkin, 70 activists of "Russkaya vesna" in Donetsk. Pro-Russian activists are being summoned by the SBU in Odessa as witnesses --deputy of the city Council Aleksandr Vasiliev (Rodina), deputy of the city council Aleksei Albu, leader of the group "Youth Unity" Anton Davidchenko. There is presently evidence of a decline in protest activity, but the situation remains volatile due to the presence of the Russian factor and new events are scheduled to take place (e.g. a referendum-veche on the subject of federalization in Kharkiv on 16 March and the march in Odessa). The veche in Kharkiv is expected to resubordinate law enforcement agencies, take over local power structures and summon Russia's assistance. Kernes and local authorities do not support the idea.

#7

Crimea's Democracy Theater

The options are union with Russia or independence, but not the status quo.

by Halya Coynash

14 March 2014

Halya Coynash is a journalist and member of the Kharkiv Human Rights Protection Group, on whose website a version of this commentary originally appeared.

Nobody expected a proper "referendum" from the puppet government in Crimea, but it would be difficult to imagine anything more farcical than the ballot paper posted on the Crimean parliament's website.

The document, in three languages – Russian, Ukrainian, and Crimean Tatar – contains the following:

Ballot Paper for the all-Crimean referendum of 16 March 2014

Mark with any symbol in the box beside the variant of the answer you are voting for.

1. Are you for Crimea reuniting with Russia, as a subject of the Russian Federation?
2. Are you for the reinstatement of the 1992 Constitution of the Republic of the Crimea and for the status of Crimea as part of Ukraine?

A ballot paper left unmarked, or where both variants are marked shall be invalid.

There are multiple problems with this document.

Firstly, there is no possibility of voting for the status quo. Those who choose to take part in this event can place their doodles, signature, or tick for one of two very different options: becoming a part of the Russian Federation or reinstating a constitution in force for around 13 days back in 1992 that declared Crimean independence.

It is just conceivable that some voters will know that on 5 May 1992 the parliament of the Autonomous Republic of the Crimea adopted a "Declaration of State Independence of the Republic of the Crimea," and that a constitution under these conditions was adopted the next day. It was suspended on 19 May, with considerable amendments made on 25 September that year.

It is more likely that squiggles will be given to the first option, which is at least comprehensible.

Secondly, it is also quite unclear how the result of this vote is to be determined, with no indication as to the minimum turnout.

A monumental change to the peninsula would not only be guaranteed by the lack of an option for staying put, but some pitifully small number of people could decide whether Crimea becomes a part of Russia or goes it alone altogether.

Referendums in general need to have clearly articulated questions to which people answer yes or no. They should also not take place under the watch of armed soldiers without insignia speaking Russian without an accent.

The decision to bring this "referendum" forward to 16 March was passed behind closed doors a mere 10 days earlier, on 6 March. Parliament "decided" to join Russia and to have this

“confirmed” by referendum.

The explanatory note asserts that “nationalist forces, having seized power through an unconstitutional coup, are flagrantly violating Ukraine’s laws, inalienable rights, and freedoms, including the right to life, freedom of thought, and speech; and the right to speak one’s native language. Extremist gangs have made a number of attempts to get into Crimea in order to exacerbate the situation, cause an escalation in tension, and unlawfully seize power.”

It was never possible that this so-called referendum could have much credibility since Ukraine’s constitution clearly stipulates that any change in Ukraine’s territory must be put to a nationwide referendum. That the puppet government in Crimea and the Kremlin should have resorted to such an inept and thuggish parody was harder to anticipate.

Even a legitimate referendum could not be organized in 10 days. Ukraine’s new leaders have stated clearly the vote will not be recognized and the Central Election Commission has suspended access to the voter register in Crimea and Sevastopol (which has separate status according to Ukraine’s constitution).

Attempts to present this as an infringement of the rights of people in Crimea will also not wash. The Mejlis of the Crimean Tatars has called on all residents of the Crimea to boycott the event. The lack of support of Crimea’s indigenous people, up to 15 percent of the population, strips it of any legitimacy.

Western countries, as well as the UN Security Council, have made it quite clear that the result will not be recognized. That should have made Crimean Prime Minister Sergei Aksenov and his Kremlin patrons back down. Instead they appear to have opted for grotesque farce.

#8

The State Duma Registered a Bill for the Annexation of Crimea

Ukrainska Pravda, March 3, 2014

[translated by Liudmila Morari for UKL]

The Russian Duma registered a bill for the annexation of Crimea. The bill was registered by 16 MPs on February 28th.

The bill proposes:

“The Russian Federation will accept a foreign state as a new subject in case of its inability to conclude an international agreement due to the lack of effective sovereign government that is obliged to protect its citizens, respect their rights and freedoms and provide actually constant and peaceful implementation of public functions”.

“The given law presumes “acceptance of the subject” based on results of the referendum conducted in accordance with the legislation of foreign state on a given territory, if the question of its accession to the Russian Federation was approved, or the public authorities of foreign state requested annexation”.

“In case of adoption by the Russian Federation of the part of foreign state as a new subject, it will be granted the status of republic, territory, region, autonomous region or autonomous region in accordance with the paragraph 2 of this article by an international treaty, and if it is absent - in accordance with the federal constitutional law, to accept a new subject into the Russian Federation, “- was stated in the bill”.

Herewith, in the explanatory note to the bill, Crimea is openly referred.

As you know, in the Ukrainian legislation the notion of “local referendum” does not exist, there is only “Ukrainian” one.

The self-proclaimed pro-Russian government of Crimea declared that it does not intent to integrate into the Russian Federation, but they only insist on the expansion of their autonomy.

#9

Because of Threats and Pressure the Party of Regions Refuses to Vote in the Parliament
Antifashist.com, 13 March 2014
<http://antifashist.com/latest-news/23457-izza-ugroz-i-davlenija-pr-otkazyva>
[translated by Oleksandr Melnyk for UKL]

The Party of Regions refused to take part in voting that takes place in the Verkhovna Rada, Golos.ua was told by people’s deputy Yuri Miroshnichenko (Party of Regions). He explained that the fraction of the Party of Regions will not participate in the parliamentary voting until the cessation of pressure on people’s deputies.

“Deputies from the Party of Regions are under pressure; we are being driven through the gauntlet with not always friendly groups of people standing on both sides. And they let us in only through one exit,” the deputy emphasized.

Miroshnichenko also said that deputies are often prevented from entering the parliament. For example, today he was not allowed to pass through the fifth entrance. Moreover, he and his colleagues receive threats. Thus people’s deputy Muraev, who introduced the proposal to move presidential elections to December 2014 “received warnings that he may regret it.”

“In the situation when deputies can not vote in accordance with their convictions and, effectively, have to fulfill demands under pressure, neither the new government nor the Maidan look good. People made such huge sacrifices for reasons other than the destruction of freedom of speech and other freedoms,” the deputy said.

Speaking on behalf of the Party of Regions, he expressed hope that negotiations with the colleagues from the opposition will make it possible to resolve the problem of pressure on the deputies. But until the resolution the “regionnaires” won’t take part in voting.

The decision of the Party of Regions to ignore parliamentary voting due to the tremendous pressure was mentioned also by the deputy Nestor Shufrych: “Today the fraction of the Party of Regions made a decision not to vote on any single question on the agenda due to the pressure on members of our party, on activists in the regions, on deputies of local councils, on some people’s deputies. In this manner we protest against developments in Ukraine. The authorities announced that they will be just and unbiased, but, unfortunately, we observe the persecution of the Party of Regions. Until this issue is addressed, the fraction will not vote on any single item on the agenda.”

Member of the fraction of the Party of Regions Hanna Herman also stated today that her colleague Evgenii Muraev, who introduced the bill about the rescheduling of presidential elections, received threats. Herman also said that people’s deputies have to enter the building of the Verkhovna Rada through the “gauntlet of people wearing camouflage outfits.”

The parliamentary journalists confirm that near the central entrance to the parliament there are indeed people forming the corridor through which people’s deputies have to pass when entering the building.

#10

Interview with Rabbi Yaakov Bleich Shlita, Chief Rabbi of Ukraine

Yeshiva World News, 4 March 2014

On Tuesday afternoon, Rabbi Yaakov Bleich shlita, Chief Rabbi of Ukraine, met privately with Secretary of State John Kerry, who was on a visit to Kiev to probe the political and civil climate in post-Yanukovitch Ukraine. Rabbi Bleich and Sec. Kerry discussed issues of interest to the Ukrainian nation and the large and vibrant Ukrainian Jewish community that has been hit hard by the anarchy and lawlessness that resulted due to the demonstrations and riots that prevailed for months before Yanukovitch's ouster.

YWN had the chance to speak with Rabbi Bleich about Kerry's visit and the challenges the Jewish community is facing.

Q: Has the tension in Ukraine quieted down since Yanukovitch left?

A: I would say the situation in Ukraine right now is hopeful, but not yet stable. On the one hand, the active violence has stopped and the revolution has ended. People feel optimistic and are hopeful for a better future. On the other hand, although the situation is no longer critical, the situation cannot be called stable. There is still quite a bit of anarchy as everything is still being slowly worked out.

People are hopeful because the revolution is over, but a new problem has arisen that has people very nervous and upset. Russia's seizure of Crimea, in southern Ukraine, is seen by Ukrainians as an unlawful attack on Ukrainian sovereignty. It is a power-play by Russia to retain their influence in the area after Yanukovitch's departure. The Ukrainian people see this as a threat to Ukrainian unity and are concerned that Russia won't stop there and will try to occupy even more Ukrainian land.

Q: Who is leading Ukraine now?

A: Alexander Turchinov, a former opposition leader, is serving as Interim President.

Q: Is there any chance Yanukovitch might try to return?

A: No. He is gone and history.

Q: How does this relate to the Jewish community? Is the danger they were facing over?

A: Unfortunately, the danger is definitely not over. The anarchy that enveloped the country during the demonstrations, when police had their hands tied trying to deal with protestors, led to a state of lawlessness and chaos. Anti-Semites who previously were maintaining a low profile came out of the woodworks and used this vacuum of the rule of law to attack Jews and Jewish institutions. Jews were followed in the streets menacingly and, in the two worst cases, stabbed and beaten viciously. Now that the revolution is over, there is a hope that things can go back to normal. However, as I said, there is still quite a bit of anarchy in the streets of Ukraine and the danger still is very real. For now, at least until we see how things develop, we still very much need all of the extra security we hired to protect our community. People are still afraid to walk the streets, especially at night, and they still need protection.

Jewish life in Ukraine is continuing. The yeshivos, kollelim, schools, kiruv center, and community center are all operating and the people are living their lives as undisturbed as possible. They are all hopeful that things will return to normal soon and the community will continue to grow and thrive. However, it cannot be said that everything has stabilized and returned to the way they were before the revolution started.

Boruch Hashem, there have been no attacks since the revolution ended and we all are hoping that the worst is over. But we know that things can change very quickly and we still need to be vigilant and to keep in place the protective measures we have taken. The private security we have hired costs us \$1,000 a day and we still need it. We still need the generous support of Yidden around the world to help cover this huge expense.

Q: What did the Rov discuss with Sec. Kerry?

A: Amongst other things I told him that the Jewish community is united with Ukrainian society in their wish to keep a single united Ukraine. We all feel it is crucial to keep Ukraine together and the Russian troops must leave Crimea. I told him that at this time it is very important for us to have help and support from the United States and from the international community. I also asked him to work to move the G-7 Summit from Sochi, Russia, to Kiev.

Q: What will moving the G-7 accomplish?

A: It will be a statement to Russia and to the world that world leaders support a united Ukraine and it will be an encouragement for the Ukrainian people.

Q: Was Kerry receptive to your message?

A: Yes. He was very supportive and interested in helping the Ukrainian people.

#11

Austria arrests Ukraine oligarch Dmitry Firtash at US request

Roman Olearchyk in Kiev and James Shotter in Zurich
Financial Times, 13 March 2013

Austria has arrested the Russia-linked Ukrainian oligarch Dmitry Firtash at the request of the US, a move seen in Kiev as Washington putting pressure on Vladimir Putin over Moscow's intervention in Crimea.

Mario Hejl, spokesman for Austria's investigation bureau, said: "On the basis of years-long investigations by the American FBI and an arrest warrant of the US federal court, the state prosecutor of Vienna issued a national arrest warrant against the businessman."

The arrest took place on Wednesday without incident and Mr Firtash, 48, is being held in the Austrian capital.

Austrian officials said that Mr Firtash had been the subject of an FBI investigation since 2006.

Mr Firtash's Group DF holding company described his arrest as a "misunderstanding" that should be "resolved in the very near term". The group claimed that Mr Firtash's arrest "was not connected with the situation in Ukraine, or the Group's activity in Europe and America, but involved an investment project from 2006".

In Kiev, news of Mr Firtash's arrest was seen as an attempt by US officials to put pressure on Mr Putin by warning him that his circle of oligarchs and business allies would face sanctions and investigation if he did not pull Russia's army troops out of Ukraine's Crimean peninsula and refrain from attempts to annex it.

Timothy Ash, analyst at Standard Bank, in a note to investors said the arrest was

“an absolutely seismic development on so many different levels”.

“Firtash . . . had close ties to Russia via the energy sector, and perhaps even to Putin,” he wrote. “Firtash’s Ostchem [chemical] company enjoyed a big gas discount from Gazprom even when [Ukraine’s state gas company] Naftogas was still paying top dollar so had a very ‘special’ relationship.”

“I think this sends a strong message to former Soviet Union oligarchs that . . . if they are to do business in/with the west they need to comply with some basic western values. I also think it sends a strong message to Russia that the west is willing to go down the financial sanctions route – unless it backtracks over Crimea and over broader policy towards Ukraine,” Mr Ash added.

Mr Firtash’s principal business assets are mostly based in Ukraine and owned through offshore entities in Vienna, Switzerland and other jurisdictions. But he has had a prominent presence in the UK for years, organising a Ukraine festival in central London last year, owning luxury property in the country and employing the likes of Lord Oxford – himself a great-grandson of former UK prime minister Herbert Asquith and a former MI6 agent – as a top executive in his Group DF holding company.

