DRIFTING AWAY?
CANADIAN TRUST, HOPE AND PRIDE
IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY

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** The opinions expressed in this report are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of Canadian Heritage.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This is the second report in a series of monographs on evolving Canadian values that is being undertaken by the Strategic Research and Analysis Directorate of the Department of Canadian Heritage as part of the social cohesion research plan of the federal government.

The starting point for this study was an empirical analysis of two large international databases: the 1990 World Values Survey and the 1995 International Social Survey (which focused on national pride). Over the 1980s and 1990s, Canadians have consistently reported a high level of pride in their country. We wished to probe beneath the surface of these findings to determine the source of this pride. Two sets of question guided our inquiry:

C Is national pride, which can be used as an indicator of attachment to Canada, related to Canadians’ feelings about the collective “macro environment” of political institutions, governance and community?

C Is national pride related in any way to shifts in the personal “micro environment”? More specifically, has the well-documented shift in Canada from a materialist to a post-materialist value orientation had an impact on levels of national pride? Is an equally well-documented shift in Western societies, including Canada, toward individualization affecting national pride?

We have attempted to link in a single study some of the most important issues facing Canadians today: the health of our social capital, the state of our trust and confidence in each other and in the institutions which govern us, and our degree of attachment to and pride in the Canadian nation. Our analysis revealed some interesting and often surprising results.

Personal outlook, economic opportunity and national pride

Canadians experienced a rapid deflation of expectations during the 1990s, in part due to falling household incomes which, according to the 1996 Census, fell almost 6% between 1990 and 1995. The study team wished to explore whether the recession in the early 1990s and the subsequent “jobless recovery” were also affecting national pride and attachment. Specifically, the study team wished to establish linkages among a variety of cognitive indicators, such as subjective well-being, personal confidence, mood, and attitudes toward risk and change, and perceptions of economic and social well-being, such as sense of control, life satisfaction, financial satisfaction and sense of economic security.

There is some evidence of a recursive association between income, employment, personal domestic arrangements, and levels of contentment among Canadians in 1990. The findings indicate that in general, those who were older, employed, married, and had higher incomes, felt higher levels of satisfaction in all areas of life. Segmentation analysis found that those who were employed (particularly male employees), had higher educations and per capita household incomes of over $15,000 were significantly more confident than those who were unemployed, had low or medium-level educations and per capita household incomes of under $15,000. Statistical correlations between life satisfaction, sense of control and financial satisfaction were found to be particularly strong, with those who had high levels of life satisfaction also expressing a greater sense of control over their life and a greater sense of financial satisfaction. These individuals also tended to be more satisfied with their jobs, suggesting a link to a sense of personal fulfillment.
Our findings indicate that those most likely to take risks are those with higher levels of self-confidence, satisfaction and personal affect: a state of being that is more likely to be enjoyed by those who are economically, educationally, and psychologically equipped to cope with change and who are more willing to take an optimistic view and “chance” on the future.

There was a positive and significant relationship between pride in Canada and both life satisfaction and financial satisfaction. A higher willingness to take risks and a positive attitude toward life also translated to higher pride. Personal affect and self-esteem therefore do appear to play a direct and indirect role in how proud Canadians feel about their country. However, it has been difficult to determine whether positive feelings about life contribute first to overall well-being which then spills over into national pride, or whether discontent based on a negative assessment of Canada leads to a more general discontent with life.

**Trust in the “system”, social capital and national pride**

Subjective well-being indicators such as life and financial satisfaction, sense of control, and personal affect/’frame of mind’ indices emerged as significant predictors of trust in government. Low self-esteem, low sense of control, poor outlook for the future and an unwillingness to take risks emerged as useful predictors of mistrust of government.

Mistrust was highest among those who agreed most strongly with the existence of flaws in the Canadian political and economic systems. Among those who agreed strongly with the suggestion that “the Canadian economic system needs fundamental changes”, 40% felt that they could “almost never” trust the federal government. This figure climbed to 45% when those respondents who felt a lack of power in the face of the legal system and the institutional structure of government were included.

Those who strongly agreed that the economic system required fundamental changes were also much more likely to believe that the country was run only for the benefit of the few, as opposed to the benefit of all people (82%). Further, 86% of those who felt that the political system should be made more ‘open’ to participation by citizens expressed this cynical viewpoint. Among those who expressed high support for the way the economic system is run in Canada, a complete reversal was evident: 73% expressed that the country was run “for all people” rather than for just the few. This reversal was further strengthened among those who expressed a high sense of control (76%) and a high sense of life satisfaction (75%).

Regional and linguistic breakdowns were also strong, reflecting possible socio-economic links. Quebec and the Atlantic provinces were the least trusting of others (61%), followed by Ontario, Manitoba and Saskatchewan (45%). By comparison, Albertans and British Columbians were highly trusting, with only 31% expressing cautious attitudes toward people in general. These regional breakdowns also showed a linguistic cleavage, with Anglophones more likely to express general trust in people (58%) than Francophones (35%). In each case, results were tempered by educational attainment and income rankings, reflecting a complexity that could be based on regional educational and income patterns. In Atlantic Canada and Quebec, for example, 84% of those with a low level of education expressed non-trusting attitudes, while only 10% of high income earners in the prosperous West did so. These findings suggest that optimism, pessimism and sense of control play key attitudinal roles in all types of trust. In this assessment, trust in people, and, by extension trust in institutions of governance, are functions of personal circumstances, in which perceptions of opportunity play a key role.
One of the most striking findings from our analysis is the weak relationship between pride in Canada and trust and confidence in institutions, particularly government. National pride in Canada appears to bear little relationship to levels of trust in public institutions such as Parliament and the civil service. Even those who said that they were very proud of Canada indicated high levels of mistrust of government.

The intuitive expectation that Canadians’ decreasing confidence in government and institutions would be reflected in decreased levels of pride was only very slightly borne out by an examination of the data in the 1990 World Values Survey. While some patterns were evident, the relationship was, for the most part, insignificant, suggesting a surprising disconnect between the political and the patriotic. It would appear that while social capital may be eroded by lack of trust, cultural capital (in the form of national pride) may not be as greatly affected.

**Attachment, belonging and willingness to move**

The study team wished to assess the way in which Canadians define themselves (belonging and identification), and express a capacity for mobility (attachment). Overall, degree of attachment among Canadians to both the nation and the continent was lower relative to other nations in the study, with over one in four respondents indicating that they would be willing to move to away from Canada to improve their living and working conditions. Further, Canadians scored highest among developed nations in their willingness to leave their continent.

The study team found that in 1990 and 1995, the ‘frustrated expectations’ of younger and higher educated Canadians (aged 18 to 34) were more likely to manifest themselves in a higher overall willingness to move outside of Canada and North America to improve living or working conditions. Young people and those who were unemployed were the least content with economic prospects in Canada and were more likely to consider not only leaving, but also discarding their Canadian citizenship in favour of another. Disappointment with economic prospects appeared to be highest among those between 25 and 34, while readiness to move is highest among the youngest cohort (18-24) and those who were unemployed.

These findings suggest that a continued commitment to the country is most likely to be made by those with fewer options and lower expectations: older, less educated and less confident Canadians. Willingness to move despite positive identification with Canada would seem to suggest that symbolic identities and attachments, strong as they may be, are losing their power to sustain a physical connection with the country. These findings lend some credence to arguments that globalization, coupled with the growing cosmopolitanism and personal confidence of younger and more educated segments of the Canadian population, may be weakening the ties that bind these people to Canada.

**Pride in national achievements**

In general, Canadians were more likely than citizens of other countries to view their country as better than others and as a model for emulation. On the other hand, they also appeared to be more prepared to recognize their country’s shortcomings and to withdraw their support if the country’s actions did not measure up to respondents’ sense of right and wrong. Canadians are relatively more proud of our collective social achievements than people in other parts of the world. They particularly value the way our democracy and social security system works, and appear to see these factors as contributing to our positive image abroad. Political and economic systems ranked lower among Canadians as sources of pride, and this may help to explain why change at these levels seems more acceptable to them than in the social system.
Achievements by individual Canadians in the arts, in sports and in science also appear to play an important role in the construction of national pride. These types of accomplishments may be contributing, however, to the personal (rather than the collective) component of pride by boosting feelings of self-esteem based on association with a “winner” or “star” who happens to be Canadian. Such achievements are also clearly post-materialist in that they are “higher-order” concerns related to belonging, self-esteem and quality of life.

**Individualism, post-materialism and national pride**

In Canada, current concerns about decreasing social capital and threats to social cohesion may well be symptomatic of a growing disconnect between values, institutions and messages. National identities are fundamentally linked to the way that individual citizens view themselves. Whether characterized as “culture”, “values” or “self-esteem”, there is a consensus that a national identity must reflect the underlying self-image of the individual. However, the nature of personal identities in advanced, post-industrial societies appears to be shifting. Some have attributed this shift to growing individualism: others to growing post-materialism. While the jury may be out on the underlying causes of this shift, there is no doubt that collective judgements about public policy, as well as national pride, are affected when personal values change.

Attachment, belonging and identification with Canada appear to coincide with higher levels of national pride. Respondents with the lowest level of pride in Canada were those who chose “region” as their level of primary attachment, followed by those who chose “North America” and “the world”. Among those who chose “Canada” as their primary level of attachment, slightly over 74% said they were very proud, as compared to 47% of those who chose “region” and 44% of those who chose “North America” and “the world”. Both attachment and pride also appear to bear some relation to value orientation. Those who were most proud of Canada were also the most attached to it, while those who were most cosmopolitan were the least ‘unconditionally’ proud. A cosmopolitan world view tends to correlate with a post-materialist value orientation. Post-materialists were not only predisposed to be less proud than materialists, but also had lower levels of attachment to the country.

**The “state nation” - National pride and public policy**

The concept of the ‘state nation’ is an important explanatory and linking concept in the study. Our comparative analysis showed that Canadians are relatively prouder of our collective social achievements than people in other parts of the world. They particularly value the way our democracy and social security system works, but are less proud of the political and economic systems. When high social capital is in part determined by an individual's perception of the state as the embodiment of the ‘social contract’ (as it is in Canada’s state-nation), it translates into a social form of citizenship that is shared by all. This commonality in turn reinforces social capital.

Our analysis suggests that in general, social values are more rooted in the Canadian identity in 1990 than economic ones. If this continues to be the case, radical change in the social environment may well have implications for national pride and national identity since it strikes at the heart of the Canadian self-image.

The negative mood among certain segments of the Canadian public has been reflected in a decline in social capital. The existence of a consistently significant relationship between how Canadians feel and responses to trust and confidence questions in the surveys analyzed appears to suggest that feelings of insecurity are associated with distrust of government. Those believing economic and political systems were ill-equipped to respond to changes in the global economy were also more likely to feel a lack of personal control over their lives, express low
levels of life and financial satisfaction and feel least confident about the integrity of the system in general.

There appears to be a segment of the Canadian population which is losing faith in the system. This segment tends to be the least equipped to deal with the effects of globalization on the Canadian economy and political system, and it has reacted by withdrawing its trust from public institutions and, to a lesser extent, from others in the community. These people are also more likely to express pessimism, cynicism, and lower levels of life and financial satisfaction. In turn, they are also more likely to find fault with the political, economic and social systems. Those who are least equipped to function within the transforming economy are resentful, particularly of governments, which are seen as incompetent for not providing the types of traditional support that Canadians have expected from their “state nation”.

Those who are well-educated, confident and satisfied with their lives are prepared to “go it alone”, but paradoxically, do not feel as compelled to withdraw their support for government and civil society. Despite their willingness to move to improve materialist prospects, younger and more highly educated Canadians are, generally speaking, as attached to Canada as older and less highly educated Canadians. However, these people are more prepared to let their heads rule their hearts when considering the economic consequences of their physical ties to Canada. We have interpreted this as a sign that physical or state-based attachments to Canada are losing their power among this segment of the population, at least when measured against the pragmatic necessity of earning a living. The much-debated “brain drain” may in fact be a reality or a potential reality for those who are most comfortable with the effects of globalization. Our findings would also suggest that if citizens cannot realize their expectations in Canada, they will move abroad to improve their conditions.

Beyond materialist considerations, we have found that Canadians continue to have a deep-seated pride in their country that persists despite significant declines in confidence in public and economic institutions. This persistence is partially attributable to Canadians’ pride in their collective social achievements. It appears to be linked as well to a growing need to reinforce personal self-esteem and belonging through vicarious identification with the national achievements of others.

Most of our research was based on pre-1995 data, which preceded major fiscal restructuring and down-sizing at all levels of government. Consequently, pride in our collective social achievements may have decreased in recent years, since national identity is so closely tied to these accomplishments. If this is the case, social cohesion may also be at risk, since these achievements represent a significant portion of the “glue” that keeps Canadians from ‘drifting away’, both physically and psychologically.
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1. INTRODUCTION

In late 1998, former Prime Minister Joe Clark stated his concern for the state of Canada’s society and economy in a time of globalization. “No longer”, he said, “is the ‘tug of the heart’ for Canada overcoming the ‘tug of the wallet’ ... young people are drifting away to the U.S. and other places [and] the things that bind Canadians together are drifting away.”

Growing economic anxiety, declining levels of trust and confidence in political institutions and a diminishing commitment to the collective Canadian ‘project’ have all been recognized as symptoms of an emerging crisis in Canada’s social capital. There is concern that young Canadians are no longer convinced of their country’s ability to provide economic opportunities and fulfill their growing expectations.

This is the second report in a series of monographs on evolving Canadian values that is being undertaken by the Strategic Research and Analysis Directorate of the Department of Canadian Heritage as part of the social cohesion research plan of the federal government. In our first report, our findings suggested that increased insecurity and decreased optimism about the prospects for personal advancement was eroding social solidarity in Canada not only among the “young and restless’, but also among older and higher income Canadians. In this study, we have gone much further in our efforts to support this hypothesis but have designed our research question in a new way. This study examines the direct and indirect impact of societal erosion on national affect, or pride in the Canadian nation as an indicator of national ‘health’. We have attempted to link in a single study some of the most important issues facing Canadians today: the health of our social capital, the state of our trust and confidence in each other and in the institutions which govern us, and our degree of attachment to and pride in the Canadian nation. Our analysis revealed some interesting and often surprising results.

