



THE IMPLEMENTATION OF TRADE
RELATIONS AND INDUSTRY STANDARDS:

THE QATARI NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY & THE AFRICAN MINING VISION

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The Implementation of Trade Relations and Industry Standards:

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the African Mining Vision

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Abstract

Relations between Qatar and sub-Saharan Africa are developing. Qatar is in fact at a critical time: the forthcoming Qatari National Development Strategy has to present and explain the future economic strategy and the measures needed to achieve it, including the complex crucial role Africa may have to realize it. It is argued here that Qatar has to consider partnerships with African stakeholders as mutual learning and mutually beneficial dynamics, revising accordingly its soft power strategy. This paper analyses the critical and renewed role of these relations between Qatar and sub-Saharan Africa, the new trends, and innovative possibilities offered by African stakeholders to Qatari counterparts and vice versa. These reciprocal opportunities go beyond mining and mineral resources, but sound natural resource governance is the starting point for economic diversification and structural transformation, both in Africa and in Qatar.

Key words: mining; economic diversification; Africa; Qatar; development strategies; economic partnerships; innovative collaborations.

Content

1. Introduction	1
2. East-South/South-South Shift	3
3. Focus on Africa: A Critical Part of the Global World	4
4. The African Mining Vision and the Qatar National Development Strategy: Compatible or Complementary Strategies?.....	7
4.1 The African Mining Vision	7
4.2 The Qatar National Development Strategy (QNDS).....	11
5. Can the AMV and the QNDS Manage a Mutually Beneficial Arrangement?	16
6. Conclusion and Policy Recommendations	20
References	24

1. Introduction

Trade relations between Qatar and African countries have greatly changed in recent times from a geographical, sectoral, and strategic point of view. Geographically speaking, the trend preferring North African countries has been replaced by a growing attention towards selected sub-Saharan African countries. From a sectoral perspective, trade flows are not anymore only related to natural resources, but to a variety of services and goods. All these changes are connected in some way to major evolutions in development objectives, priorities, and strategies both in Qatar and in African countries.

This is emphasized and explained in the African Mining Vision (AMV) and in the Qatar National Development Strategy (QNDS). The African Mining Vision (AMV) is a model of multi-level natural resource governance for African Union countries that links mining with structural transformation and economic diversification, long-term sustainable socio-economic development, reducing social and spatial inequalities in and around extractive industries. The Qatar National Development Strategy 2011-2016 (QNDS) is a policy statement meant to explicate the plan outlined in the National Vision 2030 and most importantly to give guidance and timeframe for its implementation in the 2011-2016 period, while preparing for the 2017-2022 implementation framework. The QNDS 2011-2016 remains in fact fundamental to understand Qatar's trade and international relation dynamics with both regional neighboring countries and other partners in Africa, in Europe, or elsewhere. Broadly recounted, in this first national development strategy document, the state thrives for a more stable and secure society, in which the country can be competitive on the longer terms in the international economy. And, as Qatar distinguishes itself from other states in the region, Qatari leaders perceive themselves as playing an 'effective role' from a geopolitical and/or economic perspective within the region and internationally (QGSDP 2011). Through a global governance lens, these two frameworks lay out plans to bring into existence new 'norms, rules, and standards' (Dingwerth and Pattberg 2006) that will ultimately change the economic and social

wellbeing of the societies and the regional and global geopolitical order (made by international relations) through newly formed governance mechanisms¹.

Granted, there is a profound difference between the purposes of the AMV and the QNDS 2011-2016 in their goals and content. The AMV is truly a roadmap set out to govern the management and governance of the extractive industries within African Union member states so that local, national and regional stakeholders can benefit more robustly from the revenues derived from the sector. On the other hand, the QNDS is less of a sectoral plan for governance and more of a voicing of the structural development framework for domestic investment and international affairs. Still, both policy documents present a structure meant to establish new norms, rules and standards that guide and govern political, economic, and social decisions of national and corporate leadership. Therefore, for the purposes of this paper, both texts will be examined from an international relations and governance point of view with the scope of evaluating the potential points of convergence, as well as issues that may arise in economic relationships between Qatar and the stakeholders around Africa's extractive industries. The aim is to conceptualize a means for cooperation and partnership between the two entities.

To achieve its goal, this paper is divided in six sections. After this introduction, the second section presents the East-South and South-South shift in contemporary international relations in which Qatar-Africa are included. The following section showcases the critical role of the African continent in this renewed geopolitical order. The fourth and fifth sections analyze the two frameworks (the African Mining Vision and the Qatar National Development Strategy), emphasizing their compatibility and eventual complementarity. The last section outlines some concluding remarks and consequent policy recommendations for Qatar.

¹ Governance is broadly intended here as an economic mechanism with its related political and geopolitical dimensions.