Through Group DF, Mr Firtash controls much of Ukraine’s chemical industry, whose margins are heavily dependent on competitively priced Russian natural gas. He is also a major player in the country’s natural gas market and co-owns popular Ukrainian television channels.

Mr Firtash, as a former co-owner along with Gazprom of Swissregistered RosUkrEnergo, controlled gas supplies to Ukraine and a substantial share of exports to European markets.

His close associates held high-level positions in the government of toppled Ukrainian president Viktor Yanukovich, including former energy minister Yuriy Boyko and former presidential chief of staff Serhiy Lyovochkin.

According to multiple sources, Mr Firtash had joint business interests with Russian billionaire Arkady Rotenberg, reportedly Mr Putin’s close friend and judo sparring partner.

Although Mr Firtash was not on a list of EU sanctions targets issued last week, EU diplomats said they have been working to expand the list beyond the original 18, which included Mr Yankukovich, his son, and other close associates.

Additional reporting by John Aglionby in London and Peter Spiegel in Brussels

#12

From: Timothy Ash (STANDARD BANK PLC) <tash2@bloomberg.net>

Date: Tue, Mar 11, 2014 at 7:05 PM

Subject: Ukraine - update, March 11, 2014

There continues to be lots going on in Ukraine, so I thought it useful just to provide a quick summary of the main events over the past 24H or so.

First, there has not been much evidence of compromise from any of the main protagonists.

Russia seems intent on pressing ahead with the referendum over the future of Crimea due for

March 16 – suggesting today that it will accept the result which, according to its spin will be in line with international law. Not sure which bit of international law that will comply with though given the short election campaign – not much more than a week, and the presence of armed troops on the streets. The EU has threatened they will impose sanctions if the vote goes ahead and if Russia then moves to annex Crimea – with a deadline set for the EU decision on sanctions for March 17. Ukraine has been running live fire exercises across its border (my tanks are better than yours) and is talking about forging new military units to defend the country, and asking oligarchs to contribute to arming/equipping the Ukrainian military. Interestingly, most oligarchs seem to be rallying to the independence cause, as Russian actions appear counterproductive. The US and Russia are not really talking on the same plain, with Russia's apparent offer of a compromise deal – the return to international agreements, seemingly dependent on its interests being taken into account in the formation of a government in Kyiv, which basically means the formation of a coalition government – the latter will not be acceptable to Kyiv at this stage.

Second, EC officials have signalled that the political aspects of the AA/DCFTA could be signed by March 21, i.e. those concerning general principals, political cooperation, and common foreign and security policy – not sure what "security" really means in the EU context though. Interestingly the full DCFTA is now only to be signed by November. The line here is that Ukraine will be given immediate access to some of the benefits in terms of lower import tariffs into the EU (aside from agriculture) which might bring a net gain of just under EUR500m, but the full implementation of the tariff regime (e.g. on imports into Ukraine) will be delayed for six months to fend off the risk of countermeasures from Russia, i.e. trade sanctions. The line seems to be to nuance the DCFTA so as not to create too much disruption to the Ukrainian economy. That said, the message still needs to be reinforced to Russia and the Ukrainian population perhaps that the EU is not going soft/responding to Russian pressure, and losing its appetite for the AA/DCFTA which after all was the spark which set off the Maidan demos.

Third, the last few days has produced various Western promises of financial support for Ukraine, with the EU suggesting EUR11bn of European assistance, the World Bank USD3bn, and then a USD1bn US loan guarantee package. It remains a little unclear still what the IMF itself will come up with, but my sense is not much more than USD10bn at this stage. Dissecting the various bits of finance on offer, the European pledge is a bit of smoke and mirrors frankly, as EUR5bn and EUR3bn of the funds committed reflect EBRD and EIB monies pledged for the period to 2020, so just over EUR1bn per year. This leaves perhaps EUR1.6bn in firm EU commitments of funds, linked to an IMF programme for 2014, and then perhaps some more medium to longer term funding. The World Bank support appears to be committed just for 2014, so relatively speedy disbursement, which is positive and I sense the WB might be relatively flexible. But still USD1bn from the US, EUR1.6bn from the EU, and USD3bn from the WB only gets me to USD6.1bn in non-IMF money. I am not sure what the IMF might bring to the table, but I don't sense they are exactly flush these days, but a USD10bn IMF programme, might take the total financing to USD15-16bn, perhaps as much as USD20bn. That is not an overly large programme, given the size of the problem/hole in Ukraine's financing – USD10bn in sovereign principal repayments to cover this year, and a big step up in 2015 thanks to some extent to that very funky USD3bn Russian Bail Bond. My sense is that a USD15-20bn official support programme – taking away all the froth with the EU monies – is not going to rock the market much, hence I guess all the focus on PSI, with the message that private creditors need also to step up to the plate.

Fourth, one very interesting twist in all this is Russia's plans now to come to market with a new Eurobond issue, presumably in dollars. This is part of their USD7-8bn annual borrowing programme. I guess the timing is very notable, as it won't be cheap for the MOF given all the noise around Ukraine and sanctions on Russia, but this would seem to be a counter move by Moscow to say to the US administration, try and cut our market access if you dare. If the sovereign issues, I guess this will create a benchmark/bridgehead for Russian corporate/banks who will be mindful of the need to cover around USD150bn in short term debts which fall due over the next year.

Fifth, PM Yatseniuk is due in the US tomorrow, and I expect him to get a rousing reception from all sides of the House - I assume the Russians don't come with a big new issue on that day, surely that would be rubbing it in.

#13

Putin ally warns on cost of sanctions

By Courtney Weaver, Jack Farchy and Catherine Belton in Moscow
Financial Times, 13 March 2014

Russia's respected former finance minister has delivered a stark warning that the country could soon face capital outflows as high as \$50bn a quarter and no economic growth, should western countries press forward with proposed sanctions against Moscow.

Alexei Kudrin, a member of Vladimir Putin's economic council and longtime ally of the president, said western banks had already begun to cap their credit limits for Russia and stall on planned loans against the backdrop of Moscow and the west's stand-off over Ukraine.

He cautioned that Russian banks could soon be banned from doing any transactions with US or EU lenders, a move that he said would drive additional capital outflows of up to \$50bn. Net outflows reached \$16.5bn in the fourth quarter last year. It could also slash 2014 gross domestic product growth to 0 per cent, compared with the economy ministry's 2.5 per cent forecast.

"A lot of credit limits won't be continued and certain joint projects will be stopped, that's already begun . . . Companies are becoming more cautious waiting to see whether there will be new, harsher sanctions," said Mr Kudrin, who served as Russia's finance minister from 2000 to 2011.

Bankers said half a dozen live deals to fund some of Russia's biggest companies were in limbo as lenders waited to see how punitive western sanctions would be how the Kremlin might choose to retaliate.

Companies including state lender VEB, billionaire Alisher Usmanov's Metalloinvest and oligarch Mikhail Fridman's VimpelCom, are in discussions about raising new loans, the bankers said, but added that any deal would not be priced until next week at the earliest, if at all, once all parties had a clearer idea of potential sanctions and the situation in Crimea.

"They're all waiting for Monday," said an executive at one of the Russian companies in funding talks. "On Monday they will see good or bad news [on sanctions] and make a decision."

Russia's stock market has tumbled 13.6 per cent since March 3, while its two biggest state banks Sberbank and VTB have fallen 23.4 per cent and 24.7 per cent respectively.

The stocks are two of Russia's most well-traded blue-chips and are seen as proxies for the country's overall economy. However, there have also been fears that Russia's state banks could be targeted under sanctions, dealing a potentially massive blow to the two biggest, which have billions of dollars in outstanding loans and credit lines, and to the overall Russian economy as a result.

A senior executive at one of the state banks said the bank had been holding nonstop meetings over the past few days and preparing for all possible scenarios. "We are doing everything to prepare for the worst but hoping for the best," the executive said.

Should western banks be blocked from proceeding with syndicate deals for Russian companies, the state banks would likely pick up the burden, perhaps with help from capital injections from the state, the executive said.

Bankers said they were already reporting an increase in margin calls, as many of Russia's richest

businessmen use their shareholdings as collateral.

“It is also starting to look pretty difficult for a lot of really pretty leveraged individuals, who will need access to global capital markets,” one western banker said. “On a personal basis a lot of them have got shares pledged as collateral for personal loans, so if the stock market takes a beating, that could be very difficult for them.”

#14

Russia’s Move Into Ukraine Said to Be Born in Shadows

by Steven Lee Myers

New York Times, 7 March 2014

MOSCOW — The day after he returned from the Winter Olympics, President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia gathered the 12 members of his national security council for a crisis meeting to manage a political implosion in Ukraine that, by all accounts, had surprised Russia’s political and military elite and, above all, infuriated Mr. Putin himself.

One prominent member of the council, Valentina I. Matviyenko, chairwoman of the upper house of Parliament, emerged from the meeting declaring that it was impossible that Russia would invade Crimea, yet a couple of days later Russian troops were streaming into the peninsula.

When Mr. Putin made his first public remarks on the crisis on Tuesday, he said that Russia would not support Crimea’s efforts to secede. On Friday, the Kremlin allowed a mass pro-secession rally in Red Square while senior lawmakers loyal to Mr. Putin welcomed a delegation from Crimea and pledged support to make it a new province of the Russian Federation.

An examination of the seismic events that set off the most threatening East-West confrontation since the Cold War era, based on Mr. Putin’s public remarks and interviews with officials, diplomats and analysts here, suggests that the Kremlin’s strategy emerged haphazardly, even misleadingly, over a tense and momentous week, as an emotional Mr. Putin acted out of what the officials described as a deep sense of betrayal and grievance, especially toward the United States and Europe.

Some of those decisions, particularly the one to invade Crimea, then took on a life of their own, analysts said, unleashing a wave of nationalistic fervor for the peninsula’s reunification with Russia that the Kremlin has so far proved unwilling, or perhaps unable, to tamp down.

The decision to invade Crimea, the officials and analysts said, was made not by the national security council but in secret among a smaller and shrinking circle of Mr. Putin’s closest and most trusted aides. The group excluded senior officials from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs or the cadre of comparatively liberal advisers who might have foreseen the economic impact and potential consequences of American and European sanctions.

“It seems the whole logic here is almost entirely the product of one particular mind,” said Fyodor Lukyanov, a Russian analyst and editor of the quarterly journal *Russia in Global Affairs*.

Some of Russia’s plans were clearly years in the making, including one to sever Crimea from Ukraine through Moscow’s political support for sovereignty and even reunification. Nevertheless, Mr. Putin’s strategy in the last two weeks has appeared ad hoc, influenced by events not always in his control.

“We shouldn’t assume there was a grand plan,” said Mark Galeotti, an expert on Russia’s security forces from New York University who is in Moscow and regularly meets with security officials. “They seem to be making things up as they go along.”

Mr. Putin's decisions since the crisis began reflect instincts, political skills and emotions that have characterized his 14 years as Russia's paramount leader, including a penchant for secrecy, loyalty and respect, for him and for Russia. They also suggest a deepening frustration with other world leaders that has left him impervious to threats of sanctions or international isolation, such that he shrugged off threats by members of the Group of 8 countries to boycott this year's summit meeting in Sochi, Russia.

Because of Mr. Putin's centralized authority, Russia's policies and actions in moments of crisis can appear confused or hesitant until Mr. Putin himself decides on a course of action. That was the case in the days when violence erupted in Kiev, Ukraine's capital, prompting a frantic effort by the Europeans to mediate a compromise. Mr. Putin, perhaps preoccupied with the Olympics, did not send a representative to those talks until the agreement was ready to be initialed.

Dmitri Trenin, the director of the Moscow Carnegie Center, said that Russia's role in Ukraine's upheaval was "very passive" up until the moment that the government of President Viktor F. Yanukovich collapsed. This was true, he said, despite the Kremlin's wariness about any new Ukrainian trade agreement with the European Union and its pledge in December to provide a \$15 billion package of assistance to shore up the country's faltering finances. Jolted by the government's collapse, Mr. Trenin said, the Kremlin "sprang into action almost immediately."

He and other officials and analysts said that Mr. Putin's reaction stemmed from the collapse of the agreement on the night of Feb. 21. Mr. Putin, by his own account at a news conference on Tuesday, warned Mr. Yanukovich not to withdraw the government's security forces from Kiev, one of the demands of the agreement being negotiated.

"'You will have anarchy,' " Mr. Putin said he told him. " 'There will be chaos in the capital. Have pity on the people.' But he did it anyway. And as soon as he did it, his office and that of the government were seized, and the chaos I warned him about erupted, and it continues to this day."

By then, however, Mr. Yanukovich had already lost the support of his party, whose members joined others in Parliament in ordering the security services off the barricades that they had maintained around government buildings in Kiev. Mr. Yanukovich, fearful because of reports of armed protesters heading to Kiev from western Ukraine, packed up documents from his presidential residence and fled in the early hours of the next morning. That night Mr. Putin was still assuring President Obama in a telephone call that he would work to resolve the crisis.

By the next day, however, Ukraine's Parliament had stripped Mr. Yanukovich of his powers, voted to release the opposition leader Yulia V. Tymoshenko from prison and scheduled new presidential elections. Russia's initial response was muted, but officials have since said that Mr. Putin fumed that the Europeans who had mediated the agreement did nothing to enforce it. Mr. Putin and other officials began describing the new leaders as reactionaries and even fascists that Russia could not accept in power.

"It was probably not just thought of today," Aleksei A. Chesnakov, a political strategist and former Kremlin aide, said of Mr. Putin's move in Crimea, "but the trigger came when it was clear that the authorities in Ukraine were not able to return to the compromise of the 21st."

Two days later Mr. Putin attended the closing ceremony of an Olympics that he hoped would be a showcase of Russia's revival as a modern, powerful nation. He then ordered the swift, furtive seizure of a region that has loomed large in Russia's history since Catherine the Great's conquest. The decision to order in Russian forces appears to have occurred late Tuesday or early Wednesday among a smaller circle of Mr. Putin's advisers.