In what way, if any, is national pride affected by social changes, specifically increasing anxiety, decreasing trust, and growing individualism? Is national pride related to Canadians’ feelings about the ‘macro-environment’ of political institutions, governance and community? Our findings suggest that in Canada, these elements have a complex relationship. National pride and a secure sense of collective identity depend on a variety of symbolic and pragmatic attachments. While Canadians continue to have a strong sense of pride their country, we have also experienced significant declines in our confidence in public institutions. While levels of national pride in Canada are among the highest in the world, so is willingness to leave the country in order to improve living and working conditions. Attempting to uncover the bases of these inconsistencies and to shed light on an increasingly complex web of public attitudes were the goals of this study. We conclude that while Canadians do continue to express a strong sense of pride in their country, continued reliance on this positive indicator may be ignoring the many serious symptoms of erosion in social capital.

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2. RESEARCH OBJECTIVES

Theme 2 of the Social Cohesion Research Workplan focuses on the axes of community identification and aims to produce empirical evidence on whether the intensity of people’s attachment to their community (or communities) is changing. Since this is a federal policy research initiative, the emphasis is on attachment to the national community. Empirical results drawn from the previous monograph in this series, The Young and the Restless in Canada: Frustrated Expectations in the 1990s, have shown that values are evolving at a different rate among various segments of the Canadian population and that the dynamics of attachment to community can only be understood by exploring the relationships between a number of values and attitudes within these segments.

The Young and the Restless in Canada concluded that widening cleavages between rich, middle-income and poor Canadians, between younger and older Canadians and between regions of the country were having an impact on Canadian values, the “glue” that has sustained our political and social union over the past 130 years. Drifting Away? Canadian Trust, Hope and Pride in a Global Economy takes a closer look at one of these values -- pride in Canada -- and explores the relationship between national affect and several other variables, such as trust and confidence in the political system and hope for the future.

The starting point for this study was an empirical analysis of two large international databases: the 1990 World Values Survey and the 1995 International Social Survey (which focused on national pride). The study team expected to find a direct correlation between pride in Canada and trust and confidence in the political system. When this relationship proved to be weak and insignificant, the study objectives were broadened to determine whether other variables or combinations of variables could explain variations in levels of Canadian pride.

Taking what was learned from the analysis performed in the course of the study on The Young and the Restless in Canada, the study team hypothesized that factors such as subjective well-being, materialist and post-materialist orientations and feelings of attachment and belonging might also play a role in feelings of pride. We had a strong suspicion, based on the conclusions drawn from the previous study, that access to economic opportunity and willingness to relocate might also contribute to a sense of pride in one’s country. With these hypotheses in mind, we restructured the study as an exploratory investigation with the following research objectives:

1. to analyze the theoretical literature on value change, personal and economic well-being, trust and confidence in societal institutions, and attachment and belonging to community;

2. to use the 1990 World Values Survey and the 1995 International Social Survey, supplemented by information from commercial polling sources, to explore the linkages between several groups of variables measuring:

   **Personal Outlook**
   Personal satisfaction, personal feelings of well-being, perceptions of economic security, attitudes toward risk and change
**Social Capital, Systemic Integrity, Trust and Confidence**

Confidence in political and social institutions, trust that government can solve economic problems, linkages between state and individual values, particularly with regard to personal satisfaction, personal confidence and trust of others.

**Attachment and Identity**

Feelings of belonging to Canada, geographic identification, willingness to move, rising individualism.

**National Affect - Pride in Canada**

Pride in Canada and its relationship to hope, trust and attachment, as well as to materialist and post-materialist orientations.

1. Explore these data according to several major socio-demographic categories such as age, income, education and language to determine if any particular sub-sets of the population were more or less hopeful, confident, trusting, proud of or attached to Canada;

2. draw conclusions, based on analysis of the literature and the data, about the correlates of pride in Canada and about what this might mean for social cohesion in Canada.

The Appendix to this study provides an outline of the methodology used in the quantitative analysis, as well as technical notes on the analytical tools and variables used.
3. CONTEXTUAL BACKGROUND

This chapter of the study is intended to provide the reader with a primer on several concepts that are at the heart of this study: national pride, the role of social capital and trust in promoting citizenship, and the influence of individualization, materialist and post-materialist values on attachment and belonging. These concepts are used extensively by political scientists and social psychologists in their respective fields, and this study attempts to link them to help answer several fundamental questions.

C Is national pride, which can be used as an indicator of attachment to Canada, related to Canadians’ feelings about the collective “macro environment” of political institutions, governance and community?

C Is national pride related in any way to shifts in the personal “micro environment”? More specifically, has the well-documented shift in Canada from a materialist to a post-materialist value orientation had an impact on levels of national pride? Is an equally well-documented shift in Western societies, including Canada, toward individualization affecting national pride?

The study team is aware that these concepts are seldom combined in one research study. However, a cross-disciplinary approach to the idea of national pride appears warranted because pride in country is, at one and the same time, a subjective assessment of an individual’s feelings toward the macro-community and an objective measure of the degree to which that community is responding to the individual’s need to belong and prosper. Certainly, measures of national pride are often used by governments to demonstrate the health of the body politic. For this reason, introducing useful insights from a variety of disciplines to disentangle the determinants of pride may advance our understanding of what makes citizens proud of their country and of what factors either strengthen or weaken that pride.

National pride - An expression of identity?

Over the 1980s and 1990s, Canadians have consistently reported a high level of pride in their country. During the 1980s, the Decima polling firm annually asked Canadians whether they agreed or disagreed that Canada was the best country in the world to live in. An overwhelming majority agreed in all years, ranging from 79% in 1982 (a recession year in Canada) to 93% in 1989 (the final year of an extended “boom” in the Canadian economy).

In both 1981 and 1990, the World Values Survey, respondents were asked if they were very, quite, not very or not at all proud to be Canadian. As reported by Neil Nevitte, in 1981, over 62% said they were very proud. This fell only very slightly to about 60% in 1990. In fact, this rating placed Canadians third among 12 western nations surveyed in those years, behind only the United States, where 76% said they were very proud to be American in 1981 and Ireland, where 68% said they were very proud to be Irish. In Europe overall, an average of only 40% in 1981 and 1990 said they were very proud to be their nationality, and these levels were as low as 20% in Germany and 23% in the Netherlands in 1990.

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Similarly, a cross-national study done by the National Opinion Research Center (NORC) at the University of Chicago ranked Canadians third in a group of 23 countries in terms of national pride, based on two multi-item measures of national pride. Again, the United States ranked first, followed by Austria, Canada, Ireland and New Zealand. The Netherlands ranked 13th on this scale, and West Germany ranked 16th, while East Germany and Russia tied for 20th place.4

As defined by Smith and Jarkko of NORC, “national pride is the positive affect that the public feels towards their country as a result of their national identity”. National identity is described as “the cohesive force that both holds nation states together and shapes their relationship with the family of nations”. Smith and Jarkko see national pride as having both a collective and a personal component, reflecting the “sense of esteem that a person has for one’s nation” as well as the “self-esteem that a person derives from one’s national identity”.5 In their view, national pride co-exists with patriotism and is a prerequisite of nationalism, but is not equivalent to it.

In seeking to understand what makes Canadians proud to be Canadians, we looked both at the macro-environment of collective trust and social capital and the micro-environment of trends in personal value orientations.

**The macro-environment - social capital, trust and citizenship as sources of pride**

Trust and confidence are related, but not identical concepts. According to one researcher, trust in a personal context is based on three elements:

- a rational estimate of past performance or reliability
- an assessment of the resources that others have to carry through on their promises
- knowledge of personal attributes such as character, values, integrity.6

Confidence in public institutions and organizations is also based on the first two of these elements. However, since they cannot know the personal attributes of all the individuals working in such institutions, citizens rely instead on the integrity of the legal and regulatory framework on which they are based. According to Jean L. Cohen, an American authority on civil society:

> It makes little sense to use the category of generalized trust to describe one’s attitude toward law or government. One can only trust people, because only people can fulfill obligations. But institutions (legal and other) can provide functional equivalent for interpersonal trust in impersonal settings involving interactions with strangers, because they establish action-orienting norms and the expectation that these will be honoured.7

In other words, trust may be personal, but confidence, according to this analytical approach, depends heavily on systemic integrity.

Does lack of trust and confidence in the fairness, effectiveness and probity of political and public institutions also affect attachment to one’s fellow citizens? Feelings of attachment to a community are based on the notion of social capital, a concept that has been defined in many ways by researchers and policy analysts. In general, and in keeping with the themes of this

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4 Tom W. Smith and Lars Jarkko, National Pride: A Cross-national Analysis. (Chicago, May 1998), Table 2.
paper, most of these commentators have traced the roots of social capital back to trust.

Perhaps the most widely quoted of these definitions is Robert Putnam’s whose work on civic traditions in modern Italy has become a standard reference on the topic:

Social capital ... refers to features of social organization, such as trust, norms and networks, that can improve the efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated actions.\(^8\)

In Putnam’s view, “fabrics of trust enable the civic community more easily to surmount what economists call “opportunism,” in which shared interests are unrealized because each individual, acting in wary isolation, has an incentive to defect from collective action”.\(^9\)

The World Bank takes somewhat broader view of social capital, defining it as “the social and political environment that enables norms to develop and shapes social structure”. In reviewing the various ways in which the term “social capital” is used, this definition focuses on “the ways in which reliable, stable relationships among actors can enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of both collective and individual action and interaction”.\(^10\)

In discussing what creates these types of “reliable, stable relationships”, Francis Fukuyama, another prominent commentator on the subject, states that social capital is:

... a capability that arises from the prevalence of trust in a society or in certain parts of it. It can be embodied in the smallest and most basic social group, the family, as well as the largest of all groups, the nation, and in all the other groups in between. Social capital differs from other forms of human capital insofar as it is usually created and transmitted through cultural mechanisms like religion, tradition or historical habit.\(^11\)

Does withdrawal of support for public institutions decrease social capital? If public acceptance of bureaucratic substitutes for trust lasts only as long as those mechanisms are seen to be fair and responding to the moral priorities of the population, then the conclusion appears to be "yes": declining trust does have a negative impact on a society’s social capital.

If trust in public institutions is declining, what impact is this having on Canadian perceptions of the value and worth of Canadian citizenship? For purposes of this paper, the definition of “citizenship” is the one used in 1950 by T.H. Marshall in his classic *Citizenship and Social Class* -- the body of rights and duties which goes with full membership in a society. That Canadian identity is inextricably bound up with the “body of rights and duties” of citizenship has, in fact, been empirically confirmed in a survey by Ekos Research Associates. When asked in 1996 what best described their idea of being Canadian, 49% of respondents identified a set of rights, while another 41% chose citizenship duties, such as obeying the laws of the land and helping their country.\(^12\)

Ralf Dahrendorf has stated that “citizenship is a non-economic concept. It defines people’s standing independent of the relative value attached to their contribution to the economic


\(^9\) Putnam, p. 89.


process”. He links the concept of citizenship directly to both the “civic state” and national identity:

The true test of the strength of citizenship rights is heterogeneity. Common respect for basic entitlements among people who are different in origin, culture and creed proves that combination of identity and variety which lies at the heart of civil and civilized societies.

Canadians have traditionally viewed the “civic state” as central to their identity. In her study of Canada’s social union, Margaret Biggs states that “the social union is the web of rights and obligations between Canadian citizens and governments that give effect and meaning to our shared sense of social purpose and common citizenship”. She goes on to say that the social union “embodies our sense of collective responsibility (among citizens), our federalism pact (between and across regions) and our governance contract (between citizens and government).” Biggs has concluded that “it is the social domain, not the economic union, that is most central to Canadians sense of identity and security.”

A critical question for this study is whether citizenship values and confidence in institutions are also a source of pride and commitment to Canada. In other words, does having rights and duties, whether embodied in a social contract or a Charter of Rights and Freedoms, not only make one feel Canadian, but also proud to be Canadian? And does a decrease in social capital affect how Canadians feel about Canada?

**The micro-environment -- Individualism, attachment and belonging – can they co-exist?**

The second major focus of this study concerns the impact of changing personal values on attitudes toward the state, both as an instrument of collective action and of personal ego gratification. According to a group of European political scientists and sociologists who have studied value change extensively, individualization is an intrinsic part of the modernization process in Western societies and is leading to an entirely different attitude among citizens toward traditional authority, such as the nation state. The term “individualization”, as used by these social scientists, refers to “the social and historical process in which values, beliefs, attitudes and behaviour are increasingly based on personal choice and are less dependent on tradition and social institutions”.

The individualization process, according to these researchers, has had both positive and negative effects in Western democracies. On the positive side, it has resulted in increased emancipation and democratization, increased self-determination for the individual, greater personal freedom and opportunities for self-development, self-expression and creativity. On the negative side, it has led to “an ego-centred, consumerist mentality of non-commitment” which has fostered an “unrestrained striving for realizing personal need fulfillment” and a decreased interest in public life. More specifically with regard to the political culture, European
researchers believe that individualization is leading to both pluralization and de-ideologization of political orientations. In their words, “existing political orientations are seen as a ‘political menu from which ideas and concepts are selected ‘a la carte’ ... and which need not necessarily form a coherent political pattern but may reflect political plurality and individual preferences”.

In the United States, commentators such as Christopher Lasch, Michael J. Sandel and Jean Bethke Elshtain have sounded the alarm about what Lasch referred to as “the triumph of therapeutic culture” - the idea that the wider society exists only to minister to the individual’s needs and wants. Elshtain believes that this trend results in the loss of civic identity and a completely self-referential universe where “the public sphere becomes a stage from which I can make my demands”.

The United States may be an extreme example of the triumph of individualization, as has been pointed out by Francis Fukuyama. In an analysis of the future of democracy in Asia, he suggests that four factors will be critical -- ideology, institutions, civil society and culture. Of these four, he believes that civil society and culture will be the areas where the greatest problems will be encountered, observing that “the real difficulties affecting the quality of life in modern democracies have to do with social and cultural pathologies that seem safely beyond the reach of institutional solutions, and hence of public policy”. However, he is not as despairing as Lasch and Elshtain about the potential of these two spheres to counteract the pathologies of individualization.

Liberalism based on individual rights is quite compatible with strong, communitarian social structures and disciplined cultural habits. Indeed, one can argue that the true importance of civil society and culture in a modern democracy lies precisely in their ability to balance or moderate the atomizing individualism that is inherent in traditional liberal doctrine, both political and economic.