2. East-South/South-South Shift

The contemporary global world is made of networks and flows (Castells 2000) and an apparent 'global rebalancing' (Nederveen Pieterse 2011) is recently underway. In the post 2008-09 financial crisis period, a shift in from traditional North-South power relations has morphed toward ellipses of power revolving in an East-South (referring to relations between Asian and developing countries), as well as South-South rotation. The past couple of decades have seen the emergence of strong-developing states from the 'global periphery', such as the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) nations. With other acronyms and possible grouping, the BRICS represent a variety of diversified emerging economies, as opposed to the monolithic Triad (North America, Western Europe, and Japan) order of the past (Carroué, 2007). Fareed Zakaria (2008) termed this phenomenon of increasing number and diversification of emerging economies as 'the rise of the rest.' The 'global rebalancing' is in relation to the fallout from the 2007-09 financial crisis in the United States, in which three decades of deregulation of the Western financial institutions and heavy borrowing created a debtor economy fueled by easy credit on the one hand and surpluses in China, in other East Asian nations as well as in oil exporting Gulf States on the other. The financial crisis halted investment and growth from the West, while the emerging economies had been able to capitalize on the situation by investing their liquid capital into hard assets. Over the last half-decade we have been witnessing changes in the geopolitical relations that have been dominant for some-200 years: East-South and South-South have become predominant on the North-South ties going back to the colonial era and even earlier to the imperialism. Despite recent claims about a Great Deceleration (The Economist 2013) of emerging markets, they still fragment the world into more relative and diverse powers and players.

Nederveen Pieterse (2011, p. 26) describes the emerging economies as a "coming of age for the semiperiphery as evident by the radically changing global dynamics." Emerging markets are increasingly making up a larger share of the global GDP; in 1999 that share was 21% and it grew to 36% by 2010². Robert Zollick, former President of the World Bank, has asserted that: "the developing world is becoming a driver of the global economy ... the world economy is rebalancing"

² Estimated by Morgan Stanley, New York Times 10 January 2010, cited in (Nederveen Pieterse 2011).

(ibid, p. 24). There are new sets of relations to consider according to Nederveen Pieterse;

first, the relations within semiperipheral countries between industrial and agro-mineral sectors, between urban and rural populations and between rich and poor; second, relations between the core and semiperiphery, between old and new forces; and third, relations between the semiperiphery and periphery, East-South or South-South relations such as those between China and Africa (Nederveen Pieterse 2011) and additionally, between the Gulf nations and Africa as well.

3. Focus on Africa: A Critical Part of the Global World

The North is struggling to recover from the 2007-9 financial crisis in an epoch characterized by political and economic woes of the BRICS, slowing down their past strong growth and progress and emphasizing their social weaknesses (Esposito, Kapoor, and Mathur 2016). Despite these more recent mixed performances, the emergence of these growing economies has contributed to increase the demand for minerals. Other drivers of this growing global need for minerals are: the general demographic growth at the global level, the improved standards of living (especially expanding urbanization), the new markets open by new or improved technologies, and the opportunities offered by climate change adaptation and mitigation strategies. This quest for minerals (and natural resources in general) puts Africa in a strong geo-political and strategic place. New discoveries and a unique natural resource wealth (by its diversity of precious resources and important endowments in terms of quantities) together with a generally more peaceful situation, decreasing investment risks and raising markets' attractiveness make Africa more appealing. This explains why, throughout the past decade, China has been increasing its presence in Africa and building networks.

China's insatiable demand for metals has led many market observers to believe that metal prices are currently in the early phase of a "super cycle" driven by its industrialization and urbanization. Heap (2005: 1-2) defines a super cycle as a "prolonged (decades or more) trend rise in real commodity prices driven by urbanization and industrialization of a major economy". He contends that there have been two super cycles in the last 150 years: from the late 1800s driven by the United States, and from 1945 to 1975 driven by post-war

reconstruction in Europe and subsequently by the Japanese economic renaissance. (IGS 2011)

In fact, even if China's GDP growth has reached its slowest pace in 2016 since the financial crisis, there are signs of stabilization and, among the BRICS, India still shows strong potential for growth probably more than the others. India-Africa relations also reveal this increasing attention given to Africa in the international relations' chessboard. Beyond the India-Africa Forum Summit, taking place since 2008, India is becoming more present in Africa not only with number of Indian businesses working in the continent, but also with Indian foreign aid given to a number of African countries and set to grow over time (Bhowmick 2011).

Another example of South-South developments was the November 2013 Arab and African Summit. Seventy-one countries and organizations including 34 heads of state and government gathered in Kuwait to discuss a 'common market' between Gulf States and African nations. The theme of the conference was "Partners in Development and Investment" and it had focus on the proposal by the Africa-Arab Economic Forum to create an Arab-African common market that would impact about 1.2 billion people

Some of the rhetoric heard at the summit is positive, yet there were silences as well.

When this theme, (Partners in Development and Investment), is carried out, only then can we achieve sustainable development for the nations of the two regions (Africa and The Gulf). ... We hope the summit achieves the proper utilization of capabilities available to both regions. Both issues of development and investment contain many sub-issues, namely stability and security, and both sides have agreed to discuss these matters. – Shaikh Sabah, Kuwaiti deputy prime minister (Toumi 2013).