The group, the officials and analysts said, included Sergei B. Ivanov, Mr. Putin's chief of staff; Nikolai P. Patrushev, the secretary of the security council; and Aleksandr V. Bortnikov, the director of the Federal Security Service. All are veterans of the K.G.B., specifically colleagues of

Mr. Putin's when he served in the organization in Leningrad, now St. Petersburg, during the 1970s and '80s.

The exclusions of other advisers, the analysts and officials said, underscored his increasing conservatism since he returned to the presidency in 2012 after a stint as prime minister and faced not only popular protests but also mounting criticism from the United States and Europe of the country's record on political and human rights. "He has bit by bit winnowed out the people who challenged his worldview," Mr. Galeotti said.

Neither Mr. Putin nor any other official has acknowledged ordering an armed incursion in Crimea, though Mr. Putin in his news conference said that he had bolstered security at the bases of the Black Sea Fleet, which has its headquarters in Sevastopol.

The deployment of the Russian forces — which the Ukrainian government has said ranged from 6,000 to 15,000 troops — remains a covert operation, the officials and analysts said, to sidestep international law and the need for approval by the United Nations Security Council, something that Mr. Putin and others have repeatedly insisted was necessary for any military operations against another country.

"It's a traditional thing — to deny the obvious," said Andrei Soldatov, a journalist and the author, with Irina Borogan, of a book on Russia's intelligence services called "The New Nobility."

As long ago as 2008, when NATO leaders met in Bucharest to consider whether to invite Ukraine to begin moving toward membership, Mr. Putin bluntly warned that such membership would be unacceptable to Russia, presaging the strategy that appears to be unfolding now.

According to a diplomatic cable published by WikiLeaks, Mr. Putin even questioned the legality of the Soviet Union's transfer of the region to the authority of what was then the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic in 1954. "If we add in the NATO question and other problems, the very existence of the state could find itself under threat," Mr. Putin said, according to the cable, written by Kurt Volker, the American ambassador to NATO at the time.

The question now is how far Mr. Putin intends to go. Sergei A. Markov, a political strategist who advises the Kremlin, said it was not yet clear. "He is improvising," he explained.

#15

SBU Detains a Russian Saboteur in Donetsk

Kyiv Post, 11 March 2014

Ukraine's Security Service detained a Russian saboteur in Donetsk Oblast on March 10, said SBU Chief Valentyn Nalyvaichenko. The suspect is accused of preparing explosions and orchestrating other acts of diversion, said Nalyvaichenko in a statement on March 11. His activity is suspected of serving as a pretext for a wider Russian military invasion of Ukraine beyond Crimea.

The 37-year-old man, who was not identified, carried a Russian passport and was detained jointly by the police and the SBU.

The Russian Embassy in Kyiv did not immediately comment on the detention.

"The danger of the detainee is that he's not just a regular guy, he's a trained, professional saboteur," Nalyvaichenko said. "And this individual walked about the land of miners with explosives and set up diversion groups to prepare explosions in public places where masses of people had gathered."

Nalyvaichenko said the man was a member of a “foreign special service” and has organized a number of extremist groups in eastern Ukraine. He has also allegedly supplied the groups with explosives and weapons.

The SBU said the man has served in Russia's terrorist hot spots, including Dagestan and Ossetia. He carried explosive substances and detonators in his personal belongings, Nalyvaichenko said. SBU started a criminal investigation against the Russian individual for illegal possession of arms and explosives, which can yield a prison sentence of three to five years.

#16

Kernes is Convinced: Kharkiv will Stand for Ukrainian Statehood

Ukrainska pravda, 3 March 2014

[translated by Natalia Stepaniuk for UKL]

The mayor of Kharkiv, Hennadiy Kernes, is convinced that a vast majority of Kharkiv residents will stand for the Ukrainian statehood.

He made this statement in an interview given to Komersant-Ukraine.

“In Kharkiv, people see themselves as citizens of Ukraine. In Eastern Ukraine, Russia is called a brotherly country. Throughout history, we have been tied up by familial and trade relationships, which have been strengthened by Kharkiv’s location on the north-east boarder with Russia.

According to Kernes, “the situation in Crimea is completely different”.

“This is an autonomous republic, which has its own constitution. In Eastern Ukraine, we live and work under the Ukrainian legislation. If we are law-obeying citizens, we will not let emotions dominate and we will not allow our protests to lead to Russia establishing its rule” – said the mayor of Kharkiv.

It is known that previously in Kharkiv the protests in support of EuroMaidan have been suppressed. The cars of Euromaidan activists and participants of AutoMaidan have been set on fire. Yet, before an anticipated visit of then-president Viktor Yanukovich to Kharkiv, revolts in the city grew larger.

Last week, pro-Russian protests have been held in Kharkiv. Among other things, the flag in support of EuroMaidan in front of the Kharkiv regional administration was taken down and replaced by a Russian flag. A Ukrainian flag remain untouched.

“Provocations have been organized both by radicals, who seized the administration and by pro-Russian forces” – stated the mayor of Kharkiv.

“It is not the first time that I come across the situation like that. On February 26, a Russian flag was raised on the flagpole of the administration. I met with the people in charge of this and explained them that it is illegal to mark a city administration building as a territory of another country. I think that people were driven by emotions without giving it a proper thought. The same story happened this time. As soon as emotions calmed down, the Russian flag was removed and the Ukrainian flag was re-established” – added Kernes.

#17

The Czech Republic is afraid to admit Russians so that Putin won't come to defend them

Ukrainska pravda, 3 March 2014

[translated by Nykolai Bilaniuk for UKL]

Czech Foreign Minister Lubomir Zaoralek has asked the EU to halt negotiations with Russia on visa liberalization.

He said this during a meeting of heads of foreign ministers of member states in Brussels, according to Radio Praha.

He said that Ukraine and Russia do not have mutual visa requirements. And today the Russian army invaded Ukraine to defend the Russian-speaking population. In the diplomat's view the same scenario can affect the EU, if Russians are free to move to the EU and live there.

"We heard statements from Sergei Lavrov that Russia is ready to strictly uphold the rights of its citizens anywhere. Given such statements, is it possible to negotiate a visa-free regime? Russia has always been interested in this. But if the resettlement of Russian citizens to other countries poses such a risk, how can we support such an idea?" - said Zaoralek.

As is known, Russian president Vladimir Putin decided to move troops into Crimea to protect the Russian-speaking population of Ukraine.

#18

Paet Says Leaked Call is Real, Disputes Context

Estonian Public Broadcasting, 5 March 2014

Audio of a private conversation between Foreign Minister Urmas Paet and European Commission Vice-President Catherine Ashton has been posted on YouTube today, causing the EU more consternation about phone leaks and a scramble to counter possible misinterpretations.

In a press conference at the Foreign Ministry today, Paet confirmed the leaked recording on YouTube is genuine and the conversation with Ashton took place on February 26, a day after his return from Ukraine.

In the audio, Paet is heard expressing concern to Ashton, the European Commission's High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, that Ukraine's weak interim government could be discredited by enemies due to the leaders' failure to investigate various inconsistencies and some on-the-ground accounts that suggest some snipers shot both police and protesters in the late February violence in Kyiv's Maidan square.

He said there have been altered versions of the recording, aimed at discrediting the new Ukrainian government: "I ask journalists to be extremely cautious with that recording - (in the recording) I was talking about which versions of events were doing rounds in Ukraine."

"I was not making judgements. I was only expressing concern that if the rumors take on a life of their own, it could harm the situation in Ukraine."

Some media reports suggested that the officials themselves believed the snipers might have actually been commissioned in a conspiracy by the newly formed government coalition, a possibility that did not appear to be borne out by the recording.

RT, or Russia Today, a BBC-style news service run by the Kremlin and carried to more than 100 countries, said in its breaking news coverage today that "a leaked phone call reveals the same

snipers were shooting at both police and protestors in Kiev.”

In this particular case, the recording or wiretap sounds like it was made on an EU line, as the music that plays at the start of the recording (played when someone calling the Estonian Foreign Ministry is placed on hold) is not heard when the call is initiated by an Estonian caller.

Paet said he used the ministry’s mobile phone, an iPhone 4, for the call and that he had it with him when he had visited Ukraine.

He added that he was not sure it was his phone that was traced, but he cannot be certain that his other conversations have not been hacked, and also that there is no information on how the recording was leaked.

“It is pointless to assume how the call was leaked. One can only assume why it was posted online a week after it happened, when a new government is in place.”

Paet said he had notified Ashton of the leak, although she probably already is aware of it.

“There will probably be an attempt to use the recording to discredit the new government of Ukraine. I am categorically against that. The crimes that took place in Maidan must be investigated and those responsible must be punished.”

Paet said it is up to other Estonian authorities to decide whether additional security measures are called for in connection with the leak.

The minister said an investigation must be launched into what actually happened and that there are probably many people who want an impartial investigation into the events.

In February, the United States’ top diplomat for European affairs was caught in her own telephone recording kerfuffle. A phone call of Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs Victoria Nuland and the U.S. ambassador to Ukraine caused an international row after the leaked tape, in which after they discussed the merits of different Ukrainian opposition leaders, Nuland exclaimed: “And you know, f-ck the EU.”

The call was published in the Kiev Post, but many U.S. officials fingered Russia for the wiretap.

#19

A Facebook Exchange on the Sniper Controversy

5 March 2014

[regarding the evidence of the audio recording posted on YouTube:
<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZEgJ0oo3OA8>]

Dmitry Gorenburg, Harvard U

Well, not quite evidence. The conversation is about what some oligarch told Paet. I would call it allegations, rather than evidence. Certainly needs to be investigated, though

Monica Eppinger, U of Saint-Louis

Also notable: FM Paet says he was told (by someone who was told) that the snipers shooting at both sides were working for "someone in the new coalition." However, the synopsis on youtube glosses that as, they were working for "leaders of the Maidan." We should be clear that the new coalition includes people who were not leaders of the Maidan. The person making the allegation might have been actually trying to imply that the leaders of the Maidan opened the new coalition too broadly and have inadvertently included the party who employed the snipers. Also to be clear:

I'm not making a truth claim on either side. I'm just urging careful listening and writing about this very serious matter.

Ivan Katchanovski, U of Ottawa

The Estonian FM implies that Olga Bogomolets has told him that all available evidence indicates that the protesters and the policemen were killed by the same snipers. She showed him photos and concluded that there were the same bullets and specific killing "signatures." The Estonian FM then apparently relates her saying that the new government does not want to investigate the killings and that there is stronger and stronger understanding that behind the snipers was not Yanukovich but somebody from the new coalition. Olga Bogomolets led a medical team on Maidan, and she was expected to become a deputy prime-minister in the new government. FM of Estonia reports her conclusions as credible, and both he and the EU foreign affairs chief do not counter these conclusions during their conversation. This is obviously not conclusive. But it is an extremely important since it adds to other reported evidence such as a video of the snipers shooting at both the police and the protesters. In addition to a version of the responsibility of the Yanukovich government or his backers for the massacre, the version of the involvement of some ex-opposition leaders or Pravyi sector in the massacre of the protesters needs also to be considered.

Dmitry Gorenburg

Bogomolets statement in response (from Telegraph live-blog): Olga Bogomolets said she had not told Mr Paet that policemen and protesters had been killed in the same manner. "Myself I saw only protesters. I do not know the type of wounds suffered by military people," she told The Telegraph. "I have no access to those people." But she said she had asked for a full forensic criminal investigation into the deaths that occurred in the Maidan. "No one who just sees the wounds when treating the victims can make a determination about the type of weapons. I hope international experts and Ukrainian investigators will make a determination of what type of weapons, who was involved in the killings and how it was done. I have no data to prove anything. "I was a doctor helping to save people on the square. There were 15 people killed on the first day by snipers. They were shot directly to the heart, brain and arteries. There were more than 40 the next day, 12 of them died in my arms.

"Our nation has to ask the question who were the killers, who asked them to come to Ukraine. We need good answers on the basis of expertise." Mr Paet's assertion that an opposition figure was behind the Maidan massacre was not one she could share. "I think you can only say something like this on the basis of fact," she said. "Its not correct and its not good to do this. It should be based on fact." She said the new government in Kiev had assured her a criminal investigation had begun but that she had not direct contact with it so far. "They told me they have begun a criminal process and if they say that I believe them. The police have not given me any information on it.

(...)

Lucan Way, U of Toronto

Wait a minute: So all we know is that some oligarch reportedly told someone that the shooters were from the opposition. Basically, there is a rumor that there is a rumor. This in a region where people are making sh-t up all the time. What does this tell us at all???

Ivan Katchanovski

This was not a rumor reported by an unknown oligarch but information given by the head of a Maidan medical team, who was expected to become a minister or deputy prime minister in the new government. Today's statement by Olga Bogomolets that she "saw only protesters" and did not "know the type of wounds suffered by military people" contradicts her statement during her recent press conference. She said then that she went along with other doctors from Maidan to

treat 10 internal troops soldiers who were wounded during the clashes near the parliament on February 18. Bogomolets reported that on that day 25 protesters were killed by unknown snipers. Police reported that about dozen policemen were killed on the same day, and many of them were shot by unknown snipers. There is also no information about these snipers, bullets and weapons used, etc.

A video broadcast on that day showed an opposition member of the parliament helping to prevent inspection by the protesters of what appears to be an A-15 rifle with silencer in the trunk of a car. He then drove away along with unknown people in this car with reportedly fake number plates from a street where clashes took place. Today this deputy became appointed the head of the presidential administration with no questions asked about this incident. Since February 18 there was no other public information about this incident. <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZKnk3ldf-P0>

It is stunning that there is such apparent lack of interest by the media and politicians in Ukraine and the West in identifying and prosecuting those unknown snipers and still unknown persons who gave them orders to kill.