While there is no consensus among thinkers about individualization and its impact on the “civic nation”, it is worthwhile to examine the results of a 1997 Ekos survey of the values that Canadians want their government to espouse. While the individual value of “freedom” ranked first, it was followed by four very “civic” and collective values: a healthy population, a clean environment, security and safety and integrity and ethics. Canadians appear to “want it all” with respect to their national community. They want freedom, but they want it within a framework of a system that works.

This study will explore whether civil society and culture, as Fukuyama suggests, are sufficient to create a sense of national pride, attachment and belonging or whether other forces, amplified by growing individualization, may play an equal role in these areas.

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19 Ester, Halman and de Moor, p. 10.
21 Francis Fukuyama, “The primacy of culture”, Journal of Democracy, (January 1995), p. 9. Fukuyama defines “civil society” as “the realm of spontaneously created social structures separate from the state that underlie democratic institutions”. “Culture” is defined as “phenomena such as family structure, religion, moral values, ethnic consciousness, “civic-ness” and particularistic historical traditions”. He emphasizes that culture is what underpins civil society.
22 Fukuyama, p. 13.
Post-materialism and affluence - transcending national pride?

The final concept we will examine is the impact that post-materialist values and changes in well-being might be having on pride in Canada. Just as there is a keen debate about individualism and its influence on a sense of belonging to a larger community, so there is little agreement about how a post-materialist value orientation might affect a sense of pride in one’s country.

Post-materialism, according to Ronald Inglehart, one of the early observers of this cultural change, is marked by a societal shift in values from “giving top priority to physical sustenance and safety, toward heavier emphasis on belonging, self-expression and the quality of life”. Inglehart’s work, as well as that of Neil Nevitte who has looked at Canadian value shifts from an international perspective, is based on two key hypotheses:

1. *The Scarcity Hypothesis*, which states that an individual’s priorities reflect the socioeconomic environment and that one places the greatest subjective value on those things that are in relatively short supply;
2. *The Socialization Hypothesis*, which states that the relationship between socioeconomic environment and value priorities is subject to a time lag, since basic values reflect conditions that prevailed in one’s childhood years.

Nevitte’s findings have confirmed that in Canada “in 1981 materialists outnumbered post-materialists in all age groups, but by 1990 post-materialists outnumbered materialists in three out of the six cohorts considered [i.e. among those under 45 years of age].” These data led him to conclude that “a general shift toward post-materialism took place in all the advanced industrial states, including Canada, between 1981 and 1990” and that “this particular value shift does ... appear to be linked to intergenerational change.”

Both Nevitte and Inglehart have found that “older people ... have greater confidence in governmental and non-governmental institutions, higher levels of national pride, and are less likely than the young to be ‘cosmopolitan’”. Nevitte found, in fact, that age and post-materialist orientations were the two most powerful statistical predictors of national pride: as age rose, national pride rose and as post-materialist orientations increased, national pride decreased.

The generational divide with regard to pride in one’s country is puzzling, if one is to believe Inglehart’s thesis that post-materialism leads to “heavier emphasis on belonging, self-expression and the quality of life”. Instead, co-existing with post-materialist needs for esteem, intellectual and esthetic satisfaction, there appears to be a practical concern with materialist values such as economic security. This “materialist streak”, as Inglehart himself acknowledges, tends to reassert itself, particularly among the young, during periods of economic anxiety, such that “we would expect prolonged periods of high prosperity to encourage the spread of Post-Materialist values; economic decline would have the opposite effect”. In support of this assertion, he found that during the 1970s, the 15-24-year-old group became progressively more materialist until the recession bottomed out but the 25-34-year-old group became steadily more post-

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materialist throughout the 1970s.\textsuperscript{28} Similarly, Nevitte noted a “wobble” in post-materialist orientations in Europe when studying cross-time evidence of value change between 1970 and 1990. He attributed this to the major recessions affecting all advanced industrial states in the mid-1970s and early 1980s.\textsuperscript{29}

Following from this tentative conclusion, the study team wished to explore whether the recession in the early 1990s and the subsequent “jobless recovery” were also affecting national pride and attachment. This line of inquiry had been strongly suggested by the results of the team’s previous study, The Young and the Restless in Canada, which noted a growing gap between older, affluent Canadians and younger, less well-off ones regarding such values as life satisfaction and sense of control over their futures. Were perceptions of well-being and life opportunities also linked to the lower levels of pride expressed by younger people?

\textit{Findings}

In general, we found patterns which suggested a disconnect of national pride from falling trust in government and public institutions. In other words, erosion of social capital did not seem to translate into lower pride in Canada. However, in the micro environment of personal values, we found a much less clear picture. It would appear that Canadians are torn between the heart and the head when considering their relationship to their country. Despite feelings of national pride, Canadians seem increasingly prepared to disregard national affect and to “vote with their feet” in search of a better life.

The following chapters of this study will describe our findings, using data from the 1990 \textit{World Values Survey}, and the \textit{International Social Survey} of 1995. When possible, we place these findings in the context of other printed polling material which was available to us, but whose databases were not accessible for analysis.

\textsuperscript{28} Inglehart, “Post-Materialism in an Environment of Security”, p. 889.

\textsuperscript{29} Nevitte, The Decline of Deference, pp. 46-7.
4. PERSONAL OUTLOOK

In 1972, the noted economic theorist Albert O. Hirschman first proposed the existence of “the tunnel effect” in economic development. He suggested that one’s attitude to income inequality can be compared to two lines of cars, both going in the same direction, stuck in a traffic jam in a tunnel. When one lane of traffic begins to move, the drivers in the other lane become more optimistic, anticipating that it will soon be their turn to move. However, if one lane of traffic keeps moving and the other does not, this optimism turns to anxiety, disappointment and, finally, to anger.

Hirschman translated this into the language of welfare economics by concluding that “An individual’s welfare depends on his present state of contentment (or, as a proxy, income), as well as on his expected future contentment (or income).” If an individual sees others around him improving their economic situation, he is initially optimistic that he, too, will advance. If these expectations are not fulfilled, he experiences “the tunnel effect” -- he will feel worse than before because his relative position has declined. Hirschman also observed that “the tunnel effect” can work in reverse: that if others are experiencing an economic setback, the individual takes this as an indication of future setbacks for himself and will become apprehensive and worried. He noted that this economic phenomenon had corollaries in both sociology (the concept of relative deprivation) and anthropology (studies of envy caused by individual advances in small communities).

In terms of values studies, this concept has clear linkages to “Affluence Effect”, in which a period of economic upheaval can lead to a widespread apprehension within the population about future prospects for both oneself and one’s children. In our earlier study (The Young and the Restless in Canada), we looked at changes in Canadian values through the lens of this Affluence Effect, a theoretical construct first described in 1994 by pollster Daniel Yankelovich. According to Yankelovich, “economic changes do not by themselves transform values; what does is people’s perceptions of their own, and their nation’s affluence”. Yankelovich emphasized that it was perception of affluence that propelled value change, not necessarily hard, economic fact, noting that “except at the extremes of the economic spectrum among the very rich and the very poor, value changes are mediated by people’s interpretations of their own economic condition and its future prospects, interpretations that lag behind economic reality as an economist might describe it. In his assessment, the United States and other advanced industrial economies have experienced three stages of the affluence effect since 1945. The stages are described as follows:

**Stage 1 of the Affluence Effect**
- Affluence is new and incomes are rising.
- People suspect that their economic well-being may not be new and fear it will not last.
- Values remain conservative and traditional.
- U.S. remained at this stage until the late 1960s.

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Stage 2 of the Affluence Effect
C People assume that affluence is a permanent condition and that the nation can now spend freely without worrying about tomorrow.
C People expand their life choices and choose careers and lifestyles according to their individual desires rather than the expectations of others.
C Levels of individualism rise, as does the tendency to “live for today” and to take more risks in personal life.
C U.S. remained at this stage until about 1990.

Stage 3 of the Affluence Effect
C People realize that affluence cannot be taken for granted and begin to feel cornered and disoriented.
C Apprehension grows that opportunities for jobs, income growth, home ownership, higher education and retirement are at risk.
C People begin to worry about tomorrow.
C U.S. has been at this stage since about 1990.

The degree to which “the tunnel effect” and the “affluence effect” are affecting personal attitudes and outlook of Canadians is the subject of this chapter. Specifically, the study team wished to establish linkages among a variety of cognitive indicators, such as subjective well-being, personal confidence, mood, and attitudes toward risk and change, and perceptions of economic and social well-being, such as sense of control, life satisfaction, financial satisfaction and sense of economic security.

Canada appears to have entered the third stage of the Affluence Effect a couple of years earlier than the U.S., due to the recession of the late 1980s and early 1990s. Like Americans, Canadians experienced a rapid deflation of expectations during the 1990s, in part due to falling household incomes which, according to the 1996 Census, fell almost 6% between 1990 and 1995. For example, the 1992 International Social Survey asked people to indicate whether, as compared to their father at the same age, they were better or worse off in their income or standard of living. As Figure 4.1 shows, the majority (65.8%) felt that they were worse off or much worse off. About one-third (31.9%) felt that they were doing equally well. Only a tiny percentage (just over 2%) thought that they were doing better.

In 1998, the Angus Reid Group polling firm asked Canadians whether they thought their children would be better or worse off than them. Table 4.1 shows the results. While both lower income and upper income people have about the same expectations about their children’s future economic prospects, middle income Canadians were somewhat less optimistic. Middle-aged and older Canadians also tended to be less certain that their children would enjoy the same level of prosperity as themselves.

33 “How Changes in the Economy are Reshaping American Values”, pp.17-19. (Some contend that the extended “boom” in the U.S. since the mid-1990s has led to a reversion to Stage 2, but only for those in the higher income brackets.)
This anxiety within “middle Canada” appears to be justified by recent economic trends. A study by Armine Yalnizyan of the Centre for Social Justice found that between 1973 and 1996 the proportion of Canadian families who earned enough to be considered middle class declined sharply. Those that used to earn between $31,666 and $55,992 (in 1996 dollars) comprised 40% of all families in 1973. By 1996, only 27% were in this earnings bracket. As Yalnizyan pointed out, the shrinking of the middle class and the polarization of market incomes sends some negative signals within a society:

There is an argument to be made that the more a society is clustered, perhaps at any point along the income spectrum, the more common is their material experience. This is a powerful unifying force, providing perhaps the key factor leading to greater social cohesion and mutual understanding that can lead to the desire to build together. Growth in the “tails” of the distribution may lead to exactly the opposite result -- lack of common experience, and emphasis on “going it alone”.

If, as suggested above, anxieties can be linked to both polarization and a decrease in social capital, what is happening to the “social cohesion and mutual understanding” of Canadians? If the country is in the third stage of the ‘affluence effect’, as Yalnizyan contends, is this negatively affecting a sense of national pride and attachment? If so, what, if any, are the root cognitive symptoms of this breakdown?

**Well-being, Sense of Control and Satisfaction**

The *World Values Survey* examined several types of satisfaction -- satisfaction with life in general, with home life, financial satisfaction and job satisfaction. These values are useful for this study because they clearly involve a balancing of materialist and post-materialist values. Often, what makes one group of people satisfied will leave another group indifferent. Seeing who is satisfied with each particular aspect of life provides a portrait of well-being that is essential for understanding individual hope and its impact on national attachment and national affect.

**TABLE 4.1**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Children Better Off Than Parents (Canada 1998)</th>
<th>Better off (%)</th>
<th>Worse off (%)</th>
<th>Same (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>CANADA (Total)</strong></td>
<td>63</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sex</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Age Group</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18-34</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35-54</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55+</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Income Level</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Angus Reid World Poll, April 1998

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Subjective perceptions of well-being, according to researchers who have studied the subject, are only indirectly linked to affluence. Ed Diener, an American psychologist who has specialized in the definition and measurement of subjective well-being (SWB), defines it as “how people evaluate their lives” according to such variables as life satisfaction, marital satisfaction and levels of anxiety. More specifically, Diener and his colleagues have suggested that happy people (i.e. those with high levels of subjective well-being) tend to share certain character traits: specifically, they have high self-esteem (especially those in individualistic Western cultures), they feel a high level of personal control over their lives, and they are optimistic.

According to Diener’s findings, objective wealth -- beyond a basic income level necessary to ensure survival -- appears to have minimal effect SWB. Nevertheless, social comparisons based on perceived differences in objective wealth compared to others seem to play a role in determining a person’s state of well-being. Diener has suggested that:

Often people’s standards come from observing people around them or remembering what they, themselves, were like in the past. ...if people exceed these standards, they will be happy and satisfied, but if they fall short of their standards, they will experience low levels of emotional well-being.

Especially in individualistic societies which put a premium on personal achievement, it would follow that comparison with one’s peers will have an impact on happiness. For example, work satisfaction has been shown to be a major predictor of subjective well-being among working age adults, while social participation was a significant predictor among retirees. At least part of the reversion to materialist values during times of economic recession might therefore be linked to people’s need to maintain their social and economic position within their communities and within society at large. Certainly, major social and economic dislocations are likely to entail substantial readjustments by individuals to maintain the sense of self-esteem, self-control and optimism that they feel is essential to their happiness. Many of those adjustments will fall within the material sphere, particularly if the individual is at or near working age.

Diener’s suggestion that people who are happy feel a higher degree of control over their lives appears to be borne out by our data. The 1990 World Values Survey asked Canadians to rank their sense of control on a scale of 1 to 10. On average, Canadians scored 7.56, with francophones tending to have a slightly higher sense of control over their lives (7.83) than anglophones (7.49). However, household income had a significant impact on sense of control, particularly among anglophones, as shown in Figure 4.2.

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38 Ed Diener and Richard Lucas, “Subjective Emotional Well-being”, p. 5. (Forthcoming in M. Lewis and J.M. Haviland (Eds.) Handbook of Emotions, (2nd Ed.).)
Overall in 1990, Canadians scored 7.88 on a scale 10 with regard to life satisfaction. Marital status and employment status were the top two predictors of life satisfaction, reinforcing the premise that sense of well-being is linked to both materialist and post-materialist values. As shown in Figure 4.3, those who were married or widowed had the highest levels of life satisfaction, while those who were divorced or separated had the lowest. When the data were analyzed according to employment status, they also showed a wide gap between the unemployed and the rest of the population in terms of life satisfaction.