A positive outcome of this summit has been Kuwait's \$500 million contribution to the African Guarantee Fund for Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (SMEs), established in 2010 by the African Development Bank (AfDB) and by the Spanish and Danish Governments, for the benefit of African youth. Sheikh Sabah, the Emir of Kuwait, acknowledged at the summit that some African nations are affected by poverty and famine, but assured those in the attendance that: "There are matters

that can be utilized like the continent's geographic location, its cultural diversity and huge natural and human resources"(ibid). Stricken from the agenda by the Emir were issues of 'political peace and security', because he said: "Political issues are on the minds of the whole world ... but there are certain venues to discuss and focus on them" (Toumi, 2013). There has been in fact a special acknowledgement of the issue of immigration since it has been discussed in a closed-door meeting by foreign ministers.

During this summit the Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development (KFAED) signed also loan and grant agreements with several African countries totaling 28.5 million Kuwait dinars and an additional \$1bn USD was pledged to provide low interest loans to African states (Al Jazeera 2013; Toumi 2013).

The Arab-African Initiative, of which the forums are part, has been created in 2006 and was aimed at that time at building capacities for the implementation of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). With the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) replacing the MDGs in 2016, its role seems even more relevant. The fourth Arab-African Summit took place in Malabo, Equatorial Guinea on 23-24 November 2016. This is a sign that the relations between the two regions are currently on good terms and are set to expand. Gulf States are represented diplomatically in many African states. New partnerships are evolving with emerging economic powers from Asia and the Gulf. But, what does this mean for Africa? Will these new relationships continue to enforce the economic patterns of Africa's past colonial experience? The African Mining Vision is an attempt to restructure trade relationships surrounding mineral exports in a way that favors African societies.

4. The African Mining Vision and the Qatar National Development Strategy: Compatible or Complementary Strategies?

4.1 The African Mining Vision

The African Mining Vision

- A knowledge-driven African framework for the mining sector that catalyzes & contributes to the broad-based growth & development of the mining value chain and is fully integrated into a single African market through:
 - Down-stream linkages into mineral beneficiation and manufacturing;
 - Up-stream linkages into mining capital goods, consumables & service industries;
 - Side-stream linkages into infrastructure (power, logistics, communications, water) and skills & technology development (human capital and R&D);
 - Mutually beneficial partnerships between the state, the private sector, civil society, local communities and other stakeholders; and
 - A comprehensive knowledge of its mineral endowment.
- A sustainable and well-governed mining sector that effectively garners and deploys resource rents and that is safe, healthy, gender & ethnically inclusive, environmentally friendly, socially responsible and appreciated by surrounding communities;
- A mining sector that has become a key component of a diversified, vibrant and globally competitive industrializing African economy;
- A mining sector that has helped establish a competitive African infrastructure platform, through the maximization of its propulsive local & regional economic linkages;
- A mining sector that optimizes and husbands Africa's finite mineral resource endowments and that is diversified, incorporating both high value metals and lower value industrial minerals at both commercial and small-scale levels;
- A mining sector that harnesses the potential of artisanal and small-scale mining to stimulate local/national entrepreneurship, improve livelihoods and advance integrated rural social and economic development; and
- A mining sector that is a major player in vibrant and competitive national, regional and continental capital and commodity markets. (IGS 2011)

The African continent is the home of more than fifty states, many of which have economies to some extent still reliant on natural resources despite the efforts and increased awareness. As illustrated above, emerging economies from Asia and the Gulf are focusing their attention to Africa for the purpose of securing the natural resources necessary to sustain the development of their economies. But, what does that mean for Africa?

In a 1976 publication, Africa was said to have become “more reliant, not less, on exports of primary products and raw materials and on imports of finished and semi-finished goods since independence” (Lister, 1976 in Shaw and Grieve 1978). Still in 1985, *Africa in Crisis* (Timberlake 1985) became a famous symbol of denunciation of African environmental destruction due to the misuse of natural resources, of which African leadership and Western stakeholders were deemed responsible. Two decades later, the situation and views have changed (as most conflicts have ended) with sizeable consequences on international relations between African countries and the rest of the world, non African countries being concerned by natural resource extraction. In 2006, for example, the US Council on Foreign Relation published a report with an explicit title: *More than Humanitarianism. A Strategic US Approach toward Africa* (Council on Foreign Relations 2006), explaining that the United States needed to build an international relation strategy with Africa, as the continent was becoming critical not only for security (raising terrorism) and safety (possible pandemics) reasons, but also for its critical resources. This example of an official text confirm how natural resources have recently become instrumental in the relation and attention of Western countries towards their African counterparts.

Today, in many African countries, despite the efforts, raw materials are still mainly exported. In relation to the extractive industries that are so vitally important to the industrialized first and second worlds, African consumption (even if growing in number of contexts) versus production percentages for precious metals are telling of the imbalance between development on the African continent and the wealthier economies where African resources are exported. The disparities between African consumption and production percentages for metals (table 1) utilized in modern technologies are too high and illustrative of the fact that Africa utilizes far less of its own

resources; additionally, it demonstrates the lack of modern technologies being utilized in Africa, pointing to the need for improved capacity development strategies specifically targeting new technologies.

Table 1: African consumption and production of metals.

African percentages (%) of world:	Alumina/Bauxite	Gold	Copper
Consumption	2.0	1.2	1.1
Production	8.0	19.6	7.9

Source: IGS 2011.