Oxana Shevel, Tufts U

Well, her statement is not that inconsistent. In the Telegraph response she makes a medical point that you cannot tell type of weapon from the wound when you are a doc treating it. If this is so, then whether she saw wounds on both sides is irrelevant. In the second interview she says that she walked "with her doctors" to help 10 wounded policemen. She may or may not have examined the wounds herself. All in all, I too see this more as allegations to be examined rather than "evidence." And channel 112 is not exactly credible channel. More questions than answers. Also just noticed that in earlier interview she was talking about going to treat wounded police, and later said she did not see any dead policemen. So there is no inconsistency there either, based on what she said.

Lucan Way

[Replying to Katchanovski] So I am trying to get my head around this. As far as I can tell the most damning part of this is that Bogomolets appears to believe that policemen were shot or injured. Right? The parts about leaders of the new coalition ordering snipers is pure speculation. But I agree that it is obviously worth figuring out whether policemen were shot and why.

Keith Darden, American U, DC

To me, the more interesting part of that conversation was that Paet did not think the shootings were being investigated. You can see why they wouldn't be. So long as one doesn't know who actually ordered the shooting of protesters, you can issue arrest warrants to pretty much anyone in the government for the killings (particularly if you have Svoboda controlling the prosecutor's office). We also aren't likely to see much investigation of who shot the police (or when), since that could implicate members of the new government. One does not need to imagine some master oligarch conspiracy, which is why I thought Paet's commentary on this was kind of naïve.

Lucan Way

Do we know that it is not being investigated?

Keith Darden

We don't know anything. We only know what Paet thought after a couple of days in Kyiv.

(...)

Ivan Katchanovski

[Responding to Way] Various sources, including opposition deputies, reported existence of a video showing a sniper firing first at the special police and then at protesters on Maidan immediately before the decisive escalation of the conflict on February 20. But this video has not been made public like other crucial evidence, such as bullets, trajectories, type of weapons used, types of wounds, etc. There is also an audio recording of apparently the same group of snipers when they shot over Maidan. Special police forces started to flee from Maidan, Verkhovna Rada and other key positions after some of 20 of them were wounded or killed by the snipers on Maidan on February 20. It is still not completely certain whether these snipers acted on the Yanukovich orders or for somebody else, including certain opposition leaders or the far right extremists. Such actions by Yanukovich would seem irrational from a rational choice perspective in contrast to some of those who wanted him overthrown. The passivity of new government in disclosing information and locating and finding the perpetrators of the massacre was confirmed by Maidan activists. The new minister of the interior cryptically suggested a few days ago that the investigation found evidence that a "non-Ukrainian third force" was responsible for the bloodshed but nothing more was disclosed publically.

Lucan Way

Still all seems very sketchy. . . And Yush was passive in finding out who poisoned him -- not to mention that there is now a war on. So anhy supposed passivity doesn't really say much (and would imply a vast conspiracy including most oppo). Even if police were shot (which we have no definitive evidence of right?) -- then it could have been friendly fire. Happens in a lot of conflict situations. I al;so find it odd that none of the crucial evidence has leechd out -- when everything else has leaked out. So some rumors seems worth investigating ... but other than that it is grassy knoll and JFK to me

(...)

#20

Putin's Press Conference Proved Merkel Right: He's Lost His Mind

by Julia Ioffe

New Republic, 4 March 2014

In Sunday's New York Times, Peter Baker reported that German Chancellor Angela Merkel had tried talking some sense into Vladimir Putin. The Russian leader has an affinity for the Germans and Merkel especially: He served in the KGB in East Germany, where Merkel grew up. And yet, nothing:

Chancellor Angela Merkel of Germany told Mr. Obama by telephone on Sunday that after speaking with Mr. Putin she was not sure he was in touch with reality, people briefed on the call said. "In another world," she said.

If you weren't sure of the veracity of that little reportorial nugget, all doubt should've vanished after Putin's press conference today.

Slouching in a fancy chair in front of a dozen reporters, Putin squirmed and rambled. And rambled and rambled. He was a rainbow of emotion: Serious! angry! bemused! flustered! confused! So confused. Victor Yanukovich is still the acting president of Ukraine, but he can't talk to Ukraine because Ukraine has no president. Ukraine needs elections, but you can't have elections because there is already a president. And no elections will be valid given that there is terrorism in the streets of Ukraine. And how are you going to let just anyone run for president? What if some nationalist punk just pops out like a jack-in-the-box? An anti-Semite? Look at how

peaceful the Crimea is, probably thanks to those guys with guns holding it down. Who are they, by the way? Speaking of instability, did you know that the mayor of Dnepropetrovsk is a thief? He cheated "our oligarch, [Chelsea owner Roman] Abramovich" of millions. Just pocketed them! Yanukovich has no political future, I've told him that. He didn't fulfill his obligations as leader of the country.

I've told him that. Mr. Putin, what mistakes did Yanukovich make as president? You know, I can't answer that. Not because I don't know the answer, but because it just wouldn't be right of me to say. Did you know they burned someone alive in Kiev? Just like that? Is that what you call a manifestation of democracy? Mr. Putin, what about the snipers in Kiev who were firing on civilians? Who gave them orders to shoot? Those were provocateurs. Didn't you read the reports? They were open source reports. So I don't know what happened there. It's unclear. But did you see the bullets piercing the shields of the Berkut [special police]. That was obvious. As for who gave the order to shoot, I don't know. Yanukovich didn't give that order. He told me. I only know what Yanukovich told me. And I told him, don't do it. You'll bring chaos to your city. And he did it, and they toppled him. Look at that bacchanalia. The American political technologists they did their work well. And this isn't the first time they've done this in Ukraine, no. Sometimes, I get the feeling that these people...these people in America. They are sitting there, in their laboratory, and doing experiments, like on rats. You're not listening to me. I've already said, that yesterday, I met with three colleagues. Colleagues, you're not listening. It's not that Yanukovich said he's not going to sign the agreement with Europe. What he said was that, based on the content of the agreement, having examined it, he did not like it. We have problems. We have a lot of problems in Russia. But they're not as bad as in Ukraine.

The Secretary of State. Well. The Secretary of State is not the ultimate authority, is he?

And so on, for about an hour. And much of that, by the way, is direct quotes.

Gone was the old Putin, the one who loves these kinds of press events. He'd come a long way from the painfully awkward gray FSB officer on Larry King, a year into his tenure. He had grown to become the master of public speaking, who had turned his churlish, prison-inflected slang to his benefit. A salty guy in utter command of a crowd. That Putin was not the Putin we saw today. Today's Putin was nervous, angry, cornered, and paranoid, periodically illuminated by flashes of his own righteousness. Here was an authoritarian dancing uncomfortably in his new dictator shoes, squirming in his throne.

For the last few years, it has become something like conventional knowledge in Moscow journalistic circles that Putin was no longer getting good information, that he was surrounded by yes-men who created for him a parallel informational universe. "They're beginning to believe their own propaganda," Gleb Pavlovsky told me when I was in Moscow in December. Pavlovsky had been a close advisor to the early Putin, helping him win his first presidential election in 2000. (When, in 2011, Putin decided to return for a third term as president, Pavlovsky declared the old Putin dead.) And still, it wasn't fully vetted information. We were like astronomers, studying refractions of light that reached us from great distances, and used them to draw our conclusions.

Today's performance, though, put all that speculation to rest. Merkel was absolutely right: Putin has lost it. Unfortunately, it makes him that much harder to deal with.

#21

A Historical Catastrophe

by Vitalii Portnikov

Radio Svoboda/svoboda.org, 2 March 2014

[translated by Alisa Zavialova for UKL]

After the repression of the Polish rebellion, Nikolai Alekseevich Nekrasov went to a reception honouring Mikhail Nikolaevich Muravjev-Veshatel (Hanger), and read an ode to the Polish pacificator. As a result, he received letters that said “[You are] a scoundrel!”

So that is the true picture of Russia at “its best”. What can we assume in this particular situation?

The current Russian elite (intelligentsia) may die without even attending Putin’s receptions or reading odes to honour him.

We all understand clearly that there is a Russian intelligentsia and a Russian people who don’t want to have war to the same extent that Ukrainians don’t. There is a Russian intelligentsia that is completely shocked, as much as Ukrainians are. On the other hand, it is clear that there are chauvinists among this intelligentsia and among those who support the actions of Russian leaders. However, the Russian state is the aggressor state and you are its citizens. We cannot take away the responsibility that lies on us for the aggression of the USSR against Afghanistan, against Czechoslovakia, against Hungary or against the Baltic states.

When we as kids came to the Baltic countries we all remember that “cold” attitude of those people towards us. We sincerely sympathized with people from Czechoslovakia and also believed that they were occupied by the Soviet Union but this didn’t change the attitude of its people to us. Many of us were not even from Russia or Russians, but the guilt was still on us.

I believe that we are facing the borderline now. This borderline is actually not the end of Ukraine. On the contrary, it symbolizes the end of Russia. Ukraine is not the same for Russia as Poland, Georgia and even Belorussia. It is an integral part of the Russian soul, of the Russian state and cultural myth. They have been saying for ages that Ukrainians are almost the same as Russians, well, almost. So at this very moment this minute is coming. Now we are literally counting the minutes and hours until there will be a shot right at the soul. A minute when a Russian soldier will kill a Ukrainian soldier; a Russian soldier-aggressor, and a Ukrainian one- simply protecting himself- will kill a Russian soldier-aggressor.

Russia is all finished. Our task after all this is to try to rebuild the dignity of Russia itself and also to restore its myth. This myth will probably never be restored. All those things that were done by Soloviev, Klyuchevsky and other representatives of the Russian intelligentsia in the 19-20th centuries are all completely ruined now. The dignity, thought, might be restored only through the change of the regime. It would be possible to restore the dignity only if there were thousands of hundreds people in the streets in Moscow now. Otherwise, it will take time.

I am trying my best to do everything that depends on me in order to keep at least the leftovers of the dignity in the eyes of my Ukrainian people. I am a citizen of Ukraine, but I was living and working in Russia for a long time. And I feel the personal responsibility on me for not being able to make Russia a state with the rule of law and with a real civil society, but not this kingdom of darkness that we are observing nowadays. This means I wasn’t working hard enough and I couldn’t do something with the moral values of the citizens of Russian Federation. But I at the same time think that there is a personal responsibility on every citizen of Russia. As long as the Ukrainian land is occupied, every single Russian is responsible for that. Every single Russian citizen will be responsible for every victim of Putin’s ambition, for every soldier, for every woman that won’t see her children, for every child that will become a victim of this war, for every abused dignity, for every broken family, for every refugee—this responsibility lies on every citizen of the

Russian Federation—starting with Vladimir Putin and ending with those who came to Manezhnaja Square. Those people at Manezhnaja Square and near the Ministry of Defense are Russian heroes, but those who support and facilitate this war—these are Russia’s enemies. And we need to state this very clearly today.

Does it ever happen that among millions of people there are only several whom you can consider true friends? Yes, it does. After the Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia was over, everyone understood that those several brave people who came to the Red Square in Moscow to protest were the real Russian heroes, and the millions of Soviet Union’s residents were the enemies for themselves as well as for the whole world. Russia is coming back to the same reality today. I don’t know what should be done to fix the current state of events. We understand that Russia is the country that is destined for political, economical and social isolation, no matter what happens next. It excluded itself from the list of civilized countries. The economical consequences of it will be horrifying, the economical consequences will be devastating and the moral consequences we are already able to observe now. This is a historical catastrophe.

#22

**Two-Thirds of Russians View Eastern Ukraine as “Russian Territory,”
the Result of a Massive Propaganda Effort**

by Paul Goble

Windows on Eurasia, 13 March 2014

Two out of every three Russians now consider Eastern Ukraine to be “Russian territory” and back Moscow’s use of force to “defend” the population of that region, the result experts say of an intensive Kremlin-directed propaganda effort rather than long-held views and of the Putin regime’s effective blockage of information sources challenging that line.

Lev Gudkov, the director of the Levada Center, said that the results of the new VTsIOM poll conducted this past week are the direct result of “a two-week long campaign of propaganda and disinformation unprecedented for the entire Soviet period” rather than a reflection of strongly held long-term views.

“All alternative or independent sources of information differing with the official one have been completely blocked,” he continued. Consequently, a majority of Russians are prepared to go along with what the official media say even though 70 percent of those surveyed said they did not entirely understand what is occurring in Ukraine.

The Kremlin’s propaganda effort, Gudkov said, is based on the frequent repetition of “several simple theses,” including the notion that the rights of ethnic Russians and Russian speakers are being compromised, the leaders of the Maidan revolution are “bandits, Nazis and Banderites,” and Ukraine has been in chaos since Viktor Yanukovich was ousted from Kyiv.

The VTsIOM poll confirms that Russians have largely accepted all three of these ideas. Moreover, it shows that 44 percent of Russians believe that the introduction of Russian forces into Crimea will contribute to the stabilization and peaceful resolution of the problems there, and only 21 percent think that it will lead to escalation and bloodshed.

Forty-nine percent of Russians are ready to annex Crimea, with another 30 percent more inclined to support than oppose such a step. Only 12 percent oppose such a move. And 43 percent of Russians favor the separation of Crimea and possibly the eastern regions of Ukraine as a means of resolving the crisis.

The underlying reason for such views, according to the VTsIOM organization is that “a majority of Russians (65 percent) declared that ‘Crimea and Eastern Ukraine are in essence Russian territories and Russia has the right to apply military force for the defense of their population.’”

#23

The Russian intelligentsia is organizing a congress to protest against the Kremlin's politics

Liga.net, 14 March 2014

[translated by Liudmila Morari for UKL]

The representatives of intelligentsia are going to contest the Russian authorities' actions in Ukraine.

Numerous representatives of Russian intelligentsia that disagree with the politics pursued by Kremlin are going to hold a congress in the coming days, in order to express their disagreement. This statement is published on the website of the "Novaya Gazeta".

"Our country has been plunged into a dangerous adventure. Under the slogan "Defend Russians in Crimea, as well as all Ukrainians from the illegitimate fascist Ukrainian government" the de facto annexation of Crimea has already occurred. The international law was flagrantly violated, the primordial principles of European security and stability were destroyed. Russia is rapidly slipping into a new Cold War with the West, the consequences are unpredictable, "- representatives of the intelligentsia claim.