This dynamic showed up even more clearly when satisfaction with home life was measured, also on a scale of 10. In 1990, the average Canadian ranked his or her home life as 8.4, but again, the married tended to be much more satisfied than either the single, the divorced or the separated. As with life satisfaction, employment status was a significant predictor of contentment with domestic life. Those who were unemployed registered much lower levels of home satisfaction (7.46) than those who were employed (8.38), retired or housewives (8.65). This suggests that being involuntarily separated from the workforce has an important impact on subjective assessments of well-being, even within that most personal of domains, the home.

One would expect that major determinants of job and financial satisfaction would be economic-oriented indicators, such as household income or employment status. However, in both, age also emerged as a significant predictor. In the case of job satisfaction, age was the most significant predictor. On average, Canadians ranked job satisfaction as 7.87 on a scale of 10. However, while those who were older than 25 had above-average scores (and in the case of respondents over 55 -- well above-average at 8.31), those 18 to 24 years of age had a job satisfaction level of just 7.35. This dissatisfaction had undeniably materialist origins, at least among younger people. On average, in 1990 Canadians had an overall level of financial satisfaction of 7.14 (ranked on a 10-point scale). Those with the lowest levels of satisfaction were in the 18-44 age group at 6.76. Financial satisfaction increased with age, climbing to 7.49 among the 45 to 64 year-olds and to 8.01 among those 65 years of age and over. As shown in Figure 4.4, financial satisfaction among those 18 to 44 years of age was clearly related to household income.

Not surprisingly, employment status was also an important predictor of financial satisfaction. When the data were profiled according to this variable, those who were retired registered an average financial satisfaction level of 7.80, employed persons, students,
and housewives were slightly below average at 7.12, but those who were unemployed averaged only 5.89.

There is thus some evidence of a recursive association between income, employment, personal domestic arrangements, and levels of contentment among Canadians in 1990. The findings indicate that in general, those who were older, employed, married, and had higher incomes, felt higher levels of satisfaction in all areas of life.

**Linking Risk, Change and Personal confidence**

An expressed willingness to take risks or to make significant changes in one’s life appeared to be closely related to positive personal affect and confidence in one’s own capacities. The *World Values Survey* offered an opportunity to assess the linkages between this ‘personal affect’ (i.e. mood, self-perception, and personal confidence) and attitudes toward decision-making and outlook and approach to life. Three complementary groups of questions asking respondents if they were felt various emotions, (such as excitement, restlessness, and boredom), feelings of confidence, and attitudes toward risk and change allowed for the creation of a ‘Mood Index’, a ‘Personal Confidence Index’, and a “Risk and Change Index”[^40]. With the addition of the 'sense of personal control' measure, these indices allowed the team to test further the existence and degree of relationships between personal affect and social and economic circumstances.

Who are the most satisfied, confident, risk-taking Canadians? On average, older, employed Canadians with higher income levels and stable home lives recorded higher satisfaction levels than those in other categories. Segmentation analysis found that personal confidence was also linked to these socio-demographic characteristics: those who were employed (particularly male employees), had higher educations and per capita household incomes of over $15,000 were found to have significantly higher confidence levels than those who were unemployed, had low or medium-level educations and per capita household incomes of under $15,000. With respect to attitudes toward risk and change, segmentation analysis found that a professed propensity to take risks and welcome change tended to increase with income (over $70 000/year) and education level (some to complete post-secondary) and decrease with age (under 35). These findings appear to support the hypothesis that increased affluence, and therefore increased comfort, leads to increased subjective well-being.

[^40]: Details concerning the creation of these indices can be found in the Appendix.
Indicators of well-being were also found to be mutually reinforcing. As Table 4.2 shows, statistical correlations between life satisfaction, sense of control and financial satisfaction were found to be particularly strong, with those who had high levels of life satisfaction also expressing a higher sense of control over their life and a greater sense of financial satisfaction. These individuals also tended to be more satisfied with their jobs, a finding suggesting linkages to a sense of personal fulfillment.

To further demonstrate the linkages between these perceptions of well-being, and for the purposes of graphical illustration, mean scores in the Mood, Confidence and Risk/Change indices were compared with responses to questions about life satisfaction, financial satisfaction, job satisfaction and sense of control over one’s life. The results are shown in Figures 4.5 through 4.8. In every case, higher levels of personal satisfaction and sense of control were correlated with positive mood and higher personal confidence. In Figures 4.5 and 4.6, the general positive pattern of responses supports the hypothesis that optimistic frames of mind have a recursive relationship with affirmative expressions of satisfaction and senses of personal control.

The relationship between mood and attitudes toward risk and change demonstrated a similar pattern. At the low end of the ten-point Risk and Change scales, respondents expressed extreme caution and worry about the effects of change, while at the top end of the scales,
respondents welcomed change and agreed that one must act boldly to achieve. As Figure 4.7 indicates, those who felt better about themselves were also more willing to take risks and to adopt a positive attitude to change, with the largest differences in mean scores occurring at the extremes of the indices.

Figure 4.8 illustrates a comparison between the Personal Confidence Index and a propensity to take risks. Once again, a clear positive relationship was found, with willingness to take risk increasing with personal confidence.

Hirschman, Diener, Yankelovich and other researchers of economic and subjective well-being found that, on the whole, perceived personal and social affluence are strong determinants of optimistic and hopeful predispositions. When viewed together, these indices support the expectation that there exists a recursive relationship between personal financial success and life satisfaction on one hand, and positive mood, confidence levels and attitudes toward decision-making on the other. Further, those with higher levels of personal confidence, a positive attitude to change and higher levels of job and financial satisfaction also feel more in control over their lives. While these relationships were in no way surprising to the study team, the evidence provided an essential foundation in the overall goal of the study: to examine the possibility that it is a multiple and complex set of factors which affects attachment to and pride in Canada.
While the role of subjective well-being in maintaining an attachment to community and society has not been clearly established by researchers, it seems likely that negative perceptions of well-being can in part be explained by negative perceptions of external social and economic conditions, and vice versa. The study team believes that the link between personal discontent and discontent directed at the system is one made through indicators of social capital and confidence in political, social and economic institutions. The above findings do, however, suggest that personal discontent with economic and social circumstances is affecting Canadians’ sense of hope for the future. Our findings indicate that those most likely to do something about their situations are those with the higher levels of self-confidence, satisfaction and personal affect: a state of being that, as shown, is more likely to be enjoyed by those who are economically, educationally, and psychologically equipped to cope with change and are more willing to take an optimistic view and a “chance” on the future. The following chapters will explore whether levels of satisfaction, a risk-taking mentality and positive/negative outlook are in any way related to a sense of trust in others or in public institutions, a sense of attachment to the country and a sense of pride in Canada.
5. SOCIAL CAPITAL AND SYSTEMIC INTEGRITY: TRUST AND CONFIDENCE IN PEOPLE AND INSTITUTIONS

Canadians are losing faith in each other, in their leaders, their government, and the institutions that they have chosen to govern over them. Declines of trust and confidence in politicians and institutions have not been unique to Canada, however, as the tracking of trends which began over a decade ago has revealed, a similar phenomenon is evident across most developed countries. In Canada, trends turned sharply downward in the beginning of the 1980s, (See Table 5.1) and in the United States over three decades. (See Table 5.2)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE 5.1</th>
<th>TRUST IN CANADIAN POLITICIANS 1980-1990</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1980</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage thinking politicians are competent</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage thinking politicians are principled</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage holding favourable feelings about politicians</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Decima Research

Findings by the Environics Research Group indicate that 67% of Canadians had little or no confidence in their political leaders. In the United States, the Survey of American Political Culture carried out in 1996 found that only 32% of the American population had a great deal or quite a lot of confidence in the federal government.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE 5.2</th>
<th>TRUST IN AMERICAN POLITICIANS 1966-1996</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1966</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage expressing a great deal of confidence in the President</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage expressing a great deal of confidence in Congress</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: American Survey of Political Culture

In both nations, negative feelings about government appeared to be tied to a sense of moral deterioration among the political elite. In Canada, 49% believed in 1998 that the ethical standards of the federal government had declined over the past ten years, although this represented improvement from the 69% who thought this in 1994. In the U.S. in 1996, 64% of Americans regarded their governing elite as insensitive to the public's wishes, and 59% thought that they were also unconcerned about values or morality.

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41 Table 5.1 is drawn from information in Allan Gregg and Michael Posner, The Big Picture: What Canadians Think About Almost Everything, p. 54.
42 Table 2 is drawn from information in James Davison Hunter, The State of Disunion - 1996 Survey of American Political Culture.
Further evidence suggests that this decline in trust and confidence has been matched by a similar fall in levels of “interpersonal trust”, defined as the extent to which individuals trust their fellow citizens. In 1981 and 1990, Canadians were asked whether they felt that “most people can be trusted”, or whether one could “never be too careful”. While in comparative terms Canadians were more trusting (49% trusting in 1981 and 52% in 1990), the result was low in absolute terms and represented an overall decline.

**Systemic Integrity**

What are the causes of decline in systemic and interpersonal trust and confidence? This question has become a focus of debate among academics and policy-makers. Francis Fukuyama has characterized trust as “the expectation that arises within a community of regular, honest, and cooperative behaviour, based on commonly shared norms, on the part of other members of the community”. Apart from this organic, culturally-embedded definition, he recognizes that trust can also be institutionalized through a system of formal rules and regulations. Erosion of public trust in governing structures can lead to resistance to public policies, decreased willingness to comply with laws and regulations and less citizen engagement and civic participation.

In Canada, the decreasing trust Canadians have in their governing bodies likely demonstrates that “the current system has been unable to adapt and positively respond to the changing needs and interests of its citizens”. One school of thought has suggested that rapid and far-reaching changes in the global economy and changing social conditions have been the principal contributors to an emerging public scepticism about the ability of governments and other public institutions to respond effectively and to bring about actual change in the new global environment. Cultural trends have also been targeted; a second group of researchers has theorized that beyond their actual role and public perception, the collectivist *raison d'être* of governments has become largely irrelevant in this new environment, as traditional economic, political and social roles fall by the wayside and are sacrificed to growing individualism.

In addition to the macro (systemic) level, speculation over the causes of decreasing trust has also focused on the micro (individual) level of trust and confidence. A third area of research has focused on the impact of perceived personal “well-being” on levels of trust, with particular attention paid to the perceptions of those expressing low scores on indices of life, job, and financial satisfaction, as well as sense of control and willingness to take risks. Some analysts have suggested that the aggregate impact of personal political, social, and economic insecurities over the past two decades are to blame for declining trust and confidence, a sentiment which has lasting consequences for the integrative goals of nation-building and national identity. This notion, often referred to as “social capital”, has become an important analytical tool to combine theories relating to the breakdown of traditional societal relationships. The chapters which follow will explore each of these schools of thought in more detail, making reference to empirical evidence where available. The goal is to demonstrate linkages between personal affect and systemic affect by use of the notion of ‘social capital’. If discontent at the individual level is externalized to include discontent directed at the systemic level, the establishment of linkages to pride and attachment to nation and state may be made possible.

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School 1: Government is Incompetent and Ineffective

Confidence in public institutions is based on a sense of commonality and shared experience. In addition to symbolizing solidarity gleaned from past challenges, institutions are perceived as evidence of a continuing consensus over priorities, values and goals between a people and the mechanisms that they have chosen to govern over them. Since reciprocal obligations between citizens and the state are achieved through institutions, institutional integrity may act as an important indicator of societal health. High confidence levels validate an institution’s legitimacy as a vehicle for collective will and action, while low or declining levels of confidence signal an uncoupling of citizen will from the actions of the state. As mentioned in Chapter 3 of this paper, confidence is trust that has been institutionalized through a system of formal rules and regulations.50

A popular explanation behind declining trust and confidence in public institutions is that citizens are increasingly laying blame for the ineffectiveness of government on political structures, processes and leaders. Economic and social problems, such as the state of the economy and the rise of crime, are perceived as symptomatic of an incompetent government.51 In this view, “government’s perceived inability to respond effectively to persistent national problems such as unemployment creates an increasing perception that governments cannot do anything right. …citizens are questioning government’s ability to allocate scarce resources effectively, and they are losing confidence in the usefulness of government and its ability to make the right choices.”52 Current findings appear to support this hypothesis. In 1990, the WVS asked a series of questions on this theme. Overall, Canadians expressed very little trust in their government. Only 3% reported that they “always” trusted the government, 17% that they could “most of the time” and 80% that they could trust only “some of the time” or “almost never”.

Trust that government was doing the “right” thing was also measured using a generalized indicator of perceived systemic integrity and expression of a critical/cynical view of the state. In this vein, respondents were asked the following: “Generally speaking, would you say that this country is run by a few big interests looking out for themselves, or that it is run for the benefit of all people?” This variable was interpreted by the study team as a measure of cynicism or scepticism. Despite the obvious trade-off contained in the question, Canadian respondents appeared unequivocal in their choice, with over 70% believing that the country was run only for a few big interests. As with the trust in government variable, education and income were strong predictors of this indicator. As shown in Table 5.1, those with a low level of education expressed the

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50 Francis Fukuyama, Jean L. Cohen, among others.
highest degree of cynicism, at 82% as compared to 66% for those with a university education. A similar pattern was evident for income levels. Those earning less than $25,000/year were most likely to believe that the country was run for only the interests of the few (76%), as compared to 61% of those earning over $50,000.

Canadians have high expectations for the role government should play in public life, based on perceived and expected performance, and they are likely to lose confidence when these expectations are not met. In this respect, declining confidence in public institutions may reflect a growing lack of faith in the structure and process of governance. Richard Simeon and Elaine Willis have suggested that “disaffection is driven by the gap between expectation and performance”. In their view, “the levels of disaffection and the pervasive sense of failure may be attributable to the sheer range of demands and the often contradictory imperatives which those demands create”.

Indeed, with expectations so high and demands so complex, it may be impossible for public institutions to live up to the ideals expressed by Canadians. In the Canadian WVS, the strongest determinants of mistrust in government were attitudinal in nature, relating to perceptions of the poor performance of government. Mistrust was highest among those who agreed most strongly with the existence of flaws in the Canadian political and economic systems. Among those who agreed strongly with the suggestion that “the Canadian economic system needs fundamental changes”, 40% felt that they could “almost never” trust the federal government. This figure climbed to 45% when those respondents who felt a lack of power in the face of the legal system and the institutional structure of government were included.