At the African Union Summit in 2009, the African Mining Vision was adopted by the heads of state and government from member nations. This followed the 2008 meeting of African Ministers responsible for Mineral Resources Development that called for a plan to better govern the extractive industries. This *Vision* is: “Africa’s own response to tackling the paradox of great mineral wealth existing side by side with pervasive poverty”(African Mining Vision 2013). The Vision is designed to affect governance at the local, national, and regional levels. This framework is designed to integrate mining into development policies that contribute to local development by ensuring that workers and communities experience real benefits from large-scale industrial mining, in addition to the protection of the environment. At the national level, the plan stands to guide contract negotiations between states and multinational mining conglomerates that generate ‘fair resource rents and stipulate local inputs for operations.’ At the regional level, the plan calls for ‘integrating mining into industrial and trade policy’ (Ibid.). In addition, there are measures meant to improve resource productivity in the global value chain. At the policy level governments could:

- Link initiatives on social issues in extraction to operational and resource efficiency improvements;
- Promote the exchange of knowledge, technologies and best practices on how to increase resource productivity in the extraction phase; and

- Set up internationally harmonized labeling and information systems on the (embodied) resource consumption of raw materials and commodities.

At the operational level, industries could:

- Introduce resource efficiency standards in the global extraction activity to capitalize on cost savings through resource efficiency;
- Raise resource productivity in partnerships with actors in artisanal or small-scale mining; and
- Engage in partnerships with raw material suppliers to enhance resource productivity standards. (IGS 2011)

The underlying goal is to utilize Africa's mining wealth to move from [an] 'historic status as an exporter of cheap raw materials to manufacturer and supplier of knowledge-based services. The AMV aims to build economic and social linkages that benefit Africa itself' (Ibid). The African Union nations, through the implementation of the AMV, aim to reinvest some of the wealth generated by extractive industries back into African societies so that through education and secure employment accompanied with cooperation at all levels of governance these societies may grow and strengthen economically and socially in a sustainable manner. African societies have a long history of neglect by rapacious political and economic elites and leaders, both domestic and international, thus, the AMV is an attempt to use minerals to reverse this pattern and lead Africa into the future, where African societies will have the capital and skills necessary to develop themselves and participate as transformer and consumers in the global economy, instead of being only suppliers.

According to *The Economist*, the IMF predicted that four of the world's six fastest-growing economies in 2014 would have been in sub-Saharan Africa and for the first time in living memory inflation would have dipped below the GDP growth rate. Three of the fastest growing economies were post-war nations, South Sudan whose oil exports could lead to a 35% increase in GDP; Sierra Leone was expected to see growth into the teens led by a new iron-ore development, and Chad was supposed to rise as new oilfields expand production. Nigeria, with the continent's largest population at 180 million people, had become the continent's largest economy after overtaking

South Africa (The Economist 2013). In 2015, always according to IMF data,³ three other African states were among the ten highest real GDP growth rate: Ethiopia (5th), where mineral deposits have been discovered, the democratic Republic of Congo (8th) and Côte d'Ivoire (9th) with extensive and diversified natural resource wealth. There is therefore growth in Africa and positive prospects for the future.

Part of the reason why there is optimism for African economic growth is the implementation of new governance schemes bringing together public and private entities (local and foreign) to create sound policies that promote new norms, rules, and laws that protect African interests. One of these governance frameworks is the African Mining Vision and it is meant to be a guide for governments, corporations, and other stakeholders to utilize extractive industries as vehicles for development. As new investors look to Africa for necessary resources, Africa hopes to gain a return that will lead to sustained development.

4.2 The Qatar National Development Strategy (QNDS)

In addition to the BRICS, oil-rich Gulf States are also emerging economic powers that have converted their wealth into influence. The QNDS indicates that Qatar wants to project itself as a regional and global leader in international affairs and recently its leadership has been exerted through its diplomatic and interventionist influence in arenas such as Sudan and Syria (Al Arabiya News 2013; Sudan Tribune 2013), although with a more limited impact in Syria than in Sudan. Qatar is also an emerging economy with the highest per-capita GDP rate in the world at \$102k in 2012 (Menon 2013) despite recent slow down in 2015, also due to volatility of oil prices. As part of the QNDS, the nation is currently divesting its wealth into other industries and sectors beyond its hydrocarbon extraction, storage, and export for the purposes of sustaining its current level of wealth as well as creating more opportunities for its workforce to enter diverse industries. Qatar, along with other Gulf States, is part of the East-South shift mentioned earlier and developing African markets are opportunities for Qatari investment and diversification strategy.

³ <http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2016/01/pdf/text.pdf>

Qatar is trying to maximize its comparative advantage in the hydrocarbon extractive industries, although this does not imply that Qatar is limited to investing in petroleum and natural gas projects in Africa. Additionally, Qatar is seeking opportunities for diversification of investments that will generate wealth, but will also develop networks that can expand the scope of its economy and international relations. Through the plan of diversification, the nation aims to broaden opportunities for its citizens to gain expertise and employment in diverse industries outside the public sector, which is the largest employer in Qatar. Along the lines of support for the diversification of the economy, Qatar has been investing in domestic institutions, including in the education system for the purpose of fostering expertise domestically, internally developing the capabilities and opportunities for its citizens to prosper. The QNDS is centered around the diversification of the economy away from the reliance on domestic hydrocarbons into other industries that have potential for returns on investment as illustrated by the investment strategy of the Qatari Sovereign Wealth Fund (QSWF) over recent years.