As noted in appeal, all Russian media is "pouring uncontrolled flows of lies and misinformation, in the same time the deafening propaganda is deploying campaign against anyone who tries to doubt the legitimacy of authorities and indicates that their actions have disastrous consequences for country and people."

"All dissenters are indiscriminately called the "fifth column" and "fascists." The dissenters are numerous. It is sufficient to read the uncensored media or multiple judgments in social networks in order to realize that political scientists, economists, people professionally engaged in foreign policy, and just people, endowed with any social sensitivity, are warned that Russia is coming to a real catastrophe - economic, political, humanitarian, "- the appeal claims.

By today, the appeal was signed by such famous people in Russia as the actress Leah Akhedzhakova, the writer Viktor Erofeev, the actor Mikhail Efremov, the rock musician Andrei Makarevich, the writer Grigory Chkhartishvili (Boris Akunin), the film director Eldar Ryazanov and by others.

Just to recall, the Russian Federation Council authorized President Vladimir Putin to send troops in Ukraine on March 1st. The Russian President justified his request claiming that such measures are necessary to protect Russian citizens located in Ukraine. During a press conference, on March 4th in Novo-Ogaryovo, Putin said that there is a possibility to deploy Russian troops in Ukraine, but there is no need.

#24

The crisis in Crimea could lead the world into a second cold war

By Dimitri Trenin

The Guardian (UK), 2 March 2014

Dimitri Trenin is director of the Carnegie Moscow Centre.

This is perhaps the most dangerous point in Europe's history since the end of the cold war. Direct confrontation between Russian and Ukrainian forces will draw in the United States, one way or another. While there is still time, it's extremely important to understand what each party involved is aiming for.

Over the last 10 days, Moscow has been unpleasantly surprised several times. First, when Ukraine's then president, Viktor Yanukovich, halted an operation which would have cleared his opponents from the positions they occupied in central Kiev. Given the clear order, the Berkut riot police were closing in on the Maidan – the protest movement, named after Kiev's Independence Square, whose leaders were desperately calling for a truce, – but suddenly the Berkut advance was stopped. Instead, Yanukovich invited the opposition for negotiations. The second surprise came when the negotiations turned into talks about Yanukovich's concessions, with the participation of three European Union foreign ministers.

The agreement, signed on 21 February, was a delayed capitulation by Yanukovich – who had been seen triumphant only a couple of days earlier. An even bigger surprise was the rejection of these capitulation terms by the radicals, and the opposition supporting Yanukovich's immediate resignation. Finally, the German, Polish and French governments, who had just witnessed the Kiev accord, raised no objection to the just-signed agreement being scrapped within hours. Russia, whose representative had been invited to witness the signing of the 21 February document, but who wisely refused to co-sign it, was incensed. What Moscow saw on 21-22 February was a coup d'état in Kiev. This development led to a fundamental reassessment of Russian policy in Ukraine, and vis-à-vis the West.

Viewing the February revolution in Kiev as a coup engineered by Ukrainian radical nationalists from the west of the country – assisted by Europe and the United States – the Kremlin believed Russia's important interests were directly affected. First, Russian president Vladimir Putin's plans of economic integration in the post-Soviet space would have to do without Ukraine. Second, the fact that radical nationalist components were among the beneficiaries of the Kiev revolution left no doubt about Ukraine's future foreign and security policy and its domestic policies.

The Association Agreement with the EU, whose signature was suspended by Yanukovich in November 2013, would now be signed, putting Ukraine, in principle, on track to long-term integration with the EU. More ominously, the new Ukrainian government would revoke the 2010 law on the country's non-aligned status and seek a Nato Membership Action Plan, or MAP. (It was the issue of MAP which materially contributed to the 2008 war between Russia and Georgia). In domestic terms, the triumph of western Ukrainian nationalists threatened discrimination against the Russian language, including in the largely Russophone eastern and southern regions, and a separation of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church from the Moscow Patriarchate. The new official Ukrainian narrative, it was feared in Moscow, would change from the post-Soviet "Ukraine is not Russia" to something like "Ukraine in opposition to Russia".

Moscow has always been thoughtless, lazy and incoherent in its strategy towards an independent Ukraine. It preferred instead to focus on specific interests: denuclearisation; the Black Sea fleet; gas transit and prices; and the like. During the early days of the present crisis, it remained largely passive. Now, things are changing at breakneck speed. With the delicate balance in the Ukrainian polity and society which had existed since the break-up of the USSR no more, Russia has begun to act, decisively, even rashly. Again, there is hardly a master strategy in sight, but some key elements are becoming evident.

Russia is now seeking to insulate the Crimean peninsula from the rest of Ukraine – to prevent clashes between Kiev's military or police forces or Ukrainian nationalist paramilitary groups, on the one hand, and the locals, on the other, as well as to neutralise the Ukrainian police and military forces permanently deployed in Crimea. Moscow has given political, economic and military support to the local, pro-Russian elements who never accepted Ukraine's ownership of Crimea, which was transferred from Moscow's to Kiev's administration in 1954. Moscow now has two options: a confederacy between Crimea and Ukraine and Crimea's full integration into the Russian Federation (a relevant law is being adjusted to allow this).

With regard to eastern and southern Ukraine, Russia will seek to support those elements who resent western Ukrainian rule in Kiev. Rather than favouring their secession, Moscow is likely to

support Ukraine's decentralisation up to federalisation, which would neutralise the threat of a unified anti-Russian Ukraine within Nato. The effectiveness of Russia's efforts to mobilise opposition to Kiev in the east and south will depend on the levels of wisdom and tolerance by the new authorities in Kiev. In the worst case, a unified Ukraine may not survive.

With regard to Kiev, Moscow has balked at recognising the "coup" which many Russian state-run media and officials call "fascist" or "neo-Nazi" – a reference to the collaboration between western Ukrainian nationalists and Adolf Hitler during the second world war. Russia has not recognised the provisional government and is only maintaining "working contacts" with Ukrainian officials. To poke Kiev in the eye, Russia gave the ousted President Yanukovich personal protection on its own territory, and organised his press conference in the southern city of Rostov-on-Don on Friday. The lack of legitimate authority – the Russians say the Rada, the Ukrainian parliament, is acting under pressure from the Maidan – gives Moscow a freedom to act in "lawless" and "rudderless" Ukraine.

Unlike in 2008 in South Ossetia and Abkhazia, Moscow decided not to wait for the first shot being fired before intervening: prevention, it now evidently believes, is better than counter-attack. As in 2008, however, recognition of a breakaway region by Moscow – this time, Crimea – may become the legal basis for a Russian military presence in the area beyond the terms of the 1997 Russo-Ukrainian treaty governing the status of the Black Sea fleet. This is unlikely to be a passing moment in Russian-western relations.

In Moscow, there is a growing fatigue with the west, with the EU and the United States. Their role in Ukraine is believed to be particularly obnoxious: imposing on Ukraine a choice between the EU and Russia that it could not afford; supporting the opposition against an elected government; turning a blind eye to right-wing radical descendants of wartime Nazi collaborators; siding with the opposition to pressure the government into submission; finally, condoning an unconstitutional regime change. The Kremlin is yet again convinced of the truth of the famous maxim of Alexander III, that Russia has only two friends in the world, its army and its navy. Both now defend its interests in Crimea.

The Crimea crisis will not pass soon. Kiev is unlikely to agree to Crimea's secession, even if backed by clear popular will: this would be discounted because of the "foreign occupation" of the peninsula. The crisis is also expanding to include other players, notably the United States. So far, there has been no military confrontation between Russian and Ukrainian forces, but if they clash, this will not be a repeat of the five-day war in the South Caucasus, as in 2008. The conflict will be longer and bloodier, with security in Europe put at its highest risk in a quarter century.

Even if there is no war, the Crimea crisis is likely to alter fundamentally relations between Russia and the west and lead to changes in the global power balance, with Russia now in open competition with the United States and the European Union in the new eastern Europe. If this happens, a second round of the cold war may ensue as a punishment for leaving many issues unsolved – such as Ukraine's internal cohesion, the special position of Crimea, or the situation of Russian ethnics in the newly independent states; but, above all, leaving unresolved Russia's integration within the Euro-Atlantic community. Russia will no doubt pay a high price for its apparent decision to "defend its own" and "put things right", but others will have to pay their share, too.

#25

Why Violence in 2013-2014 and a Peaceful Resolution during the Orange Revolution?

by Maria Popova

Remarks delivered at the roundtable *Why Ukraine Matters?*
McGill University, Montreal, Canada, 19 February 2014

Maria Popova is Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science at McGill University, Canada.

Viktor Yanukovych now has the dubious distinction of being the only modern head of state to be removed from power *twice* by massive protests (h/t Henry Hale)—at the end of the Orange Revolution in 2004 and during the Euromaidan protests of 2013-2014. The two events had many parallels—tens to hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians gathered on Kyiv's Independence Square, Maidan, a mobilized and strongly supportive Center and West of the country, a skeptical-to-hostile East and South, and a triumvirate of opposition leaders. But there was a tragic and important difference as well. Violence was completely absent during the Orange Revolution, which took 21 days and felt like a mix between a campaign rally and a rock concert. By contrast, over 100 people died and hundreds have been wounded or injured in the run-up to Euromaidan's sudden success on February 21st, 2014. How did it come to this? How did the peaceful demonstrations that started in mid-November over a policy disagreement ultimately give way to violent government change? Why was the Orange Revolution impasse resolved quickly and peacefully, but the 2013-2014 standoff generated a spiral of escalating violence?

Why was the Orange Revolution shorter than the Euromaidan protests?

First, the Orange Revolution had a single focal point-- overturning the results of a fraudulent election. Orange protestors may have had different reasons to be in Maidan-- support for Yushchenko's nationalist agenda, trust in his economic policy competence, discontent with high corruption under Kuchma, or anger at having their votes stolen—but they were clearly united by one overarching demand: recognition of Yushchenko's election victory. The Euromaidan protests, despite the name, did not have the signing of the EU Association Agreement as a single focal point. While Yanukovych's last-minute about-face on Ukraine's geopolitical orientation triggered the protests in late November, very quickly the focus was diluted by other grievances. 10 days into the protests, they no longer had one overarching demand, but, at least three—1) the signing of the European Association Agreement; 2) the resignation of the government; and 3) a stop to police brutality against peaceful protestors. In fact, the third demand was most strongly supported by Maidan participants, according to Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS) polls.

Second, in 2004, there were clear institutional channels for resolving the conflict and a well-defined window of opportunity for pursuing these channels. The election result dispute went to the Supreme Court, which had the legal mandate to resolve it. The window of opportunity was defined by Court procedure—after hearing arguments from both sides, the Court has a statutory-determined time frame, within which it has to deliver a decision. In 2013-2014, by contrast, there was no obvious institutional channel for pushing for the resolution of any of the three main demands of the protestors. In the context of a presidential constitution that concentrates policy making powers in the president and the existence of a legislative majority loyal to the incumbent executive, there were limited institutional levers, through which the opposition could press its demands. To achieve policy reversal or the resignation of the government, the opposition's only option was to attempt to drive a wedge in the parliamentary majority and cause it to split. Popular mobilization is a very blunt tool for pressing this demand, especially when MPs are tied to the president through clientelism and corruption.

Third, in 2004, the lame duck president, Leonid Kuchma, was more willing to compromise. He was finishing his term and leaving office. In 2014, Viktor Yanukovich who, before the protests started, had good chances of winning re-election in 2015, was much less willing to compromise. In 2004, constitutional reform was a compromise solution par excellence, as it provided benefits for both sides. The opposition would receive the presidency, but due to the adoption of constitutional amendments, it would be a much weaker office. There was no such solution available in 2014 and Yanukovich did not budge an inch from his initial position. Several proposals that have been portrayed as compromise are not. The repeal of the Jan 16th laws that introduced significant limitations on the right to protest and the amnesty law that would have allowed the release from jail of hundreds of protestors should not be considered a compromise.

First, with the presidential majority in parliament and the tight executive control of the judiciary, neither of these steps was credibly permanent. In fact, Yanukovich's parliamentary majority started to reintroduce some parts of the 1/16 laws as other amendments in early February. In addition, the courts could have found ways of not implementing the amnesty law. The cabinet's resignation was also not credible compromise in the absence of constitutional changes that could guarantee that the PM is not simply a pawn of the president. The offer of the PM's position to one of the leaders of the opposition, Arseniy Yatsenyuk, was also a meaningless gesture, or even a trap, in the absence of independent courts and constitutional change. Finally, Yanukovich agreed to some meaningful concessions—constitutional reform and early presidential elections only during what turned out to be the last day of his tenure—but when he left Kyiv on February 22nd, he did not sign the constitutional reform package, thus triggering a constitutional crisis.

Why did the Euromaidan protests turn violent?

The first possibility is that, in contrast to the Orange Revolution, which was led by three mainstream, centrist Ukrainian politicians, the 2013-2014 protests were dominated by far-right extremists that carry the bulk of the responsibility for the spiral of violence. The nationalist far-right was largely absent from Maidan in 2004, but in 2013-2014, there were at least three radical nationalist actors-- the parliamentary-represented far-right, nationalist party Svoboda (Freedom), and two social organizations that also promote radical nationalist ideas, Pravyi Sector (Right Sector) and Spilna Sprava (Common Cause). Maybe their presence made violent escalation only a matter of time? In fact, this explanation has received quite a bit of attention recently. The claim that Euromaidan was dominated by the far right seems exaggerated, however. KIIS data shows that in early December, the overwhelming majority of Maidan protestors came on their own initiative (92%) and did not belong either to a party (2%) or to any social organization or movement (6%). This data casts doubt on claims that Svoboda and other far-right organizations were instrumental in bringing people to Maidan. By February, 22% of Maidan-goers stated that they belonged to a "social organization/movement" (i.e. Pravyi Sector, and Spilna Sprava among others).