Not surprisingly, the ‘confidence in the Canadian political system’ indicator reflected the same kinds of attitudinal predictors as the trust in government indicator. Those who agreed “strongly” that the economic system in Canada required “fundamental changes” expressed significantly lower confidence in the political system, with the proportion of low confidence in this group at nearly 75%. Not unexpectedly, confidence in Parliament appeared to be more strongly related to criticisms of the political process than of the economic system, though this discrepancy was not a pronounced one. Among those who agreed “completely” that the government needed to be “made more open”, over 70% expressed either “none” or “not very much” confidence in Parliament. Among those who felt that the economic system required major structural changes, 68% reported low confidence in Parliament.

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School 2:  The Nation-State is Incapable of Responding to Global Change

A second theory thought to explain declining trust and confidence in governments and institutions is the belief that not only do citizens lack faith that their government will respond to the changing global economic environment, but that they also perceive this ineffectiveness to be symptomatic of a broader weakening of the nation state. In this view, a generalized lack of confidence extends beyond the simple laying of blame and can be traced to a sense of growing futility among citizens. In the economic and social realms, forces of globalization have made it increasingly difficult for national governments to develop effective domestic policies, particularly through traditional policy instruments. The extent of national ‘discontents’ is thus reinforced by the real and perceived inability of public institutions and government to deal with the country’s problems, such that “economic insecurity and pessimism about the lives of future generations have all added to the belief that government either is making things worse or is incapable of making them better”.

This lack of faith is not unique to Canada, though its explanations may be somewhat different. American researchers attribute growing disaffection with public institutions among the white middle classes to a cultural breakdown, noting that the middle classes “are not especially worried about the national economy, the local economy, about their jobs or their personal finances” but “fear that their way of life ... is being lost due to developments in the culture they feel but do not quite understand”. These researchers speculate that the vitality of civic institutions and the commitment of the majority of Americans to the American political culture will be eroded if this trend continues.

Canadian researchers tend to view a growing lack of faith and erosion of trust as more indicative of a breakdown in the social contract -- an institutional problem-- than as a sign of cultural malaise. Basing their argument on the assumption of a Canadian preference for the state as a nation-building tool and key player in social identity and stability, Keith Banting, George Hoberg and Richard Simeon conclude that:

... periods of political stability, widespread consensus, faith in the legitimacy of leaders and institutions, and policy coherence occur when the prevailing political values and practices are consistent with the economic and social realities that confront the society. When they diverge, however, consensus is likely to break down, social conflict to increase, self-interested forms of behaviour to proliferate, alternative ideological prescriptions to multiply, the sense of community to break down, faith and trust in government to decline, institutions to appear cumbersome and unresponsive, and policy to be incoherent and ineffective.

In their view, the challenge (and only feasible outcome) is to “develop new understandings and practices that can sustain enduring values while adapting institutions and practices to new conditions.”

58 Banting, Hoberg and Simeon, p. 411.
School 3: Lack of Faith in Government as an Extension of Individual Frustration and Economic Insecurity

A third school of research suggests that growing mistrust is an extension of frustrations experienced at the individual level, and it is in this area of research that the findings of the present study are most useful. In this view, feelings of insecurity brought about by an individual’s own negative experiences with the pace of social and economic change are attributed to the impact of poor leadership and incompetent governance. Perceived economic marginalization erodes trusting attitudes, since citizens blame government and other public institutions for negative outcomes in their own lives. An association is drawn from personal discontent to discontent with the system and its perceived failures.

Recent findings suggest that these negative feelings and insecurities are primarily economic in origin. Ekos Research found in 1996 that a staggering 43% of Canadians felt that they had “lost all control over their economic future”, while 47% thought that there is a good chance that they would lose their job in the next couple of years. Suzanne Peters, the author of a much cited exploratory project on Canadian values, has also noted the prevalence of this insecurity, observing that “Canadians exhibit a sobering mix of anxiety, insecurity, and alienation “ in which an increase in the perceived risk of losing one’s job, one’s support system, and of increasing crime and poverty now “constitute an economic and social transformation which is shaking Canadian society to the core.”

Our findings support these observations. Subjective well-being indicators such as life and financial satisfaction, sense of control, and personal affect/”frame of mind” indices emerged as significant predictors of trust in government. Low self-esteem, low sense of control, poor outlook for the future and an unwillingness to take risks emerged as useful predictors of mistrust of government. A consistently significant relationship between subjective indicators and responses to trust and confidence questions suggest that feelings of insecurity are negatively associated with distrust of government.

As Figure 5.2 shows, those reporting an above average sense of life satisfaction reported higher overall levels of trust in government, and were also less likely to exhibit extreme negative or positive opinions on this indicator. Those with the lowest levels of financial satisfaction also were the least trusting of government, but those expressing higher levels of financial satisfaction (Figure 5.3), were not significantly higher on this scale.

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Not surprisingly, given the established positive correlations among life satisfaction, financial satisfaction and sense of control indicators, a higher sense of control was related to increased trust in government. As perceptions of control decreased, so did the likelihood of trust, with results ranging from a low of 1.3% (on a four-point scale) among those reporting a low sense of control to a high of 2.1 for those with a high perceived level of control. (Figure 5.4)

Cynical attitudes were associated with more critical and less trusting sentiments. As with both the trust in government and confidence in the political system variables, those who strongly agreed that the economic system required fundamental changes were also much more likely to believe that the country was run only for the benefit of the few, as opposed to the benefit of all people (82%). Further, 86% of those who felt that the political system should be made more ‘open’ to participation by citizens expressed this cynical viewpoint.

High levels of criticism of the political and economic systems were also influenced by measures of subjective well-being, with the highest degree of cynicism in any subgroup recorded by those expressing a low sense of control over their lives (91%). Overall, criticism of the economic system appeared to be by far the most powerful predictor of cynicism. Among those who expressed high support for the way the economic system is run in Canada, a complete reversal was evident: 73% expressed that the country was run “for all people” rather than for just the few. This reversal was further strengthened among those who expressed a high sense of control (76%) and a high sense of life satisfaction (75%).

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Mood also bore a strong relationship to systemic trust and confidence. Figure 5.5 shows this trend using a number of trust variables from the WVS cross-tabbed with respondent scores on the Mood factor index introduced earlier. A higher score on this index indicates a more positive frame of mind. The figure indicates the mean scores on the mood index corresponding to selected responses for individual trust variables. These mean scores are indicated above the respective variables. The reference line labelled “mean” represents the overall population mean score for the Mood Index. In each case, those that scored higher on the Mood index also gave more trusting responses.

Social Capital under Pressure - Economically Insecure and Frustrated Canadians are More Likely to Distrust Others

How does declining trust and confidence relate to the way Canadians perceive each other in the public sphere? If social capital is defined as “the expectation that arises within a community of regular, honest, and co-operative behaviour, based on commonly shared norms, on the part of other members of the community”\(^{61}\), it is built on the trust “embodied in the smallest and most basic social group, the family, as well as the largest of all groups, the nation, and in all the other groups in between”.\(^{62}\) Gauging levels of trust among people reveals the success to which citizens are sharing their common public space, common resources, and common opportunities with their ‘company of strangers’.

The Canadian WVS asked respondents whether they felt that “most people can be trusted”, or whether one could “never be too careful” in their dealings with others. The results revealed some interesting patterns. While in international terms Canadians were quite trusting (only the Scandinavian countries scored higher), in absolute terms the level of trust among people was low (52%). Similarly low levels of trust were detected when Canadians were asked about their sense of trust in their ‘fellow countrymen’. Overall breakdowns showed that only a quarter of respondents “completely” trusted fellow Canadians, while 53% trusted “a little”, and one in five trusted “not much” or “not at all”.

When these figures are contrasted with trust indicators collected in previous years, evidence is mounting that people are losing faith in people, and that this lack of trust is strongly influenced by personal circumstances. Other public opinion research studies have found four main factors that appear to play important roles. First, American research has found that some groups in society are more trusting than others, in particular, those with higher levels of education.\(^ {63}\) Second, since higher educational attainment is often a measure of relative standing in society, class and income measures have also been to found to be important for deciphering the origins of distrust. Third, there appears to be a clear relationship between negative personal feelings and perceptions of injustice in society in general. As such, opportunities to realize one’s expectations in life -- including having the necessary financial resources and social networks -- are conducive to trust, whereas real or perceived social inequality, obstacles to advancement, and outright social disadvantage are not.\(^ {64}\) Finally, economic anxiety and pessimism about economic prospects are damaging to trusting attitudes. The perception of an “increasingly impersonal economy” is particularly telling for those who believe that not only is the economy worsening, but that their own financial futures are deteriorating and that their children will not be better off than they are.\(^ {65}\)

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\(^{64}\) Ibid., p. 3.

\(^{65}\) Morin and Balz, “Reality Check”, Washington Post, January 28, 1996, p.2
These observations were also found by the study team to be characteristic of the Canadian sample. Interpersonal trust appeared to be determined by a multi-layered set of elements, including outlook, control, and willingness to take risks. As Figure 5.6 shows, those possessing a more cautious view of risk were less likely to trust people. The pattern moved in the direction of more trusting views as respondents moved up the scale toward a ‘bold’ outlook. Attitudes were also tempered by sense of control. Those expressing low levels of perceived control over their lives were less likely to trust people in general (Figure 5.7).

Sense of control is also evident in respondents’ views of the political process. When results for trust were broken down by views toward the pace of political change in Canada, those strongly believing that the pace of change was too fast were less likely to trust in general (68%), as compared to 38%) who disagreed strongly with this notion.

Life and financial satisfaction were also influential, as indicated by a pattern where above average life satisfaction coincided with increasing levels of interpersonal trust. Figures 5.2 and 5.3 (presented earlier) demonstrate the direction of this relationship, with lowest levels of both financial and life satisfaction coincided with lower means scores on the “trust fellow countrymen” indicator.

**Socio-demographic Characteristics of Trusting Attitudes**

Subjective well-being and ‘trusting optimism’ are related concepts since the ability to trust is more likely to be found among those who are insulated from the ‘menace’ of the untrustworthy. The simple hypothesis of Eric Uslaner, an American sociologist, stated that the more affluent an individual is (in objective terms) or feels (in subjective terms), the more likely he or she is to trust in general. Here, trust is a function of personal circumstances and optimism: people who have enjoyed a modicum of prosperity either through familial wealth or personal effort are more confident about their futures and have more reasons to be optimistic. They are also more likely to give trusting responses to subjective trust indicators. In a “risk society”, opportunities to realize one’s own economic and social expectations are more likely to bring about an increase in general trust levels, whereas perceived inequality and injustice are not. Trust declines as

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66 Eric Uslaner, as cited in Robert Wuthnow, “The Foundations of Trust”.

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economic resources decline; people are less trusting when they have fewer economic resources to risk because they have more to lose.67

Socio-demographic breakdowns of this type were evident in the Canadian sample, following the same patterns as were observed by American researchers. In 1990, those most inclined to believe that “one can never be too careful” were those with low levels of education (65%), (see Figure 5.8) those with low household incomes (69%) and low rankings on the Well-Being Index (56%). Age also appeared to play a role, with younger Canadians being less trusting: 60% of those under the age of 25 expressed cautious attitudes with respect to others. A number of factors appear to influence variations for the “trust fellow countrymen” indicator. Here, age group was the most powerful predictor, as shown in Figure 5.9.

Regional and linguistic breakdowns were also strong, reflecting possible socio-economic links. In this regard, Quebec and the Atlantic provinces were the least trusting (61%), followed by Ontario, Manitoba and Saskatchewan (45%). By comparison, Albertans and British Columbians were highly trusting, with only 31% expressing cautious attitudes toward people in general. These regional breakdowns were highlighted by a linguistic cleavage, with Anglophones more likely to express general trust in people (58%) than Francophones (35%). In each case, results were tempered by educational attainment and income rankings, reflecting a complexity that could be based on regional educational and income patterns. If the poor and uneducated are less likely to trust, it would follow that poorer regions would express an aggregate general mistrust. In Atlantic Canada and Quebec, for example, 84% of those with a low level of education expressed non-trusting attitudes, while only 10% of high income earners in the prosperous West did so.

**Trust, confidence and social capital - Conclusions**

These findings suggest that optimism, pessimism and sense of control play key attitudinal roles in all types of trust. In this assessment, trust in people, and, by extension trust in institutions of governance, are functions of personal circumstances, in which perceptions of opportunity play a key role.

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It is perhaps no coincidence that the attitudinal and socio-demographic variables described above formed strong predictors of trust, confidence and cynicism. The similarity among the findings and patterns of responses would suggest that they are all measuring a similar underlying theme: that those believing economic and political systems are ill-equipped to respond to changes in the global economy and require changes are also those more likely to feel a lack of personal control over their lives, express low levels of life and financial satisfaction and feel least confident about the integrity of the ‘system’ in general.

Trust and social capital, if they are grounded in a personal sense of well-being, may not be easy to rebuild in the face of current social and economic anxiety. A critical question for those interested in the future cohesiveness of Canadian society is whether those individuals with the lowest levels of trust are also withdrawing their allegiance from the country. We therefore turn now to the question of whether attachment to and pride in Canada are being affected by these global and personal factors.
6. ATTACHMENT TO AND IDENTIFICATION WITH CANADA

The findings thus far have indicated that 1) Canadians are sceptical of both the integrity of their fellow Canadians and the competence of traditional institutions of governance, and 2) these feelings appear to be linked to growing personal feelings of insecurity, lack of satisfaction, and pessimistic outlook for the future. It was the intention of this study to make qualitative and quantitative connections between apparently dissimilar ideas: growing senses of economic and social anxiety and pride in country. The findings thus far suggest that as perceived anxieties increase, trust and confidence decline – first among Canadians themselves and more broadly as blame is assigned to government and other public institutions. It is here, however, that the argument appears to encounter obstacles since findings suggest little direct correlation between trust and pride indicators.

What is the link between anxiety and pride? We believe the answer lies somewhere in the complex maze of identity formation, national attachment, and belonging. Insecurities brought about by economic change reinforce fragmenting identities as individual need increasingly circumvents a desire for community membership. During the “nasty nineties”, individuals have been forced to look increasingly to themselves and their families for support, bringing identity and political concerns closer to home. In return, identity formation becomes an issue increasingly removed from national and collective activity. 68 Personal identity replaces collective identity as the basis for contemporary political engagement.