The QSWF was established by Emir's decree in 2005 and is managed by the Qatar Investment Authority (QIA) for the purpose of investing the oil and gas surpluses for future generations. According to a KPMG analyst,⁴ the Fund's "prime objective is revenue diversification to minimize Qatar's reliance on energy prices and thereby securing the future prosperity of its people" (Menon 2013). The QIA has been acquiring assets across industries such as hospitality, real estate, financial services, commodities and retail.

Large stakes in household names in financial services such as Credit Suisse, Barclays, Agricultural Bank of China, Banco Santander Brasil, and the London Stock Exchange are as much a part of the QIA's portfolio as Volkswagen, Porsche (*has been sold*), Tiffany, LVMH, Sainsbury's or Harrods. Other well-publicized investments include the QIA's stake in French oil major Total, Royal Dutch Shell, and BAA, the owner of London's Heathrow airport. Its real estate investments include: the historic Le Lido at the Champs Elysees in Paris; the City Center DC in Washington, which is believed to be the largest downtown development currently underway in any US city, and the London Olympic Village (*ibid.*).

⁴ KPMG is an international network specialized in audit, advise and accounting with offices in 155 countries.

Qatar has consequently outlined a *National Development Strategy* to lead the nation into 2030 and regulate foreign investments, while framing and giving coherence to the diversification process. The strategy “builds on a society that promotes justice, benevolence and equality [...] which protects public and personal freedoms, promotes moral and religious values and traditions, and guarantees security, stability and equal opportunities” (QGSDP 2011). This type of language generates optimism about the potential shift in global affairs. If Qatar were to adhere to the essence of the previous statement then it could be reasoned that partnerships within African extractive industries, as well as other markets, could meet the objective of benefiting host societies. By extending this promise of ‘justice and equality’ beyond its borders to its trading partners, Qatar would be projecting a ‘new’ type of capitalism, one that is not a zero-sum, or structurally imbalanced toward those with the greatest amount of capital. This new form of capitalism would be characterized by elements of real and genuine Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR), such as transparency, protection of public goods, access to public goods, and inclusion of multiple stakeholders as opposed to classical capitalism, which holds at its core that capital accumulation is the sole objective and market forces should be free from interference by any regulations.

The QNDS is set upon four pillars that can support the nation today and project its influence into the future. Human development, the first pillar, is meant ‘to enable all of Qatar’s People to sustain a prosperous society.’ In a decade, from 2004 to 2014, the Qatari population grew very rapidly, going from 0.8 million to 2.2 million people (Ministry of Development Planning and Statistics 2015). Although the official national population almost tripled in the last decades, a closer look shows that Qatari nationals are only 12 percent of the total population in 2014, while expatriates make up the remaining 88 percent (against 24 percent and 76 percent in 2004) (Kapiszewski 2006; Ministry of Development Planning and Statistics 2015). The wealth that the nation has accrued through its hydrocarbon industries has great potential to achieve the national goals, but only if human capital is greatly enhanced and if the economic diversification is really achieved. This is what the leadership of the country has understood and displayed in the Strategy. In fact, the GDP per capita annual growth rate has progressively gone down from 36.2 percent in 2000 to a negative score for the first time in 2013 with -2.3 percent (Ministry of Development Planning and

Statistics 2015). The Qatari government has in fact moved toward fulfilling this national promise by investing for the purpose of economic diversification and many facets that feed into such advancement of educational opportunities and institutions, while building institutional capacities (QGSDP 2011).

Social development, the second pillar of the plan, is meant to “maintain a just and caring society based on high moral standards and capable of playing a prominent role in the global partnership for development” (Ibid.). Qatar has a good opportunity to establish itself as a forerunner in the reshaping of global partnerships for development through agreements with African nations and partnerships with the corporations connected to African mining and beyond. This focus on social development in international relations is an example of the East-South shift, where wealthy nations from Asia and the Middle East are investing in ‘global Southern’ nations; in some cases replacing and in others adding to the dynamics of the established, but waning North-South influence-based relationships. These dynamics are evident in the constant and strong increase of Qatari official development assistance in the last decade from both government and non-government stakeholders.

The third pillar focuses on national economic development, “to achieve a competitive and diversified economy capable of meeting the needs of, and securing a high standard of living for, all its people for the present and for the future” (Ibid.). Qatar has proven to be prudent with the management of the rents it has collected through its national hydrocarbon industries. This effort, paired with the benefits of natural resource deposits, has managed to place Qatar in a position of financial and political strength that the nation has until recently exploited to secure growth and widely strengthen its international relations with countries in the North as well as in the South. Nowadays, diversification is a necessity (as emphasized by GDP trends) and an urgent need. With the QNDS ending in 2016, the preparation of the next cycle puts economic diversification even more at the core of the forthcoming strategy. The situation has in fact much changed in the last six years: the next strategy requires a more humble approach in times of uncertainty and change for the country. “The need to diversify Qatar’s economy away from hydrocarbons is key to NDS 2017-22, and the empowerment of the private sectors to make up the shortfall of a government-driven economy is prominent. It was not that these were unimportant in NDS 11-16, but the necessity to

change the economy to a more sustainable mix between private and public sector was not there” (Stephens 2016).