Thus, even at the height of influence and strength for the far-right on Maidan, it still represented less than a quarter of all protestors. Moreover, the "far-right as instigators of violence" explanation has a chicken and egg problem. There is considerable evidence that far right groups indeed engaged in violent confrontation with riot police. However, it is possible that the rise of the nationalist far right, especially the groups that advocated and engaged in violence starting in January, may have been the result of police brutality (on Nov 30 and Dec 10), the use of extrajudicial killings, kidnappings, and beatings, and the repressive Jan 16 laws.

Throughout December and January, not only the mainstream opposition leaders, but Svoboda's Oleh Tyahnybok as well consistently disavowed violent protests and urged Maidan-goers to remain peaceful and calm even if there were provocations). Notably, violent protests started only on January 19th, after the passage of the January 16th laws. Those laws criminalized or introduced harsh administrative penalties for many peaceful protest activities, such as driving in groups, picketing in front of politicians' residences, defaming politicians, collecting information

about police officers or judges, and distributing vaguely-defined “extremist” materials. The particularly vague participation in “mass disruption” charge would carry a 10-15 year sentence. This brings me to the second, and possibly stronger, explanation of the spiral of violence in 2014.

The increasing politicization of justice under the Yanukovich administration increased the probability of violence both on the part of the regime and on the part of protestors because it significantly decreased the possibility of a credible commitment to compromise for both sides. Even before the first casualties in January, in the absence of an independent judiciary, Yanukovich could not be provided with guarantees that he would not be jailed if he accepted a significant reduction of his presidential power. Maidan activists’ stakes in victory were also raised by the politically subservient judiciary. The weakness of due process meant that virtually anyone who participated in the protests, rather than only those who perpetrated violent acts, could serve a 10-15 year prison sentence for taking part in a “mass disturbance”.

While the Ukrainian judiciary has long been dependent on incumbent politicians, as my previous research has demonstrated, the trend towards the use of the courts to achieve political goals only intensified after Yanukovich won the presidency in 2010. In 2010, Yanukovich used the Constitutional Court to increase his powers by reversing the 2004 constitutional reforms. In 2010-2013, the courts actively prosecuted members of the previous administration for corruption. Not only Yanukovich’s archrival, ex-PM Yuliya Tymoshenko, but 9 other ministers and deputy ministers from her government were prosecuted, convicted, and sentenced to sizable prison sentences. 5 additional ministers fled the country rather than face what they believed to be politicized courts that were fulfilling Yanukovich’s agenda. This was a two-fold increase both in the number of prosecutions and the conviction rate of high-level politicians in comparison to the 2000-2010 period. The use of selective prosecution by the Yanukovich government probably significantly contributed to Yanukovich’s intransigence during the standoff and decision to resort to repression, rather than bona fide negotiations. Given the track record of judicial dependence from the executive, it is hard to imagine a way to provide credible guarantees to Yanukovich that he would not be jailed in the event of losing power, either partially under a parliamentary system or fully after new presidential elections.

The politicization of justice that was at full display once the protests started also contributed to the gradual radicalization of Maidan. In early December dozens of Euromaidan activists were arrested and faced criminal charges. While some may have indeed committed criminal acts, there are reasons to believe that the judicial process was closely controlled by the executive. Initially, *all* activists, who were arrested were remanded to custody for 2 months by the lower courts. Then on December 10th, Yanukovich gave some guarantees to former president Kravchuk, that many of the activists would be freed. The incumbent executive should not be able to make such a promise if the judiciary were an independent institution. Immediately after Yanukovich’s signal, the appellate courts started reversing the lower court custody decisions and releasing activists on bail or to house arrest, thus signaling executive influence over the judicial decision-making process. In January, the number of detained protestors swelled significantly and again virtually all of them were remanded to custody. The only district court where four activists were ordered detained under house arrest, rather than in the overcrowded jails was Obolonsky District Court. On January 23, the chairwoman of that court abruptly resigned. A few days later, a judge from Vinnitsya oblast resigned and gave a press conference, at which he complained of relentless executive pressure on judges and claimed that any judge who stepped out of line could be fired within 4 hours.

The political subservience of the judiciary to the executive increased the likelihood of radicalization on the part of the protestors after the passage of the January 16th laws. Had Ukraine had a powerful and independent Constitutional Court, the opposition could have hoped to quickly gain a reversal of the January 16th laws. Had the ordinary judiciary enjoyed independence from politicians, the vast majority of protestors who did not engage in criminal acts would not feel as vulnerable to arbitrary enforcement of the laws. But as early as mid-December Maidan activists expressed certainty that if the protests did not succeed in dislodging or

significantly weakening Yanukovich, many activists would be prosecuted and would serve lengthy sentences on trumped up charges. Moreover, KIIS survey data shows that throughout the protests, the “cruel repression of protest participants” was the top motivator of Maidan-goers. In addition, throughout the protests often the top demands of Maidan targeted the judiciary—the release of all detained activists (supported by 64-82% of protestors) and the criminal indictment of those involved and responsible for police brutality. Pravyi Sector leader Дмитро Ярош also cited the release of detained activists and the radical reform of the judiciary as two of his organization’s five top goals.

Clearly, the violent escalation of the Euromaidan protest was not inevitable. However, the absence of clear institutional channels for a swift resolution, the increased politicization of the judiciary, and the use of selective justice against protestors, which went hand in hand with the strengthening of the far right segment among the protestors were all contributing factors to the tragic spiral of violence that marked the end of the Yanukovich regime.

#26

History Matters: Russian National Myths and the Ukrainian Crisis

by Frank E. Sysyn [for UKL]

Frank E. Sysyn is Director of the Peter Jacyk Centre for Ukrainian Historical Research at the Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, University of Alberta

In the recent ideological battle over Putin’s intervention in Ukraine, the press office for his close collaborator, the head of the Russian Orthodox Church, Patriarch Kirill, issued a statement to the church’s followers in Ukraine urging them not to resist the Russian incursion. A call from the subordinate acting head of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, Metropolitan Onufrii, had pleaded for the Patriarchate to issue an evenhanded statement in order to avoid conflict between the Ukrainian and Russian peoples. Instead the Russian Patriarchate insisted “The Russian people is a nation divided on its historical territory, which has the right to be reunited in one state entity.” Here we have the essence of Russian historical thinking -- -- Slavophilism, Orthodox unity, and imperial legacies -- that underlies how Putin and much of the Russian elite view Ukraine and Ukrainians.

There is another view. Just before World War I, the dean of Ukrainian historians Mykhailo Hrushevsky noted that the concept that Ukraine has its own history was becoming imbedded in Ukrainians’ national consciousness and that this concept was no longer heretical to foreigners. He also argued that historical continuity should not be measured by *translatio imperii* (transfer of rule) concepts that traced history from medieval Kyiv to later far away Moscow and Petersburg and saw the inhabitants of Old Rus’ as one people. Rather he believed historians should emphasize culture, society, and ethnicity, for him the history of the people or nation. He sought the continuity of old Kyiv in modern Kyiv and the Ukrainian lands. Recent academic discussions have often been critical of writing the history of ethnic groups over centuries and reading nations back into the past. Yet while this skepticism has often been displayed in relation to Ukraine and Ukrainians (indeed, in the 1990s the *Slavic Review*, the major journal in the field had a discussion over “Does Ukraine have a History?”), academics and journalists have been much less critical of Russian myths and claims to legacies.

While most Ukrainians have come to accept Hrushevsky’s vision of the past, the Russian elite clings to a very different viewpoint that many Western commentators accept uncritically. Sometimes this acceptance is explicit, sometimes implicit. New Yorker editor David Remnick, editor of the *New Yorker*, a good journalist and area specialist, engaged recently in the following exchange with Charles Rose on his PBS show: “Russia’s history begins with Kiev, not in Moscow.” Rose: “How is that?” Remnick: “Long story.” While an interview is a hard place to deal with a complicated issue, it would be possible to note that this version of history is contested. Over the past weeks, too many journalists and academics have affirmed the view that Rus’ -- a

vast medieval dynastic confederation led by a Scandinavian dynasty, using a Balkan Slavic language, presided over by churchmen who were mostly Greek, and inhabited by disparate groups of Slavs, Finnic speakers, and Turkic steppe nomads -- was somehow "Russia" and its inhabitants, the "Russian people." Ignored are the views that the Russian people's real cradle was in the area around Moscow centuries later or that the Ukrainians have a differing origin vision for Kiev and the old Rus' confederation and its relation to their nationhood.

A hundred and fifty years ago, French and German historians took up cudgels as to whether the Carolingian Empire was ruled over by Charlemagne or Karl der Grosser, the same figure appropriated to the narratives of both nations. Today arguments for territorial demands, rights over other populations, or spheres of influence based on such hoary discussions would be dismissed out of hand. Yet the works of the much cited social scientists Ernst Gellner or Eric Hobsbawm or Benedict Anderson, the modernists whose writings argue for the relatively recent development of nations shape all scholarly discussions of the field, do not seem to register in much of the popular writing on Russia and Russian visions of the past. I do believe that nations have earlier roots and concepts of nation certainly do as both Azar Gat and Caspar Hirschi have recently argued so persuasively, but one must discuss these questions with care and place them in historical context. Above all, one should apply equal rigor in examining all national myths and manifestations of nationhood.

Commentators who would instantly dismiss a vision of contemporary Europe as Christendom too readily accept some concepts of Orthodox (or Slavic) unity vision for Eastern Europe imbedded in the Russian historical narrative. Clearly Russian narratives of the past must be taken seriously, especially because as Vladimir Putin and Patriarch Kirill demonstrate, such visions of nation, religion, and civilization can motivate in deadly serious ways. They, like Ukrainian historical narratives, should however be exposed to the light of critical historical thought. When academics, statesmen, and journalists readily affirm Russian national myths and claims, they at times cross over into validating Russian infringements on Ukrainian sovereignty and even independence. Certainly then the past is being abused.

#27

Before and after Maidan

by Halyna Mokrushyna

Doctoral Student in Sociology, University of Ottawa

Prepared for the Roundtable

"The Rebellion in Ukraine: Alternative Views",
Chair of Ukrainian Studies, 26 February 2014

[The links to the cited data cannot be provided in an email format –UKL]

Ukraine is on the crossroads of civilizations – this is a popular definition of this country's political, geographical and cultural contours.

In Ukraine two civilizations are facing each other – the Western one, democratic, free and enlightened, is represented by Western Ukraine. Eastern Ukraine embodies Eastern civilization - despotic, submissive and dark, according to the paradigm predominant in Western thinking.

These cultural and political orientations have historically been formed over several centuries – Western Ukrainian, identity is built on Ukrainian nationalism, and oriented towards Europe. In Western Ukraine the national heroes are Stepan Bandera and the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists, who fought against Nazis and Soviets for Ukrainian independence during Second World War. Some Western Ukrainians allied with Nazis during the same war. For Western Ukrainians Soviets are occupiers. The right-wing nationalist political party Svoboda, now a member of the ruling coalition, has its main support in Western Ukraine. It declares that all

Ukrainians live under internal occupation by the criminal party of Party of Regions and communists, and that their mission is to free Ukraine from this occupation.

Eastern Ukraine, where the majority speaks Russian, is oriented towards Russia and has an identity, rooted in Soviet mentality and working class consciousness. In Eastern Ukraine people celebrate a different hero – a Soviet soldier that defeated fascism in the Second World War. For Eastern Ukrainians Soviets are not occupiers, Soviets are their fathers and grandfathers, who won the Second World War, and who built a powerful country. Russians are their cousins and brothers from the Slavic brotherhood.

Of course, this is a symbolical abstraction, two extremes, so to speak. The majority of Ukrainians do not adhere strictly to any of these mythologies, but nevertheless most of the public discussions and political rhetoric within Ukraine and outside of it are based on this dichotomy.

In Ukraine the vast majority of Ukrainians speak Ukrainian and Russian. The monitoring of the dynamics of Ukrainian society, conducted by the Institute of the Sociology of the National Academy of Science of Ukraine, conducted from 1992 to 2013 shows that Ukrainian/Russian bilingualism has always been a social norm in Ukraine and it has been a unifying factor of Ukrainians as a political nation. Moreover, during all 20 years of monitoring the number of supporters of the European Union (and NATO) has never exceeded the number of supporters of close ties with Russia and other countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).

According to the most recent research, the political orientation of Ukrainians looks like this: 51,1% of Ukrainians were in favor of closer ties with Russia and Belarus, while 33,2% were favoring closer ties with Europe. In 2013 we saw an increase in the number of supporters of the European Union – 36,2 %, and decrease in support of joining Russia and Belarus – 48,1%. Most Ukrainians, however, as we see, continue feeling closer to Russia and Belarus, than to Europe.

The same longitudinal research of 1992-2013 by the Institute of Sociology of the Academy of Sciences of Ukraine also found that calls for restricting the use of Russian language do not contribute to the consolidation of Ukraine as a state. Forcing the signing of the Association with the European Union, to the detriment of relations with Russia and other countries of the CIS, poses a risk to social unity of Ukrainian society. It goes without saying that it also entails economic risks.

What unites Ukrainians, are not national belonging or the national Ukrainian state (7,4% and 7,5% respectively), but discontent with current power structure (34.1%) and common hardship of life (33.4%).

This discontent has been growing since Yanukovich, the loser of the Orange Revolution, was elected President of Ukraine. In three years of his presidency he gave away positions, contracts, and money to his closest relatives, including his two sons, and a circle of friends. The Yanukovich family became the richest oligarch group in Ukraine. The population of Ukraine continued sliding into poverty.

Since 2010 we see a significant drop in the trust that Ukrainians have in their power structures: trust in the President drops from 30.8% to 10.9%; trust in the governments drops from 19.6 % to 8.1%; trust in the parliament (Verkhovna Rada) decreases from 13.4% to 4.6%. Over 2/3 of the population believe that the current power does not protect national interests of Ukraine or pretends to protect them. Ukrainians do not trust their President, their government, their police, their judges.