This link to personal attachment at first glance appears to be a tenuous one, since declining trust and confidence in government is more likely symptomatic of a growing dissatisfaction with traditional structures and processes of governance than of changes in personal identity formation. Michael Ignatieff argues that “all modern politics is about belonging, about creating the understandings and the institutional frameworks which enable us to believe that we do actually belong to communities called ‘society’ or ‘nation’ ” 69. Are those Canadians who feel increasingly frustrated with their economic outlooks and disenchanted with government for failing to counteract the negative aspects of globalization less likely to feel Canadian or ‘attached’ to Canada?

Globalization, Individualization and Attachment

One approach to bridging these two ideas is to look at the way that globalization and the globalized economic system are affecting the social sphere and the formation of personal political identities. The impact of changing relationships among political identity, government and nation may be found in the way Canadians define themselves, and the degree to which ‘Canada’ as a nation holds power as a vehicle of identification. Across modern industrial nations, collective identification appears to be weakening to the point of jeopardizing the social supports that have traditionally contributed to secure identities and self images. 70 In this respect, American analyst Lance Bennett has noted that:

changes in the social organization of work have created a host of familiar stresses and insecurities that stem from career changes, layoff, and underemployment and result in disruptions of personal time,

70 Ibid.
family patterns and social roles. All of these changes have created dilemmas for individuals as they construct and manage personal identities.\textsuperscript{71}

Bennett identifies two polarizing challenges in the relationship between an individualizing society and community membership. First: ‘globalization’, or the appearance of it, has compelled individuals to turn “inward”, and to “embellish [their] own personal identity”, usually through very localized, often non-geographic attachments. At the root of this force is the need to combat the “rootlessness” of globalization, since “as institutional and geographic borders lose their legitimacy, our search for belonging intensifies.”\textsuperscript{72} Second, Bennett argues, a fear of ‘being left behind’ and the lure of ‘cosmopolitan globalism’ is compelling many to turn their gazes ‘outward’, toward larger regions and the world. If the nation-state is becoming an antiquated structure increasingly incapable of achieving national goals, it would seem natural for individuals to abandon it for alternative sources of identity, reducing in turn their attachment to it.\textsuperscript{73}

The study team wished to assess the way in which Canadians define themselves (belonging and identification), and expressed capacity for mobility (attachment). Such sentiments are difficult to support empirically using available indicators. Attachment, belonging and identification are concepts normally measured using two question forms. The most common tool is one which measures how “close” a respondent feels to his or her town, province, region, and country. This question is intended to gauge an individual’s primary sense of attachment (i.e. one’s first choice). Another tool to measure attachment questioned respondents’ willingness to leave if such a move would bring about improved working or living conditions. This form of question was a useful indicator of the mobility capacity of the sample, but is used here to gauge attachment. For example, how willing would an individual be to move to the United States if it meant he or she could earn a higher salary, pay lower taxes, and enjoy warm weather throughout the year? Exploring to what extent these attractions are convincing to Canadians, and to whom they are attractive are highly relevant to the questions at hand.

**Socio-demographic Characteristics of Reduced Attachment**

Various polling surveys have attempted to assess propensity to move. In 1998, Goldfarb Consultants Inc. examined data that showed young people between the ages of 18 and 24 were more willing to consider moving to the United States and becoming American and found that this sentiment rapidly diminished as Canadians moved into their late 20s.\textsuperscript{74} Why were young people more willing to move? Part of the answer may lie in frustrated material expectations. Goldfarb asked Canadians to compare how they felt about their country and how it was actually viewed on the world stage. There was widespread agreement that the country was performing up to Canadians’ expectations in areas such as the environment, education and quality of life. However, when it came to providing jobs for its people, the gap between expectation and reality was wide, with 39% of Canadians wanting to see Canada as a good provider of jobs, but only 12% feeling that this was the way it was actually viewed internationally.\textsuperscript{75}

The study team compared the responses to Goldfarb’s question asking whether Canada could be described as a country with good economic opportunities with the responses to the questions

\textsuperscript{71} Bennett, “The UnCivic Culture: Communication, Identity, and the Rise of Lifestyle Politics”, p. 16.

\textsuperscript{72} Irshad Manji, Risking Utopia: On the Edge of a New Democracy (Toronto: Douglas and McIntyre, 1997), p.11.

\textsuperscript{73} Barnard, Cosgrave and Welsh, Chips and Pop: Decoding the Nexus Generation. (Toronto: Malcolm Lester, 1998), p. 215.


about willingness to move to the U.S. and to become an American citizen. The results are shown in Table 6.1.

**TABLE 6.1**  
**ECONOMIC PROSPECTS AND INTEREST IN LEAVING CANADA - 1998**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Good economic opportunity (% rating highly)</th>
<th>Likelihood of moving to the United States (% saying very or somewhat likely)</th>
<th>Interest in becoming an American citizen (% saying very or somewhat)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total - CANADA</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>AGE GROUPS</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18-24</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25-34</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35-49</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50-64</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>65+</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>HOUSEHOLD INCOME</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low (under $35K)</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium ($35-60K)</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High ($60K+)</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>EMPLOYMENT STATUS</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employed full-time</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employed part-time</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Student</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not in labour force</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Goldfarb Report 1998

These results suggest that young people and those who were unemployed were the least content with economic prospects in Canada and were more likely to consider not only leaving, but also discarding their Canadian citizenship in favour of another. Disappointment with economic prospects appears to be highest among those between 25 and 34, while readiness to move is highest among the youngest cohort and those who were unemployed.

**FIGURE 6.1**  
**WILLINGNESS TO LEAVE CANADA VARIATIONS BY EDUCATION LEVEL**

0 20 40 60 80
% Unwilling to Leave Willing to Leave

☐ High School ☐ Some or Complete College ☐ Some or Complete University

Source: ISSP National Identity 1995
Breaking down attitudinal variables in the World Values Survey (1990) and ISSP (1995) on selected socio-demographic indicators further supported Goldfarb’s findings by revealing specific segments of the population that were more likely to express a willingness to move in order to improve living or working conditions. As Figures 6.1 and 6.2 show, education was a powerful predictor of mobility in the general population in 1995, with only 13.5% of those with only a high school education willing to leave Canada, as compared to 40% of those with some to complete university education. Thirty-five per cent of those with some to complete university were also willing to leave North America. Breakdowns by employment status revealed a similar finding (Figure 6.3), with students emerging as the most willing to move, at 44%, as compared to a national average of 25%.
Segmentation analysis also revealed that education and age characteristics followed similar patterns with respect to mobility and attachment. In particular, young Canadians (aged 18-34) with higher levels of education (university complete) were most likely to express a willingness to leave the country. Figure 6.4 displays the results of a breakdown on this basis.

Interestingly, the 1990 WVS data revealed that weaker attachment and a greater willingness to move did not extend to substantial changes in locus of primary identification among this group. As Figure 6.5 shows, more of this ‘young and educated’ cohort chose Canada as their primary attachment than any other choice, and at a percentage roughly equal to that of the general population (35% as compared to 40%). This group was, however, more likely to choose North America or the world as their primary level of identification (17% as compared to 13%).
Values and Attitudinal Characteristics of Primary Identification

Analysis of the primary geographic identification variable using attitudinal measures in the WVS revealed two key findings. First, Canadians who scored higher on the confidence index were less likely to choose ‘Canada’ as their primary level of identification and more likely to choose North America or the World. As Figure 6.6 shows, 40% of those with lower levels of personal confidence chose Canada, and only 13% made a more ‘cosmopolitan’ choice. Among those with high confidence, the percentage identifying primarily with Canada was halved, while the percentage of those choosing North America or the World more than doubled.

![Figure 6.6: Primary Identification: Confidence Index](image)


Figure 6.7 shows a comparison between materialist/post-materialist values and choices of primary identification. The pattern of attachments indicates a clear ‘outward’ trend with increased post-materialist response patterns: a higher percentage of pure post-materialists chose the ‘cosmopolitan’ option of North America or the World (26%) than the choice of ‘Canada’ (24%), while nearly 50% of pure materialists chose Canada as their primary attachment and only 9% chose the cosmopolitan option.

![Figure 6.7: Primary Identification: Post-Materialist Values](image)

International Comparisons

The 1995 International Social Survey asked two questions to gauge degrees of attachment to community and nation. In the first set, respondents were asked to rate their willingness to move to another region or province, country, or continent if it meant they could improve their working or living conditions (attachment). In another set, respondents were asked how ‘close’ they felt to these choices (belonging and identification). International comparisons on these indicators revealed that in general, Canadians expressed a high capacity for mobility. Figures 6.8 and 6.9 show the results for these comparisons. Overall, degree of attachment among Canadians to both the nation and the continent was lower relative to other nations in the study, with over one in four respondents indicating that they would be willing to move away from Canada to improve their living and working conditions. Further, Canadians scored highest among developed nations in their willingness to leave their continent.

Degree of attachment, as measured by how “close” respondents felt to selected geographical entities, also revealed low positive feelings within the Canadian sample. As Figures 6.10 and 6.11 show, Canada ranked near the middle and bottom ranges relative to other nations. Particularly surprising was the finding that Canadians do not feel as “close” to their country as other nations despite high levels of pride recorded in the WVS and elsewhere.

These international comparisons show that Canada ranks highly with respect to populations willing to move within and outside the country and continent to improve working and living conditions, and populations expressing lower feelings of attachment. The discrepancy between attachment, identification and pride led the study group to explore whether particular groups in Canadian society were driving these lower reported degrees of attachment, and whether these groups matched the same socio-demographic characteristics as those expressing low levels of life and financial satisfaction, personal confidence, sense of control, and trust.
Attachment to and Identification with Canada - Conclusions

The study team found that in 1990 and 1995, the ‘frustrated expectations’ of younger and higher educated Canadians were more likely to manifest themselves in a higher overall willingness to move outside of Canada and North America to improve living or working conditions. Those who were most confident tended to identify less with the nation, as did those who exhibited more post-materialist response patterns. These findings suggested that a continued commitment to the country was most likely to be made by those with fewer options and lower expectations: older, less educated and less confident Canadians.

Contradictory findings on attachment and identification indicators raised other questions: despite their willingness to move to improve materialist prospects, younger and more highly educated Canadians were only slightly less likely to identify Canada as their primary level of attachment than older and less highly educated citizens. This latter finding would appear to weaken the arguments cited above that the forces of globalization and individualization are leading younger Canadians to turn inward to local communities and attachments.

On the other hand, willingness to move despite positive identification with Canada would seem to suggest that symbolic identities and attachments, strong as they may be, are losing their power to sustain a physical connection with the country. These findings lend some credence to arguments that globalization, coupled with the growing cosmopolitanism and personal confidence of younger and more educated segments of the Canadian population, may be weakening the ties that bind these people to Canada. Arguments in favour of changing definitions of identity – largely in favour of non-state expressions – are also supported since a desire to leave the country may not be associated with an individual’s sense of being a ‘Canadian’. In this sense, weak attachment and nation-based primary identification are not mutually exclusive attitudes.
The limitations of available attachment and identification indicators mean that it is unclear whether emotional ties to Canada are weakening. If economic circumstances are driving Canadians away, are social and cultural factors keeping them here? How does national pride fit into personal and collective identities? The final section which follows explores the concept of pride (national affect) and attempts to disentangle the factors that promote and erode emotional identification with and attachment to Canada.
7. PRIDE IN CANADA - DECONSTRUCTING NATIONAL AFFECT

Thus far, we have examined the impact of personal well-being/confidence on hope for the future and the role that personal affect plays in contributing to trust and confidence in government and other institutions. We have shown that those with more education and skills seem to be more willing to move, even if this means leaving Canada, and we have speculated about the strength of their attachment and belonging to the country, based on these findings.

This section will focus on empirical measures of national pride to see if they are correlated with hope, trust, confidence and attachment. The guiding questions for this line of inquiry are the following:

- Does national pride have a civic dimension? Is pride in Canada related to shared values and collective interests?
- Is pride in Canada related to perceptions of systemic integrity such as trust and confidence in government?
- What is the relationship between identification, attachment to Canada and national pride?
  - How are shifts in personal values affecting national pride?

For the purposes of analysis, the study team employed a survey methodology commonly used in marketing known as the “top-box approach” in its treatment of the ‘pride in being Canadian’ variable. This approach holds that in a “mature market” -- defined as a market for whom the issue in question is easily recognized -- those who perceive any degree of doubt with respect to the issue will not choose the most positive response option. Only those who feel unquestioned satisfaction with an issue will choose this option. Those who feel any degree of hesitancy are grouped to form the ‘dissatisfied’. Using this breakdown, 60% of Canadians were “very proud”, and 40% expressed lesser degrees of pride.

The collective component of national pride is what it usually measured by polls and surveys, but the personal component -- whether one feels better about oneself as a result of being a Canadian -- is less well-understood and less often investigated. After a brief theoretical review of the concept of ‘national pride’, this section explores the collective and individual elements that increase Canadians’ positive attitudes toward their country. It then builds on the analysis presented thus far and examines the personal components of pride and the social psychological factors, such as mood and trust, which may influence its levels. This section offers some hypotheses about the relationship between personal affect and national pride, although we admit that we will be making a “leap of faith” based on limited indicators. Finally, we draw conclusions about the relationships between national pride, collective achievements, personal affect and their implications for social cohesion.