Environmental development is the last pillar and it is meant, to “ensure harmony among economic growth, social development and environmental protection” (Ibid). This initiative recognizes the importance of protecting the natural environment at home, but also abroad where Qatar may invest its capital. The environment is being threatened on a number of fronts and it is a primary challenge for powerfully influential global actors to directly engage for the purposes of mitigating damages and developing a governance scheme that promotes sustainable utilization of natural resources. Furthermore, Qatar is confronted with water shortages and the challenge of water management, made more dramatic by demographic growth and climate change.

Qatar is planning and implementing a strategy that can secure its emerging society in an evolving future, but what is Qatar’s vision for the world? Qatar has outlined a fine plan for its national growth and development. The framework is sound and strongly built with an evidence-based approach. The nation’s strong economy built on hydrocarbon rents and the diversification of the economy that is underway and the domestic investments in education and human development, properly continued and adapted to the new situation in the next development strategy, could deliver what the Qatar National Vision presents. The question that needs to be asked is: how will Qatar conduct its affairs in African nations? This has to be asked because, beyond Qatar’s good intentions, as stated in the second pillar of the QNDS, Africa is a challenging place with remaining high levels of corruption and inequality and development gaps. The AMV is an attempt to rectify these injustices and deficits and the QNDS outlines guidelines for just practices. Nevertheless, both frameworks are interested first and foremost in defending the interests and resources of their own populations. How to create the conditions for a win win situation?

5. Can the AMV and the QNDS Manage a Mutually Beneficial Arrangement?

The above description of the complicated and somehow contradictory state of the African continent implies that there are opportunities as well as risks for investors. Vast economic inequality is a norm within many African states, while Qatar had a very high GDP, becoming a high-income economy. This contrast is posing a challenge, making African countries vulnerable. Pillar number two of the QNDS states that Qatar plans to maintain its national social level, so that it will be “capable of playing a prominent role in the global partnership for development” (QGSDP 2011). The African Mining Vision (AMV) outlines a plan to develop African societies through new governance schemes in and around extractive industries. Nevertheless, a panafrikan plan offers guidelines, but no guarantee against mismanagement, corruption, and consequent increasing inequalities. Qatar’s vision for itself as a leader in development initiatives has the potential to come to fruition through investment in Africa. In both cases, economic diversification is critical and foreign direct investments are a main avenue to achieve it: Qatar’s foreign relations ambitions could be in fact revised and reduced in the forthcoming years and a win-win situation could become critical for both parts.

African nations are extremely diverse in their foreign relation strategies and in possession of different capacities to act agency, as well as dissimilar for their wealth and power. Africa has always been a place of great opportunity, but the paradox is that the sources of wealth and opportunities, have been controlled by a leadership that has not had the capacity or the political will or both to transform the continent’s natural endowments into sustainable development. The pervasiveness of corruption that African countries are trying to fix is linked to these leadership gaps and to extreme socio-economic imbalances and is one of the major reasons of mismanagement of natural resources. Number of current governmental and regulatory structures in place in many sectors, including mining, within African nations is not sufficient to enforce socially responsible policies (like local content policies) and accountability, creating thus a space for corruption and rapacious activity or making policy efforts ineffective.

One illustration of this is a deal that China made with the government of Nigeria. This story illustrates the challenges that the AMV is attempting to mitigate, as well as a pitfall that investor

nations like Qatar could potentially fall into. Deal making with certain African governments may welcome the opportunity for non-transparent practices and inequitable outcomes, as illustrated by this occurrence. China is the leading country in the East-South shift and it is greatly interested in Africa's natural resources, particularly oil and natural gas that the nation needs to fuel its economy. In 2006, China's President Hu Jintao held a summit on Sino-African relations that was attended by all forty-eight African countries with diplomatic ties to China. The strategy China deployed at this meeting was powerful, promising to double investment in Africa, canceling debt owed to China, providing greater access to Chinese markets, training workers, and building infrastructure (Zakaria 2008). Partnership development such as this is largely positive for both sides, but there are also mechanisms in place that allow for greater cooperation but at the expense of the society, as the following example will point out. For instance, in 2007 the Nigerian government was negotiating a \$5 billion loan with the World Bank for a train system. The World Bank conditionalities stipulated that the Nigerian government should take measures to address the rampant corruption within the railway system. China saw an opportunity and offered the Nigerian government a \$9 billion loan to develop the entire train system with no strings attached undercutting the World Bank deal and eliminating any need for the Nigerian government to address the issues of corruption. In fact, it is reasonable to assume that part of China's loan went into the coffers of government officials and not toward the improvement of the national railroad system (Na'im 2007). Similar Chinese deals and loans can be recorded in other African countries like Angola, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Zambia for example (Brautigam 2011).