People are dissatisfied with the level of life they lead and they are pessimistic about their future. Moral behavior deteriorates: in pursuing their interests, only 11 percent adhere to moral standards, and 44% are always ready to ignore morality. Despair is on the rise in the Ukrainian society: in the last three years the percentage of Ukrainians who believe that it is hard to live, but they can endure, decreased from 53.4% to 46.8%, while the percentage of those who believe that

they cannot endure anymore has increased from 29.8% to 33.5%. Life became more and more intolerable for Ukrainians.

So what we have is a demoralized society, increasing poverty and mistrust of government. We have two different memories and two different identities within Ukraine. And we have a greedy oligarch in power. We also have the European Union, not very willing to add additional weight on its already shattered economy and on complicated relationships between various members of the Union. And we have two superpowers, vying for spheres of influence – Russia and the United States.

With all the tensions within the Ukrainian society and the fight over geopolitical influence outside Ukraine, Euromaidan was bound to happen. Ukrainians have risen to defend their right to live a decent life, without fear and corruption. And they paid with their lives for that.

I will not retell the story of Euromaidan. We all have followed it closely. We all have mourned the death of Ukrainian citizens, activists of Maidan and of soldiers of the Internal Forces. I just wanted to reflect on how the Ukrainian society will live after this revolution.

Members of the former opposition, who became a ruling coalition, are fighting for positions in the new government and adopting one law after another. Did they forget who brought them to their offices and what is the role of people's deputies in the parliament?

How about the rule of law in Ukraine? Let me remind you about the agreement, signed between the opposition and Yanukovich on February 21, and co-signed by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of France, Germany and Poland. According to this agreement, both sides promised to put an end to violence and to bring back the Constitution of 2004, which restricts the power of the President and transfers it to the Parliament. A presidential election should be called, but no later than in December of 2014. The law on the return of the Constitution of 2004 has to be ratified by the President of Ukraine, Viktor Yanukovich, before it becomes a law.

Yanukovich did not have time to sign the law. Maidan goes to the Verkhovna Rada and blocks all the exits. Deputies are locked inside. A voting marathon begins. Yanukovich is declared dismissed by the new majority in the parliament and a newly elected speaker of the Verkhovna Rada, Turchinov, becomes an acting president. All the key positions in power get new appointees after the vote to dismiss their old occupants: A new power structure takes shape in Ukraine. The West rapidly recognizes the new political leadership of Ukraine and starts talking about immediate financial help for Ukraine, help which it refused to Yanukovich.

The members of the Party of Regions receive threats and are intimidated. During the vote of February 22, when one of the “regionals” tries to leave Verkhovna Rada, he is caught by the rebels, and only the intervention of Vitali Klychko saves him from the righteous anger of the crowd. The same episode happens with Nestor Shufrych – he is caught by the Maidan activists, who are trying to bring him to Maidan, shouting “Hanba!” (“Shame!”). The signer Sviatoslav Vakarchuk and the Self-Defence of Maidan save Shufrych.

Oleh Efremov, the leader of the faction of the Party of Regions in the government, and the head of Luhansk regional administration, upon his return to Luhansk on February 21, 2014 tells the session of the regional and city council that armed “peaceful protesters” have beaten police officers, have broken their legs and shot them.

On February 23 the right radical group “Pravyi Sector”, addressing Russian speaking citizens of Ukraine declares the derussification and decomunization of Ukraine. On February 23, the parliamentary majority votes for the cancellation of the law on Ukrainian language. This law provided the right for national minorities of Ukraine to use their native language in regions (oblasts) where this minority constitutes more than 10 percent of the population.

How do Eastern Ukrainians view it? I will let you guess. Euromaidan did represent the whole of Ukraine, but it was predominantly formed by Western Ukrainians. [A survey, conducted on February 3 by Kyiv International Institute of Sociology jointly with the foundation “Demokratychni initsiatyvy imeni Ilka Kucheriva”, revealed the following: the overwhelming majority of people on Maidan are from outside Kyiv – 88 %, an increase from 81% in December of 7-8, 2013). Residents of Kyiv constitute only 12 %. In this 88% percent 55% are from Western Ukraine (42 % in December), 24 percent from Central Ukraine and 21% from South and East.] When the new regime, riding the wave of popular upheaval/rebellion/revolution, rooted in Western Ukraine, starts by restricting the right of the Russian language, how do Eastern Ukrainians feel? How do members of Party of Regions feel, when they receive threats and are intimidated? How do Eastern Ukrainians feel when the monument to the Soviet Soldier, liberator of Europe, is torn down in Stryi?

How do Russians feel when they see it?

Why, when Yanukovich suggested that trilateral negotiations be held, including Russia, European Union and Ukraine, did the European Union rejected the idea, stating that the Association is strictly between the European Union and Ukraine, and no third party is allowed? Why is the West so eager now to help Ukraine with all possible means? And money is suddenly available?

Why was it so pressing to topple Yanukovich? The next presidential elections in Ukraine, before Euromaidan even began, were scheduled for January 2015. Now we will have them on May 25. Only eight months earlier, and Ukrainians had to pay with human lives for that?

Why did Ukraine have to pay such a high price for the geopolitical games of ambitious politicians, greedy oligarchs and dirty political technologies of super powers?

These are questions that I am asking myself these days. I will leave it to political scientists, criminologists and judges to answer the question of who ignited the flame, which took the lives of tens of Ukrainians. But I am afraid that the wounds that have been inflicted on Ukrainian unity, if it has ever existed, will take a very long time to heal. The lesson that we all should take from it – let us not see an enemy in the other, let us not divide the world in a simplistic dichotomy of “white democracy” and “black communist imperialism”. It is dangerous and it kills. For Ukrainians within Ukraine who are now forming a new government, I would say: “Do not forget about those from the South and the East”. Thank you.

#28

What Does Ukraine’s Euromaidan Teach Us About Protest?

by Olga Onuch and Gwendolyn Sasse

MonkeyCage Blog (Washington Post), 27 February 2014

Last week the Ukrainian protest movement known as EuroMaidan spiraled out of control and descended into violence. On Feb. 18, Berkut (riot police) used severe tactics to repress protesters. The violent storming of the Maidan protest camp in Kiev, left about 90 dead (many under the age of 25) and over 600 injured (from both sides of the barricades, but mostly protesters). Analysts and journalists have struggled to understand the protest cycle as it turned to violence and the rapid succession of events since.

Protests that involve “ordinary” citizens are rare and confusing events, in particular if they last for a long time like the Ukrainian protests that began in November. Protests evolve all the time, and one stage in the process critically shapes the next stage. The issues and events that trigger a protest may not be the same as the ones that sustain a protest movement or make it tip into violence.

The Ukrainian protest cycle since November provides us with important insights into the often misunderstood dynamics of popular mobilization. It follows a number of patterns known from other cases of mobilization, but it also highlights some underexplored aspects and provides important correctives, not least to accounts of protests given by journalists and analysts “in the heat of the moment.” It also breaks with the model of “electoral revolutions” centered on rigged elections in “competitive authoritarian” regimes.

Triggered by now-ousted Ukraine leader Viktor Yanukovich’s decision not to sign an Association Agreement with the European Union, the current protests started with a more intangible conglomerate of popular aspirations rather than a concrete event like an election that can be re-run. As a result, the nature of the demands stayed in flux and coalesced around the dismissal of the president without, however, fusing into a clear political alternative with majority support among the protesters and the political opposition.

Four aspects in particular make the Ukrainian protests interesting for the wider study of protest:

- 1) The profile of the protesters at different stages of the protest cycle (different types of protesters drifting in and out of the protests and the formation of a hard core sustaining the protest but remaining divided in itself with right-wing extremists involved in the violent incidents but not controlling the protests)
- 2) The prolonged disconnect between the protesters and the regime on the one hand and between the protesters and the political opposition in parliament on the other hand
- 3) The occurrence of (small-scale) protests in favor of the EuroMaidan in the most unlikely places for opposition mobilization in eastern cities of Ukraine
- 4) The important but ultimately subsidiary role of external actors in framing and catalyzing events

Political scientist Sidney Tarrow’s work on protest cycles (also known as cycles of contention or waves of collective action) provides a useful framework for understanding the political dynamics surrounding the EuroMaidan. According to Tarrow, the cycle begins with a rapid diffusion of mobilization as existing social movement organizations (SMOs) create political opportunities for “ordinary citizens to join in. This is followed by innovation and expansion in the forms of contention, as well as shifts in the collective action frames and the protest discourse. A further phase sees a coexistence of organized and unorganized civic engagement leading up to a period of heightened interaction between the party in power and the party in opposition. At each stage, the use of violent repertoires by activists or the party in power shifts the rules of the game.

Breaking down the EuroMaidan protest cycle into phases of mobilization and referencing who participated when and how (based on on-site surveys and rapid interviews collected as part of the Ukrainian Protest Project at the University of Oxford and NaUkMa, which was described in a Monkey Cage post in January) allows us to better contextualize the turn to violence.

The EuroMaidan Protest Cycle

Nov. 21-30: creating political opportunities for “ordinary” citizens to join in: Mobilization started on Nov. 21, after Yanukovich announced that he would not sign the Association Agreement with the EU. Between Nov. 21-23 local journalists, activists and students coordinated small protest events in Kiev’s Independence Square (Maidan Nezalezhnosti). Journalists and activists used online social media to inform and motivate citizens, and the #EuroMaidan was created. Yet it was not until political opposition leaders Vitali Klitchko, Arseniy Yatseniuk and Oleh Tiahnybok jointly coordinated a pro-EU march on Nov. 24 in Kiev (on the anniversary of the Great Famine and the Orange Revolution) that “ordinary” citizens joined the protests, which quickly grew to 100,000 to 250,000 people. By now the central demands were “a better way of life” associated with “a European future for Ukraine.” “Ukraine is Europe” became the main slogan. The

protesters split into two groups, one led by nonpartisan SMOs convening in the Maidan and the other led by political opposition groups in Evropeiska Ploshcha (European Square). Smaller but substantial protests took place in regional city centers across central and western Ukraine. The following week the protests shrank in size (2,000 to 35,000 in Kiev). As we see from our survey of protest participants, they were maintained by activists (with experience and networks from 2001 and 2004) and students, with some participation by other groups, such as middle-aged young professionals. The protests remained peaceful, included live concerts, and activists continued to reject partisan attempts at “co-optation.”

Nov. 30 – Jan. 16: shift in collective action frames and protest language: On Nov. 30, a small group of protesters (mostly students and journalists) were brutally beaten in a first raid by Berkut. This assault on unarmed peaceful protesters (including foreign journalists and women), went viral on social media outlets and galvanized the protesters. In rapid interviews protesters said that the protests were “not about Europe anymore,” but about “saving Ukrainian democracy” (Data: Ukrainian Protest Project). On Dec. 1, after a coordinated effort by opposition parties and the Civic Sector SMO, 500,000 to 800,000 people joined the protests in Kiev. Our surveys show that protesters were now made up of a cross-cleavage coalition of citizens. They represented three age groups (under 30, 30 to 55, and 55-plus), at least two religious cleavages (Catholic and Orthodox), and they included large numbers of Russophones (30 percent) and participants who had previously voted for Yanukovich (19 percent) and the Party of Regions (15 to 19 percent) (Data: Ukrainian Protest Project). Large protests were held in all western and central regional city centers, and hundreds of protesters (up to 2,000) gathered in Crimea, Odessa, Kharkiv, Kirovohrad, Sumy, Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk, Zaporizhzhya and Poltava. Regime repression had provided activists with new frames and mobilization tools that facilitated mass mobilization.

From Nov. 30 onwards, activists explained in interviews that they were struggling to control (young male) protesters escalating violent and nationalist rhetoric. Several key leaders of the Civic Sector expressed their concerns about having to collaborate with the extremist Pravyi Sektor (Right Sector) and the right-wing party Svoboda (authors’ interviews with Civic Sector members). These groups began coordinating teams of 100 to 200 armed individuals who walked around the city center wearing hard hats, holding bats and chanting nationalist slogans. Protests continued throughout the next month, with nightly gatherings in city centers. As our survey shows, each violent encounter between protesters and militia made the protests shrink in size, with women dropping out at a faster rate than men (data: Ukrainian Protest Project). In rapid interviews conducted at the end of December, protesters complained that the opposition was unable to achieve anything, and described a sense of growing desperation.

Jan. 16-27: innovation and expansion in the forms of contention: On Jan. 16, the regime and its Party of Regions parliamentarians voted in anti-protest laws that made all protest illegal. Protesters reacted by building barricades in the Maidan. On Jan. 19, the Berkut attacked the protesters at night. Between Jan. 19 and Jan. 24, at least three people died as a direct result of police action, and many were injured. This second wave of repression changed the composition of protest participants: They now included a strong majority of young males, and right-wing groups gained a foothold (authors’ interview with unnamed activist). The expansion to extreme violent repertoires, such as Molotov cocktails and the increasing use of nationalist symbols, marked a sharp break in Ukraine’s protest history from the Soviet dissidents through the transition period. The new forms of contention polarized Ukrainian citizens and encouraged the regime to employ so-called anti-terrorist measures. Radicalized protesters occupied government buildings in Kiev and other cities, including in some eastern regions. Facing increasing internal pressures from Party of Regions financiers, Prime Minister Mykola Azarov stepped down and offered the post to opposition leader Yatseniuk. The opposition declined the offer and demanded that Yanukovich resign. In an attempt to quell the diffusion of protests, the wave of repression subsided. The protests continued; by this time Pravyi Sektor, the Svoboda Samo Oborona (Self-Defense) and retired Afghanistan veterans controlled most of the front lines, leading to a further radicalization in the protest repertoires.

Jan. 27 -Feb. 20: coexistence of organized and unorganized civic engagement: Unhappy with what protesters described as the “opposition leaders’ inability and ineffectiveness to achieve the EuroMaidan’s aims,” the official opposition protest events were combined with autonomous citizen initiatives (see below for a list of Kiev-based Self-Defense Patrol Groups). Throughout the country (mostly in the center-west), citizens coordinated their own peaceful and direct-action protest events (such as defending medical clinics and donating items). Activists complained in interviews that they or the opposition could not control the protest movement. Hard-core protesters explained that they had “nothing left to lose,” and members of the Pravyi Sektor stated that they were “prepared to die as heroes for their country.” The baseline claim uniting all protesters was the removal of Yanukovich from power. When on Feb. 18 Berkut and special operations Alpha militia started another raid on protesters, this time using live ammunition, grenades and snipers, the worst-case scenario of a large-scale “civil war” (pitting the regime against the protesters) seemed inevitable to the activists and protest participants interviewed. The protesters felt that now they were “fighting for the fate [dolya] of their country.”