National pride and National Identity - Definitions and Distinctions

In this sub-section we look at the concept of national pride and at its relationship to social cohesion, which has been defined by the federal government’s Social Cohesion Research Network as being:

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the ongoing process of developing a community of shared values, shared challenges and equal opportunity within Canada, based on a sense of trust, hope and reciprocity among all Canadians.\textsuperscript{77}

It may be useful to recall the set of definitions of “national pride” and “national identity” developed by Smith and Jarkko of the National Opinion Research Centre (NORC) at the University of Chicago and outlined in the introductory section of this paper. In their view:

\begin{itemize}
\item National identity is the cohesive force that both holds nation states together and shapes their relationship with the family of nations.
\item National pride is the positive affect that the public feels towards their country as a result of their national identity. National pride has a collective component (the sense of esteem that a person has for one’s nation) and a personal component (the self-esteem that a person derives from one’s national identity).\textsuperscript{78}
\end{itemize}

Pradip N. Thomas, writing in the journal \textit{Media Development}, defines national identity as “the glue that binds all citizens to a larger, wider, trans-local sense of belonging to the nation-state”. Like Smith and Jarkko, he distinguishes national identity from nationalism, which he characterizes as “the expression of a particular, often exclusive version of national identity”.\textsuperscript{79}

In common with other commentators, he locates national identity within a framework of democratic citizenship, stating that “National identity is more than pious words enshrined in formal doctrines such as a constitution: it is fundamentally about the rights to citizenship and the enjoyment of those rights”.\textsuperscript{80}

In Britain, a study by Mark Leonard of the Demos think tank identified three levels of national identity:

1. values, principles and cherished beliefs - the “glue for corporate or social cohesion as well as ... the source of people’s motivation to act in a wider interest”;
2. institutions which express identity, including parliaments, businesses, charities;
3. messages or forms of identity, such as flags, logos and citizen behaviours.\textsuperscript{81}

Leonard concluded that change at the cultural (or first level) would have to be reflected in the other two levels. If institutions and messages do not conform with the values and principles espoused by citizens, its identity can fall into crisis with negative consequences for social cohesion. In Canada, current concerns about decreasing social capital and threats to social cohesion may well be symptomatic of a growing disconnect between values, institutions and messages. To explore whether feelings about the country – its cultural capital – are also being affected by such a disconnect, we begin with an examination of the linkages between collective values and national pride and identity.

\textsuperscript{77} Social Cohesion Research Workplan. (Ottawa, 1997), p. 4.
\textsuperscript{78} National Pride: A Cross-national Analysis. p. 1.
\textsuperscript{80} Thomas, p. 3.
\textsuperscript{81} Mark Leonard, Britain™ - Renewing Our Identity. (London, 1997), p. 45.
Civic Values and the “State-Nation”

The relationship between pride and national identity has been a preoccupation of the Canadian government for several decades but became a particularly salient issue in the 1990s in the context of the discussions on constitutional renewal. A position paper published by the federal government in 1991 on Shared Values: The Canadian Identity concluded that:

Canada is a country that believes in freedom, dignity and respect, equality and fair treatment, and opportunity to participate. It is a country that cares for the disadvantaged at home and elsewhere, a country that prefers peaceful solutions to disputes. Canada is a country that, for all its diversity, has shared values.  

Implied, if not stated, was that these shared values were sources of pride for Canadians, serving as the foundation of the national community and the national identity. By basing national identity on a set of shared values, this publication also implicitly acknowledged the linkage between the personal values held by Canadians and the collective expression of these values in the form of a Canadian identity.

Several commentators have been more explicit in tying individual values to their collective expression as national identity. Richard Gwyn in his book Nationalism Without Walls: The Unbearable Lightness of Being Canadian observed that Canada was not really a nation state but a “state nation”, by which he meant that “our state has formed us and has shaped our character in a way that is true for no other people in the world”. He concluded that “without a common ethnic identity, without much remembered (or imagined) history, without external walls, the Canadian community either exists as a political entity within which all here act as citizens, involving themselves with others in a not-too-strict account of how much the [tax] bargain is worth ... or there is no particular reason for the Canadian community to exist at all.” This “state-nation” orientation has been supported empirically through polling results. Ekos Research Associates, as part of its Rethinking Government project, asked participants to rate the most important values both for society and for the federal government. It discovered that these values were basically identical.

Michael Ignatieff has reviewed the phenomenon of individualization within modern democratic states founded on the principle of the “civic nation”. In his view:

A civic society should ... be a free one. Individuals ought to be free in their patriotism. They should choose their level and degree of civic attachment. From which it follows that many will choose precious little attachment.

This tension between freedom and belonging is played out daily in conflicts between personal / family needs versus career / civic obligations. In Ignatieff’s view, “Our anxieties about what we owe society and what society owes us are integral to the modern idea of belonging.”

84 Nationalism Without Walls, p. 34.
86 Ignatieff, “Belonging in the past”, p. 4.
87 Ignatieff, “Belonging in the past”, p. 5.
to Fukuyama’s assertion that institutional arrangements matter less than civil society and culture, Ignatieff believes that procedural fairness at the institutional level may be the only sure basis for belonging in an individualistic, pluralist society and that if “the liberal state guarantees procedural fairness to all groups, there is no reason in principle why they cannot compete and disagree peacefully”. His assertion that a well-functioning civic apparatus is a critical component of national belonging and pride resonates particularly strongly in Canada since Canadians have traditionally viewed the civic nation as central to their identity.

What these commentators have in common is a recognition that national identities are fundamentally linked to the way that individual citizens view themselves. Whether characterized as “culture”, “values” or “self-esteem”, there is a consensus that a national identity must reflect the underlying self-image of the individual. However, as noted in earlier chapters, the nature of personal identities in advanced, post-industrial societies appears to be shifting. Some have attributed this shift to growing individualism: others to growing post-materialism. While the jury may be out on the underlying causes of this shift, there is no doubt that collective judgements about public policy, as well as national pride, are affected when personal values change.

The Demographics of Pride

A review of the demographics of pride is a useful prelude to the “deconstruction” that we undertake in this chapter. The first major point to be noted is that Canadians are prouder of their country than the citizens of most other nations. In 1990, the World Values Survey asked the question “How proud are you to be Canadian?”. A huge majority (94%) said that they were very or quite proud. Only 6% said that they were not very proud or not at all proud. This non-proud figure was increased to 40% when the “top-box” approach was used.

Among standard Socio-demographic predictors, language emerged as the best predictor of pride, followed by region. As Figure 7.1 shows, about 67% of English Canadians said that they were very proud to be Canadian, as compared to 39% of French Canadians. Further breakdowns revealed that within the French Canadian group, men with higher educations expressed the lowest levels of pride, with only 31% saying that they were very proud.

Region was also a strong predictor of national pride, with Ontario and Atlantic Canada expressing the greatest pride in Canada and Quebec the least. (See Figure 7.2). In view of the continuing strength of the sovereignty movement in Quebec, it is probably not surprising that 15% of respondents in Quebec said they were not very or not at all proud of Canada, as compared to less than 2% of respondents in Ontario and Atlantic Canada and about 4% in the West. On the other hand, one should not lose sight of the fact that 85% of Quebecers were very or quite proud of Canada in 1990.

FIGURE 7.1 PRIDE IN BEING CANADIAN: LANGUAGE GROUP

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88 Ignatieff, “Belonging in the past”, p. 5.
Strategic Recherche
Research et analyse
and Analysis stratégiques

Another significant determinant of national pride in Canada was age. As Figure 7.3 indicates, 73% of those over 65 years of age were very proud of being Canadian, as compared to 58% of those under the age of 65. Those under 65 were also more inclined express negative feelings about their country, with 41% exhibiting feelings of hesitation and failing to choose the extreme positive option.

Patterns were also evident when pride was compared with educational attainment. As Figure 7.4 shows, as level of education increased, so too did a propensity to exhibit feelings of hesitation with respect to national pride, with 45% of those with the highest levels of education saying that they were less than very proud.

**Pride in Collective and Individual Achievements**

The 1990 *World Values Survey* asked respondents what made them proud to be Canadians (see Figure 7.5). When asked to choose among these options, 37% of Canadians identified the health and welfare system (clearly a collective and “civic” element) as their greatest source of pride in the country. Canadian scientific achievements were the next most popular source of collective pride. Culture and the arts generated pride among 10% of Canadians, while another 10% said that Canada’s sporting achievements made them proud. However, Canada’s economic and political systems were identified by only 5% and 4% respectively as sources of pride.
Canadians over the age of 55 tended to be most proud of the health and welfare system, with 46% of this group saying that it made them proud, as compared to 37% of Canadians overall. On the other hand, as shown in Figure 7.6, younger and more educated Canadians were slightly more likely to view sporting achievements (15%) and scientific achievements (32%) with pride. In his comparison of Canada and the United States on specific pride measures using the 1990 World Values Survey, Nevitte found that Americans are nearly twice as likely as Canadians to look at their scientific achievements (46% versus 26%) as a source of pride, and are more likely to be proud of their political system (17% versus 4%) and their economic achievements (12% versus 5%). Canadians, on the other hand, express much greater pride than Americans in their health and welfare system (37% versus 7%), and they are slightly more likely to look to their sporting achievements (10% versus 5%) and their culture (10% versus 8%) as sources of pride.

The 1995 International Social Survey also asked whether specific national achievements made people very proud or proud. The results were as shown on Table 7.1. Overall, Canada ranked third among 23 nations when pride was measured in this way. What is interesting about Table 7.1 is how closely the responses in 1995 correspond to those in 1990. Canadians ranked national scientific, arts and sporting achievements highly in 1995, as they did in 1990. Similarly, the social security system (a “civic” value, like the health and welfare system) tied for fifth place with Canada’s history, despite Gwyn’s contention that there is little “remembered” history. Interestingly, when the 1990 choice of “political systems” was made more explicit in 1995, Canadians also ranked democracy in Canada and Canada’s political influence in the world quite highly, in third and seventh place respectively. As in 1990, economic achievements garnered a much lower level of pride.

Nevitte, The Decline of Deference - Canadian Value Change in a Cross-National Perspective, p. 65. It should be noted that the WVS asked respondents to choose one source of pride from a list, rather than asking how proud the respondent was of each item, as did the International Social Survey.
For all countries, Smith and Jarkko noted that, “On average pride in Specific Achievements is greater for non-political domains (History, Arts and Literature and Sports) than for domains tied to the state and public policies (e.g. Global Political Influence, the Military and Social Welfare). In absolute terms, Canadians also ranked these types of personal achievements quite highly. However, in relative terms, Canadians tended to be much prouder of the way our democracy works, of our social security system, and of our political influence in the world than respondents in other countries. All of the latter can be considered expressions of collective esteem -- a positive assessment of the nation’s collective achievements -- rather than personal esteem -- the personal “high” one feels when the achievements of a country’s scientists, artists or athletes garner international acclaim.

TABLE 7.1
PRIDE IN SPECIFIC NATIONAL ACHIEVEMENTS - 1995
CANADA COMPARED TO INTERNATIONAL RANKINGS*
(% VERY PROUD AND SOMEWHAT PROUD)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Canada(%) / Ranking</th>
<th>International (%) / Ranking</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Scientific achievements</td>
<td>84 / 1</td>
<td>68 / 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arts achievements</td>
<td>80 / 2</td>
<td>73 / 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Way democracy works</td>
<td>79 / 3</td>
<td>49 / 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sports achievements</td>
<td>78 / 4</td>
<td>77 / 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>History</td>
<td>77 / 5</td>
<td>71 / 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social security system</td>
<td>77 / 6</td>
<td>41 / 9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political influence in the world</td>
<td>72 / 7</td>
<td>44 / 8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic achievements</td>
<td>58 / 8</td>
<td>48 / 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armed forces</td>
<td>55 / 9</td>
<td>45 / 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fair and equal treatment to all groups</td>
<td>n/a**</td>
<td>39 / 10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: International Social Survey Program, 1995
* 23 countries participated.
** Choice was inadvertently dropped from the Canadian survey.

The 1995 International Social Survey also asked a series of questions that were used to measure general national pride -- or pride that was not related to specific national achievements but was more in line with traditional nationalism (defined by Smith and Jarkko as “a strong national devotion that places one’s own country above all others”)91. Respondents were asked to say whether they agreed strongly, agreed, felt neutral, disagreed or strongly disagreed with a number of statements about their country. The results are shown on Table 7.2.

TABLE 7.2
GENERAL NATIONAL PRIDE - 1995
CANADA COMPARED TO INTERNATIONAL RANKINGS*
(% AGREEING STRONGLY AND AGREEING)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Canada</th>
<th>International</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rather be a citizen of own country than any other</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country better than others</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Have reasons to be ashamed of country</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World would be better if more like own country</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support country - right or wrong</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: International Social Survey Program, 1995
* 23 countries participated

---

This pride scale, as Smith and Jarkko note, is less tied to objective conditions and depends, to a
great extent, on "subjective assessments of national identity." Canada ranked fifth among the
23 countries when scores on all five measures were aggregated. In general, Canadians were
more likely than citizens of other countries to view their country as better than others and as a
model for emulation. On the other hand, they also appeared to be more prepared to recognize
their country's shortcomings and to withdraw their support if the country's actions did not
measure up to respondents' sense of right and wrong.

Overall, the deconstruction of pride by specific achievements yields another important piece to
the puzzle of national affect. Canadians are relatively more proud of our collective social
achievements than people in other parts of the world. They particularly value the way our
democracy and social security system works, and appear to see these factors as contributing to
our positive image abroad. Political and economic systems ranked lower among Canadians as
sources of pride, and this may help to explain why change at these levels seems more
acceptable to them than in the social system.

**Systemic Integrity and Pride - The Weak Link**

The following sections probe beneath demographics and specific sources of pride to seek a
clearer picture of what attitudinal influences affect overall levels of national pride. One of the
most striking findings from our analysis is the weak relationship between pride in Canada and
trust and confidence in institutions, particularly government. Recalling our earlier point that trust
is based on first-hand, personal knowledge, while confidence relies more on perceptions of
systemic integrity, we decided to look first at the responses to questions about trust and pride in
Canada to see if they revealed anything about the relationship between personal and national
affect. Then we turned our attention to the systemic questions of confidence in various
institutions to see if they were related to national pride.

The 1990 *World Values Survey* asked a series of
questions about trust -- whether the respondent
trusted people in general, his or her fellow
Canadians and the government. In 1990, 53% of
Canadians said that you could trust people most of
the time, but 47% felt that you can never be too
careful about other people. When this response
was cross-tabbed with the question about pride in
Canada, 54% of those who were very proud of
Canada also said that they trusted people, as
compared to 36% of those who were not at all
proud of Canada. Figure 7.7 shows the overall
response to the question, “How much do you trust
your fellow Canadians?” When this result was
compared with responses for national pride (shown
in Table 7.3) the result was statistically significant
and showed a clear pattern. Seventy-three per cent of those who expressed high levels of pride
also said they trusted their fellow Canadians “completely”, as compared to 28% of those
expressing less pride. Seventy-one per cent of those who were mistrustful of their fellow
Canadians also expressed lower levels of pride, as compared to only 29% of those who said
they were very proud.