Qatar has built its economy on resource rents and has done very well due to its natural resource reserves, but, the Qataris know that their hydrocarbon reserves are finite and that they cannot rely only on them anymore. This is why it is urgent for Qatar to diversify and this is the reason for divesting into other nations and industries. African states that sit atop large natural resource reserves have not been able yet to fully capitalize economically across society, as Qatar and other Gulf States have been able to do. One economic force that can cause problems for resource-rich nations is the "Dutch disease." This is a negative outcome that manifests in the relationship between the exploitation of natural resources and a decline in other exports, such as the manufacturing or agriculture sectors. The increase in revenues from natural resources makes the

country's currency stronger compared to that of other countries. This causes an imbalance in exchange rates that makes other export products of resource-exporting nations less competitive in the global market. Nigeria exemplified this in the 1970s, when oil revenues grew and made other exports such as peanuts and cocoa unprofitable, which curtailed production and led to a collapse in these two agricultural staples (Collier 2007). Nevertheless, flourishing policy efforts and success towards industrialization and green industrialization across the African continent (UNECA 2016) based on local resources and advantages can reduce Qatar's comparative advantage when compared to African countries.

An important danger for African economies is the potential for flight of foreign direct investment (FDI) resulting in the 'bursting of a bubble' similar to the boom-bust outcomes in Asia in the late 1990s.⁵ Qatar and other Gulf oil exporting nations have avoided such an economic catastrophe largely due to hydrocarbon rents being their primary export so far, so there are no other industries or products to be affected in this way. Their economies are built upon the single commodity; thus, supporting the necessity for Qatar's policy of diversification.

The African Mining Vision, as mentioned, is a model of governance for the extractive industries and it has a purpose of addressing problems revenue sharing from mining, including tax revenues, and redistribution of the benefits to the various stakeholders involved and levels of appropriate state revenues from mining activities. In short, the AMV is an attempt to address human security deficits in African societies, such as job security, living wages, education for employment, environmental security and safety, and broadening and deepening local economies. Recently, Nigeria's Environmental Rights Action (ERA) NGO stated that the AMV "will only favor foreign investors to the detriment of the African continent and will not address critical livelihood concerns of local artisans." These sentiments were expressed at the 14th Annual Review and Strategy Meeting of the African Initiative of Mining, Environment and Society held in Accra, Ghana (Nwokpoku 2013). The group observed that the AMV remains important to reshaping the political economy of the mining industry. Although, issues that have long plagued the continent remain in play, such as government and national elite monopolization of profits, while ordinary people

⁵ See: Becker 2013.

remain jobless and poor as well as the occurrence of environmental degradation and disasters continue.

Furthermore, despite progress in countries like Burundi, Mali, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Mozambique, challenges of implementation slow down its use and benefits at the national and regional levels. So, where does this leave the AMV as a governance model if not completely and uniformly implemented across Africa? And, to what extent are the agents of Qatar able to adhere to the beneficent image they want to project as leaders and partners in international affairs, if their economic prospects are not so brilliant and if they have not yet ensured that they will successfully diversify their economy and overcome their internal challenges?

The facts remain that Africa's natural resource wealth is for sale to the nations that are able to afford to pay for them. The inclusion of the BRICS and Gulf States along with the US and Europe increases the importance of Africa's resources; just as well, the increased demand raises prices and relative profits for Africa. But how are those profits going to be allocated? The AMV structure leads some to think that it may not work as it intended resulting in the persistence of the previous governance status and inequalities. It remains to be seen how particular states and Regional Economic Communities (RECs) implement the AMV and the extent of political will to include stakeholders (especially civil society and communities) from all levels of society for the purpose of encouraging sustainable development led by natural resource extraction.

The structure of the system remains for the moment still in favor of the customer nations and the political and economic elites within Africa. The enforcement of the AMV must become a priority, but at the moment the AMV, as a governance scheme, is not enforced to show its benefits. This is a characteristic of many new governance schemes: countries are able to outline best practices and promote good intentions, but they do not have the power of enforcement that a law generally carries. These new governance strategies are often enforced voluntarily and through peer pressure. Unfortunately, this does not always produce the desired outcomes.

On the other hand, consumer nations such as Qatar may be absent of rapacious intent, but the structure of the exchange scheme does not protect all the stakeholders. New governance schemes such as the AMV and international economic relations like those between African extractive

industries and consumer nations are considered to be beyond the realm of taking into account local economies. Traditionally, that has been the sphere of government influence. As we progress into the future, the welfare state continues to recede and with it goes the ability to provide security for people at the local level; therefore, private governance will have to reconsider the traditional way of doing things and reformulate for the purpose of greater inclusion – just as the AMV has attempted to do or as private sector initiatives like social enterprises do.

6. Conclusion and Policy Recommendations

As shown in this paper, African countries are setting in place mechanisms to protect themselves, as well as diversifying and increasing their trade relations with more and different partners, especially at the regional level, but also at the continental level.