Feb. 20-22: heightened interaction between the party in power and opposition: The violence triggered two significant developments: the imposition of sanctions by the United States and European Union on individuals tied to the regime followed by an EU-brokered political agreement, and a rapidly increasing number of defections from the regime by oligarchs, Party of Regions parliamentarians and ministers, and the chiefs of the army and police forces. The political agreement of Feb. 21 proved too little too late. The protesters could not accept anything short of the president’s resignation. As the protesters booed the opposition party leaders as they spoke in the Maidan, the leaders of the Pravyi Sektor and Samo Oborona announced that they were giving Yanukovich an ultimatum to resign by 11 a.m. Saturday, Feb. 22. Yanukovich fled the capital before protesters took over the presidential administration and his private residence.

Feb. 22 – ongoing: rule by an uneasy alliance between the opposition and protesters: The direct interaction between the opposition, the protesters and the regime has ended. The whereabouts of Yanukovich are uncertain; the opposition and some defectors dominate parliament, which is trying to assert control over the events; police and security have abandoned their positions; regional elites from the east and south are gathered in Kharkiv talking about autonomy; and protesters remain in Kiev, as well as central and western cities, and have moved to eastern regions to keep up the momentum. Activists have begun investigations into the previous regime and have begun archiving incriminating documents found on Yanukovich’s property. In interviews the current protesters have expressed a sense of dissatisfaction and fear that the opposition in parliament will fail to represent them appropriately.

Conclusion

The Ukrainian protest cycle has followed the general pattern outlined by Sidney Tarrow. But it also points to two important dynamics that are not sufficiently captured by this model: the diversity of the protesters and fluidity with which they join and leave different stages of the protest and the significant disconnect between the protesters as a whole and the political opposition. The former cautions us against singling out any one type of protest actor as a causal force behind the events, while the latter makes it likely that instability and incidents of violence will continue.

#29

Application deadline: March 14, 2014

[Statements of intent can be sent soon and the Jacyk Fellowship will accept applications until next week –DA]

The Petro Jacyk Post-Doctoral Fellowship is available to junior scholars in the social sciences and humanities with a research and teaching focus on contemporary Ukraine. The fellowship is open to recently awarded PhDs (persons holding doctorates for no more than three years at the time of application). The program is advertised internationally and does not have any restrictions

with respect to citizenship. The Fellowship runs for twelve months.

The Petro Jacyk Post-Doctoral Fellowship has both research and teaching components. The successful candidate will spend most of the Fellowship period in residence at CERES. While at CERES, the Fellow is expected to devote her/his time to preparation of his/her dissertation for publication and/or to start a new research project. The Fellow will work closely with an appointed research supervisor and participate in activities of the Petro Jacyk Program for the Study of Ukraine. This will include guest lectures, workshops, and conferences. In addition to research, he/she is expected to teach a one semester course (seminar or lecture) that deals with contemporary Ukraine.

As a rule the fellow will visit Ukraine in the spring or early summer of the fellowship year to conduct research and give two lectures. The Jacyk Program for the Study of Ukraine will cover the cost of travel and some living expenses. We are grateful to the Petro Jacyk Education Foundation for its continuous support of the study of contemporary Ukraine at the University of Toronto.

Inquiries may be sent by e-mail at sveta.funchak@utoronto.ca or by regular mail to Svitlana Funchak, Ukrainian Programs, Centre for European, Russian, and Eurasian Studies, Munk School of Global Affairs, University of Toronto, 1 Devonshire Place, 111N, Toronto, Ontario M5S 3K7, Canada Tel: (416) 946-8113; Fax: (416) 946-8939

For more information and application forms visit
<http://www.utoronto.ca/jacyk/postdoctoral%20fellowship/index.htm>

#30

Sixth International Social Science Summer School in Ukraine

“Embracing the City”

Lviv (Ukraine), 1-8 July 2014

Sponsored by
The Wolodymyr George Danyliw Foundation (Canada)

in partnership with

The Chair of Ukrainian Studies at the University of Ottawa (Canada)
The French Embassy in Ukraine
The Center for Urban History of East Central Europe (Ukraine)
The University of Paris Ouest Nanterre-La Défense (France)
The Franco-Belarusian center for European studies (Belarus)
The Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales [EHES] (France)

The city is man’s most successful attempt to remake the world he lives in more after his heart’s desire. But, if the city is the world which man created, it is the world in which he is henceforth condemned to live. Thus, indirectly, and without any clear sense of the nature of his task, in making the city man has remade himself.

—Robert Park, sociologist

One of the most powerful lenses on the transformative past and present is the city. The region of East and Central Europe, in particular, witnessed dramatic changes in urban space over the last centuries. Industrialization encouraged urban growth from the late 19th century; projects of social engineering, deportation, migration and ethnic cleansing transformed the city in the 20th century; today new movements, communications, and technologies are shaping the 21st century city. The city offers itself as a space for investigation: social construct, material reality, economic unit, national symbol, artistic project, political battlefield, and intellectual idea. Cities everywhere face

the challenge of global change, but cities in East and Central Europe face the past everyday in urban space. Cities in East and Central Europe are often torn “east” and “west,” and between different “posts,” whether socialist, communist, or colonial.

In Ukraine Euromaidan changed the face, the identity, and the meaning of the city of Kyiv for its residents, for Ukrainians, and for the world watching as buildings, streets, and neighborhoods took on new meanings. The emerging civil society and the terrifying urban violence transformed urban space, and urban space also shaped the movement itself. Beyond Maidan, we can theorize more broadly movements of urban mobilization. Today’s map of the city reflects both the historic sea change of the last several months, but also much more: the traces of multiple imperial projects, and a rich interwoven ethnic and religious and linguistic past. Traces of the past exist in close proximity and emerge in new ways in the present; today people both new and old are using the built environment and spaces of the past for a new vision of the future.

The Summer School seeks to embrace the city as a focal point for examining questions of belonging, place, power and the intersection of society and state in urban space. What makes a city? What are the boundaries of the city--and within the city? Who are the stakeholders in building, transforming, managing, and narrating the city? How do urban changes shape and represent changes in society at large? How is the identity of city in the age of branding and rebranding shaped and challenged? How does the city shape urban mobilization and what is the connection between urban space and political change? How do people transform the built environment around them, and how are people, in turn, influenced by buildings, places, and urban space?

Topics of investigation could include:

- *urban mobilization: political protest movements in urban space
- *urban social movements: civil society, media coverage, support and social media in urban space and transforming urban space
- *urban socio-economic development: power, property and politics
- *architecture and the built urban environment: urban renewal, gentrification, preservation and conservation
- *urban planning and development: local, national and international stakeholders
- *the city and national projects: historical legacies in contested places
- *the city as commodity and symbolic space: tourism, mega-events, heritage industry
- *the city as a space of inclusion and exclusion: diversity, conflicts, cohesion between new and old inhabitants
- *borders inside and outside the city: migration, accommodation, belonging
- *reforming the city: activists and activism, neighborhood activism, preservation activism
- *governing the city: managers and city officials, public policies, practices, and their reception among the urban population

The Sixth International Social Science Summer School in Ukraine welcomes proposals that embrace the city from many disciplines in the social sciences and adjacent fields, such as history, sociology, anthropology, political science, economics, architecture, and urban studies. Our regional focus is the former Soviet Union, Central, Eastern and Southeastern Europe. While the primary focus will be on the 20th and 21st centuries, 19th century proposals are welcome.

Format: workshop and fieldwork

The Summer School is interdisciplinary and follows a workshop format. Each participant will present a pre-circulated paper and receive comments from a group of international faculty, as well as from other participants. Participants are expected to contribute actively to discussions and to participate in the extracurricular program. Throughout the week we will include several roundtables, field visits, local interviews and excursions within the region.

Location : Lviv (Ukraine)

The International Social Science Summer School in Ukraine takes place in a different city of

Ukraine every year. Previous schools have been held in Uman (2009), Dnipropetrovsk (2010), Ostroh (2011), Zhytomyr (2012) and Mykolaiv (2013).

Lviv, known also as Lwów, Lemberg and Lvov, offers an ideal location for exploring the city as a space and place where different ideologies, belongings, and visions of futures and pasts intersected on the micro and macro level.

Lviv was a true crossroads between East and West. Founded by a Ruthenian prince in the 13th century, the city belonged to the Polish Lithuanian Commonwealth from 1340-1772, was capital of Austrian Galicia from 1772-1918, second city to Warsaw in independent Poland from 1918, then from 1939 brought into the Soviet fold and part of Soviet Ukraine until 1991, interrupted by one of the most brutal Nazi occupations from 1941-1944. In Lemberg-Lwow-Lviv a panoply of now-famous figures lived and/or studied: historian Adam Ulam and nuclear scientist Stanislaw Ulam, science fiction writer Stanislaw Lem, architects of international human rights Rafael Lemkin and Hersch Lauterpacht, economist Ludwig von Mises, philosopher Martin Buber, poet Zbigniew Herbert, and screen actor Alexander Granach.

World War II transformed the city: only 10% of the pre-1939 population, but most of the city's Habsburg-era built environment, survived the war. Re-narrating and re-allocating urban resources characterized the Soviet period. In the post-Soviet period Lviv has become a site for Ukrainian nationalism, including right-wing nationalism, and displays a complicated desire to embrace and erase its multi-ethnic past. Who belongs in Lviv? How have these multiple, competing, interacting projects shaped the city? What is the future of this city with a past? How does the city's identity shape its role in the future of Ukraine, Europe, and the post-Soviet geopolitical landscape?

Lviv inspires these questions and serves as an ideal place to discuss larger issues of embracing the city in Eastern and Central Europe. Moreover, the Euromaidan movement has shaped not only Kyiv, but also Lviv, as well as other urban spaces throughout Ukraine. While events in Ukraine are still unfolding, the role of the city, urban space, and mobilization deserves attention; Lviv offers a platform and laboratory to discuss the city in all its political, social, economic, and cultural contexts.

Duration

One week, Tuesday 1 July – Tuesday 8 July 2013.

Eligibility

The Summer School is open to PhD students (or students enrolled in a kandidat nauk program) and young researchers (up to six years removed from their PhD or kandidat nauk degree). Proposals strong on theory and empirical research are particularly welcomed. The working language of the Summer School is English. Participants must be comfortable working in English.

Program Costs

There is no program fee. The organizers will cover accommodation, meals, workshops and all excursions. The participants (or their institutions) must pay travel expenses to Lviv. Lviv has an international airport with many European connections, and can also be easily reached by train from Kyiv.

How to apply?

To be considered for the Summer School, candidates must complete an application form (that includes a 500 word project proposal) and add a CV. They can also send an additional written sample, such as a conference paper, a dissertation chapter, or a publication (optional). The application must be sent by e-mail to ukrainesummerschool@gmail.com, by 15 April 2014. The application form can be requested at Ukrainesummerschool@gmail.com or downloaded from the following address:

<http://www.ukrainianstudies.uottawa.ca/pdf/2014%20Summer%20School.pdf>

#31

The Jean Monnet Chair at the Institute of European, Russian, and Eurasian Studies, Carleton University, invites you to a policy workshop on:

Ukraine and Beyond:

Is the EU's Eastern Partnership an effective policy for its neighbours?

Date: March 31, 2014

Time: 8:45 AM – 5:00 PM

Location: Carleton University – Robertson Hall 6th Floor

Room: Senate Room, 608

This workshop provides a timely opportunity to gain a deeper understanding of the background to the current crisis in the Ukraine and its implications for future relations between the EU and its eastern neighbours.

Initiated in May 2009, the Eastern Partnership (EaP) has been the EU's key initiative to develop closer relations with its eastern neighbours (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine). However, following the decision by former Ukrainian president Victor Yanukovich to step back from signing an Association Agreement with the EU late last year, protests against the decision in Ukraine led to removal of Yanukovich, installation of a new pro-Western interim government in Ukraine, and subsequent Russian intervention in Crimea. As events have spun out of control, this has raised new questions about the adequacy of the EU's eastern policy, both toward neighbours like Ukraine and in relation to an increasingly assertive Russia. At the same time, two of the EU's other eastern neighbours (Moldova and Georgia) initialed Association Agreements with the EU in November 2013.

This event is sponsored by The Jean Monnet Chair at Carleton University, in cooperation with the Embassy of the Republic of Poland, the Embassy of the Republic of Lithuania, and the Canada-Europe Transatlantic Dialogue. The Jean Monnet Chair is supported by the EU's Lifelong Learning Programme of the European Commission's Directorate-General for Education and Culture.

The event will feature experts from Europe, Russia, and Canada. A full program will be posted closer to the event on the event webpage.

Registration for this event is required.

For details and registration, go to <http://www.carleton.ca/eurus/cu-events/workshop-eastern-partnership-vilnius-summit/>

For more information, contact Dara Marcus at dara.marcus@carleton.ca

UKL 469, 14 March 2014

Fair Use Notice: MAY CONTAIN COPYRIGHTED MATERIAL THAT IS REDISTRIBUTED FOR PERSONAL, SCHOLARLY USE ONLY. UKL is a single emission e-mail to a limited number of scholars and professionals in the area of Ukrainian studies who have requested receipt of the list for scholarly and educational purposes. UKL is distributed on a completely volunteer basis. The UKL editor believes that the use of copyrighted materials therein constitutes "fair use" of any such material and is governed by appropriate Canadian and International law.

Dominique Arel, Chair of Ukrainian Studies

University of Ottawa
559 King Edward Ave.
Ottawa ON K1N 6N5
CANADA
tel 613 562 5800 ext. 3692
fax 613 562 5351