When turning to mining, the AMV is a first attempt to take ownership of natural resource management and governance and improve the functioning of this industry at the national and regional levels, while effectively and practically pushing for industrialization and diversification from the overreliance on mining and minerals. The present and future QNDS have a similar goal of economic diversification, but the Qatari strategy has different priorities. If in Africa infrastructural development (both soft and hard) remains a critical development requirement and an urgent need, this is less the case nowadays in Qatar, where the focus on diversification is expressed as an effort to improve education and human capital and develop the service sector. Industrialization has also to be rethought in Qatar, but this has maybe to be leaved to a longer-term perspective.

While the focus on the mining industry standards is evident and critical in the AMV, especially but not only for artisanal and small-scale mining, Qatar has still serious gaps when it comes to these standards, especially for workers conditions, health and safety regulation, subcontractors, etc. The same applies to environmental standards, where serious concerns exist in Qatar at a time when the situation is changing in several African countries, setting in place advanced environmental regulations.

While looking at trade and business opportunities in African countries, Qatar must revise its terms, modalities, and approaches for these partnerships. Against a ‘grabbing method’, a mutual

learning and mutual advantage perspective will have to be used. As a consequence, Qatar's economic diversification ambitions through Africa and developing countries in general will have to be revisited to fully take into account the reconfiguring of global powers and reshaping geopolitical order. The principle of *mutual advantage and learning* has to inspire political relations and economic partnerships between Qatar and African countries, if errors or failures want to be avoided.

Based on the previous analysis, some policy recommendations are outlined below:

- *Revisiting Qatar's international relations strategy*: in a time where the comparative advantage of emerging economies towards the global South appears to be decreasing and of growing economic and political uncertainties in the Western world, Qatar's international relations strategy, using influence on African countries as a tool to expand its global power has to be revised to consider them as virtually equal commercial partners.
- *Mutual learning and beneficial commercial partnerships*: cooperation with African countries has to be based on principles of mutual learning and mutually beneficial advantages. New finance for development schemes, including public-private partnerships, South-South cooperation, private equity, etc. must be preferred.
- *Technical cooperation more than development assistance*: considering Qatar's technical and technological comparative and competitive advantage, compared to African countries, technical cooperation is a very promising strategy of collaboration, of which Qatar and African countries could take advantage. This could happen in the oil and gas sector, but also in agriculture (given the expertise that Qatar has developed to this extent), in line with what the International Labour Organization, the Food and Agriculture Organization, and governments like Japan are doing in African contexts.
- *Partnering with businesses*: Qatari stakeholders should also increasingly consider partnerships with African private sector actors, especially in a context of raising awareness in Africa on the need for private sector development as a critical step for Africa's structural transformation.
- *Social entrepreneurship as an innovative avenue*: to this extent social entrepreneurship is becoming a promising path for both achieving financial gains and social benefits. This is

needed in Africa and some experiences in this sense are flourishing in Africa. Considering social challenges in Qatar, especially in terms of gender gaps, social entrepreneurship could be a profitable economic strategy. Social entrepreneurship could also be developed in Qatar and to this extent collaborations with African counterparts (especially from West, Southern, and North Africa, where social entrepreneurship is more developed) could be critical.

- *New partner countries?* If Qatar has privileged investments and presence in a few sub-Saharan African countries, new partners are progressively emerging in Africa for Qatar (like Eritrea), but other countries could be of interest in the short-term future. Qatar is then widening and deepening its presence in Cameroon, Gabon, Democratic Republic of Congo, Senegal, and Côte d'Ivoire among others.
- *Economic diversification through Africa:* through new types of partnerships with African stakeholders, Qatar may also enhance its chances to achieve economic diversification, not only investing in non-extractive sectors in Africa, but also learning from innovative African policy experiences.
- *Build capacities and skills:* Qatar has an important and pressing need to build capacities, skills, and competencies. Education and vocational training remain a major gap in Qatar and policy exchanges with African countries could certainly be beneficial.
- *Industry standards:* Qatar should also consider enhancing its industry standards, in the extractive sector, but also in other domains, especially looking at workers' conditions and gender gaps. Policy review exercises, including African experiences, and roundtable discussions between decision makers and leaders from Africa and Qatar could contribute to improve a critical situation holding back Qatar's economic and international relations prospects (Ministry of Development Planning and Statistics 2015).
- *Helping implement the AMV:* one could also imagine that Qatar could support African countries and RECs to implement the AMV. Given its expertise with sound governance of extractive resources, Qatar could advise African countries on appropriate implementation strategies and also support in monitoring progress. This would not be development assistance, but rather an experience helping Qatar regaining the path of economic growth through sounder natural resource governance.

- *The forthcoming QNDS* is therefore crucial and it has to carefully outline practical strategies and directions, explaining what is going to change with respect to the previous QNDS and what is going to remain and be continued. The new QNDS has to clearly and openly stretch the critical and revised role of African partners, as well as the interest they represent for Qatar and under which conditions.

African mining and mineral resources have to become a blessing for African countries and the process has started with the AMV. In order to do this, African countries have to industrialize in a smart, green, and competitive way. Qatar is confronted to similar problems, although in a different situation. Only as trade partners helping each other to industrialize and opening the way for new productive activities socially and financially beneficial, Qatar and African countries can hope to succeed.

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