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High levels of mistrust were recorded when Canadians were asked whether they “trusted government to do what was right”. As shown in Table 7.4, even those who said that they were very proud of Canada indicated high levels of mistrust of government. Among those who were not as proud, a slightly higher number said that they almost never trusted the government to do what is right. These results, while constituting a weak measure, were statistically significant.

Finally, we looked at the relationship between national pride and our measure of cynicism, a question that asked whether the country was run for a few big interests or for all the people. In 1990, Canadians overwhelmingly believed that the country was run for a few big interests (70%), rather than for all the people (30%). As Table 7.5 shows, those who scored low on measures of pride were somewhat more likely to say that the country was run for a few big interests. This relationship was statistically significant.

The 1990 World Values Survey asked respondents to indicate whether they had a great deal, quite a lot, not very much or no confidence in a series of institutions, and the study team also examined these variables in relation to pride in Canada. Figure 7.8 shows the percentages expressing high (a great deal or quite a lot) and low (not very much or no) confidence in several public institutions.
In general, Canadians tended to have more confidence in administrative arms of the state, such as the social security system and the legal system, than in its political apparatus. However, when confidence in these institutions was compared with pride in Canada, it became evident that those expressing low confidence tended to be slightly less proud than those who had higher confidence. Table 7.6 shows the percentage difference between those with high and low confidence at each level of pride. The biggest “pride gap” was found with regard to the armed forces: 81% of those with high confidence in the armed forces said that they were very proud of Canada, as compared to 51% of those with low confidence. The “pride gap” was also large between those having high confidence in the legal system (67% of whom were very proud) and those with low confidence (53% very proud). In other words, those who were least confident in the armed forces and the legal system -- both instruments of the state coercive power -- also tended to be the least proud of Canada. However, as the third row of Table 7.6 indicates, people with low levels of confidence in governing and state institutions still tended to say that they were “quite proud” of Canada.

### FIGURE 7.8

**CONFIDENCE IN PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS**

![Confidence in Public Institutions](image)

- **High Confidence**
- **Low Confidence**


### TABLE 7.6

**PRIDE IN CANADA**

PERCENTAGE DIFFERENTIAL BETWEEN THOSE WITH HIGH AND LOW CONFIDENCE IN SELECTED INSTITUTIONS - 1990

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pride levels</th>
<th>Political system</th>
<th>Parliament</th>
<th>Civil service</th>
<th>Armed forces</th>
<th>Social security system</th>
<th>Legal system</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Not at all</td>
<td>+2</td>
<td>+1</td>
<td>+1</td>
<td>+2</td>
<td>+1</td>
<td>+1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not very</td>
<td>+2</td>
<td>+2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>+4</td>
<td>+1</td>
<td>+2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quite proud</td>
<td>+6</td>
<td>+5</td>
<td>+6</td>
<td>+23</td>
<td>+5</td>
<td>+10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very proud</td>
<td>-10</td>
<td>-7</td>
<td>-7</td>
<td>-30</td>
<td>-6</td>
<td>-14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: *World Values Survey, 1990*

The intuitive expectation that Canadians’ decreasing confidence in government and institutions would be reflected in decreased levels of pride was only very slightly borne out by an examination of the data in the 1990 *World Values Survey*. While some patterns were evident, the relationship was, for the most part, insignificant, suggesting a surprising disconnect between the political and the patriotic. Those few Canadians who said that they were not very or not at all proud tended to be least confident in the armed forces and legal systems, but the main impact of this lack of confidence appeared to be a reduction in pride from the “very proud” to the “quite proud” category. Negativity and cynicism had a predictable impact on pride responses, but not as great as expected. In fact, it would appear that while social capital may be eroded by lack of trust, cultural capital (in the form of national pride) may not be as greatly affected.
These findings leave us with a number of questions. If, as Mark Leonard suggests, expressions of national identity and pride are a function of values, institutions and messages, why do low levels of confidence in national institutions not have a very great impact on national pride? If lack of trust in government and confidence in the governance system does not significantly affect national pride, what does? We turn now to the issue of value orientations, attachment and belonging to explore what impact these had on Canadians' sense of pride.

Value Orientation: Patriotism and Cosmopolitanism

In 1990, the World Values Survey asked a series of questions about policy goals that people would like to see for their country. What is striking about these results is the high percentages of respondents who chose economic growth and a stable economy as their first priorities. Despite the rise of post-materialism, large numbers of Canadians continued to be concerned about material factors, particularly material factors related to economic performance. This concern would appear to be linked to economic anxieties, but the study team wished to explore whether it had any linkages to pride and attachment. To get a clearer picture of the value orientations driving these responses, the study team developed an index from the policy goals questions to determine how many respondents were:

1. pure materialists - both choices were materialist goals
2. mixed materialists - first choice a materialist, second a post-materialist goal
3. mixed post-materialists - first choice a post-materialist, second a materialist goal
4. pure post-materialists - both choices were post-materialist goals.

As Figure 7.9 shows, when a set of questions was asked which juxtaposed two materialist goals (a stable economy and the fight against crime) and two post-materialist ones (progress toward a less impersonal society and a society where ideas count more than money), the balance was clearly in favour of materialist values.

To see if a post-materialist orientation affected attitudes toward national institutions, we checked to see how materialists and post-materialists scored on the question about trust in government. As Figure 7.10 shows, materialists were much more likely to say that they almost always trusted government than post-materialists.

Materialists also tended to be prouder of Canada than post-materialists, with over 66% of pure materialists and 65% of materialists saying that they were very proud to be Canadian, as compared to 58% of post-materialists and 39% of pure post-materialists.
If, as Nevitte suggests, the Canadian population is shifting to a post-materialist orientation, both trust in government and levels of national pride may continue to decline. Until results of the 1999 World Values Survey are available in 2001, it is impossible to test this hypothesis. Moreover, as the balance of this chapter will show, the determinants of national pride are considerably more ambiguous than a simple demographic analysis would suggest. Even when tested against other intuitively related variables, such as trust and attachment, the results are inconclusive and tend to suggest a more complex picture lying just below the surface of the standard data.

As noted in the chapter on ‘Attachment to and Identification with Canada’, those who were most prepared to leave Canada were those who are single, younger, highly educated and with higher incomes. But, does a material need to leave the country bear any relationship to national affect? Can you be proud, but still want to (or need to) leave? As shown in Figure 7.11, in 1990, a plurality of Canadians said that they identified first with Canada than with any other geographic region.

When these responses to the “attachment” question were compared with the “pride” question, it became evident that respondents with the lowest level of pride in Canada were those who chose “region” as their level of primary attachment, followed by those who chose “North America” and “the world” (Figure 7.12). Among those who chose “Canada” as their primary level of attachment, slightly over 74% said they were very proud, as compared to 47% of those who chose “region” and 44% of those who chose “North America” and “the world”. On the other hand, as Figure 7.12 also shows, those who were most proud of Canada were also the most attached to it, while those who were most cosmopolitan were the least ‘unconditionally’ proud.

A cosmopolitan world view tended to correlate with a post-materialist value orientation. When the materialist/post-materialist index developed by the study team was compared with the question on geographical attachment, this correlation was supported. Over 47% of pure materialists identified first with Canada, as compared to only 25% of pure post-materialists. While 26% of pure post-materialists said that their first level of attachment was to North America and the world, only 10% of pure materialists made this choice.

Segmentation analysis further supported the link between this finding and levels of pride. Figure 7.13 shows the relationship between value orientation and pride in being Canadian. Those expressing pure post-materialist values were least likely to express ‘unconditional’ pride, while those expressing materialist orientations were the most likely. Comparisons to geographic
attachment identified a link to cosmopolitanism. Of those identifying first with North America, 56% expressed lower levels of pride. This ‘not as proud’ figure was increased to 65% when segmented to identify those expressing post-materialist value orientations (not shown).

Attachment, belonging and identification with Canada, therefore, do coincide with higher levels of national pride. Both levels of attachment and pride also appear to bear some relation to value orientation. Post-materialists not only tend to be less proud than materialists, but also to have lower levels of attachment to the country. This orientation could be related to the demographics of attachment highlighted in Chapter 6, which revealed that those most prepared to consider leaving Canada were the young and the educated (who also tend to be the segment of the population most likely to adopt post-materialist values).

Complicating this picture, however, are the attachments of the materialist segment, which one would intuitively believe to be the most willing to move to improve economic prospects. Instead, they are the least cosmopolitan of the value groups, the most proud and the most attached to Canada. Clearly, geographic attachment, while related to national pride, does not tell the whole story.

**Personal Affect**

The cumulative findings of this study have suggested that the aggregated effects of personal self-esteem should figure more prominently in perceptions of national pride. In order to test this hypothesis directly, the study team explored the relationship between pride and the satisfaction, personal confidence and mood indices that were first introduced in Chapter 4. As Figure 7.14 shows, there was indeed a positive and significant relationship between pride in Canada and both life satisfaction and financial satisfaction. Those who were most satisfied on both fronts were more likely to express higher levels of national pride.

Higher scores on the personal confidence, willingness to take risks/positive attitude to change and mood indices each correlated positively with national pride. Figure 7.15 shows that those scoring highest on the confidence index also expressed higher ‘unconditional’ pride (76% as compared to 60% of those with more average levels of personal confidence). A higher willingness to take risks and a positive attitude toward life also translated to higher pride.
Results ranged from a low of 53% “very proud” for the risk averse to 71% “very proud” for those scoring in the upper ranges of this index (see Figure 7.15).

Figure 7.16 shows the relationship between the mood index and feelings of pride. These findings support those of life and financial satisfaction. In each case, a generally positive attitude toward life appears to coincide with a generally positive attitude toward Canada.

Conclusions

There appear to be no easy answers to the many questions posed in this chapter, even after each of the threads of the analysis are disentangled. We can see that each of the threads has a place in the overall pattern, but we still have no clear picture as to how to weave them into the design. While the analysis gives clues as to the general linkages among the elements, there is no clear evidence of causality. Since higher levels of life and financial satisfaction are related to age, marital and employment status, are we seeing a repeat of the “young and the restless” scenario of our previous paper? Are the mature and secure prouder of Canada because they are financially secure and more contented in their lifestyle? On the other hand, if post-materialists are supposed to be less oriented toward material concerns, what is the source of their discontent? Why are they less attached to Canada?

We can conclude that national pride in Canada appears to bear little relationship to levels of trust in public institutions such as Parliament and the civil service. This disconnect of pride from feelings about state-related institutions has been accompanied by an increasing linkage of national pride to collective achievements that promote quality of life and collective well-being (such as the health and welfare system and democracy). This is not a great surprise if one accepts the traditional image of Canada as a “state-nation” and the long-standing tendency of Canadians to take pride in their social and civic accomplishments. At the same time, we have
detected a strong link with post-materialist types of achievements with which he individual can identify on a personal basis (such as the accomplishments of athletes, artists and scientists), suggesting that a second stream of “pride-inducing” motivations may exist and, indeed, may grow if the post-materialist segment of the population increases.

Personal affect and self-esteem do appear to play a direct and indirect role in how proud Canadians feel about their country. However, it has been difficult to determine whether positive feelings about life contribute first to overall well-being which then spills over into national pride, or whether discontent based on a negative assessment of Canada leads to a more general discontent with life. We have also been unable to disentangle the way in which post-materialist value shifts might be affecting national pride. In some ways, the “young and the restless” coincide with the post-materialist population, but if this is the case, decreased attachment to Canada by this group of people does not make sense unless one assumes that a) they are also driven by materialist needs to a certain extent, or b) that vicarious identification with post-materialist national achievements in the arts and sports are not sufficient to offset the appeal of continental or global identification.

Achievements by individual Canadians in the arts, in sports and in science also appear to play an important role in the construction of national pride. These types of accomplishments may be contributing, however, to the personal (rather than the collective) component of pride, as defined by Smith and Jaarko, by boosting feelings of self-esteem based on association with a “winner” or “star” who happens to be Canadian. Such achievements are also clearly post-materialist in the sense that Nevitte described: they are “higher-order” concerns related to belonging, self-esteem and quality of life.\footnote{For a more detailed description of the difference between materialist and post-materialist values, see Nevitte, The Decline of Deference: Canadian Value Change in Cross-national Perspective, p.28.} Assuming, once again, that the post-materialist segment of the population is growing, it can be expected that these types of achievements will play a larger role in the future in contributing to pride in Canada.
8. CONCLUSIONS / IMPLICATIONS

We began this study by asking ourselves two questions. Is national pride related to Canadians’ feelings about the collective “macro environment” of political institutions, governance and community? Is national pride related in any way to shifts in the personal “micro environment”, specifically to perceptions of diminished affluence, coupled with growing post-materialism and individualism within the Canadian population? The answers to these questions were not unequivocally clear, but our empirical investigation did uncover strong linkages between personal well-being at the “micro” level and declining social capital and trust. However, we were surprised to discover that these “micro” level changes did not seem to have an impact on national pride. Rather, the indirect influences of declining personal well-being and social capital revealed a complex ‘web’ of attitudes which we endeavoured to explore.

While creating a host of new questions, this ‘web’ pointed to possible explanations as to why pride was affected in some ways but not in others. This final chapter of our study summarizes the conclusions drawn from an analysis of the values surveys we studied. These interpretations are, for the most part, based on objective, empirical analysis. We have noted those instances where we have had to make a “leap of faith” as a result of incongruent data, indirect or multi-layered associations, or weak or ambiguous findings.

Trust, Perceptions of Affluence and Declining Social Capital

Much has been made of recent characterizations of Canada as a ‘state nation’, defined as a nation whose state has formed and shaped its character. As Michael Ignatieff has observed, “a strong civic culture depends on public investment and public services” which are the “institutional sinews of a strong national identity”. He has also suggested that once these services deteriorate, the wealthy, who can purchase them on the private market, cease to be willing to pay extra taxes for the public realm. Those who are not wealthy feel abandoned and are tempted to withdraw their consent from the national project.94 Our findings suggest that social capital is largely dependent upon the way individuals perceive their surroundings: if people feel anxious for social or economic reasons, this anxiety is likely to be reflected in the way they interpret external forces. These forces are more likely to be seen as negative, whether they are institutional, such as government, abstract, such as ‘globalization’, or personal, such as in distrust of others. On this basis, levels of perceived control and social affluence are strong determinants of optimistic and hopeful predispositions, while perceived injustices, inequalities and unrealized expectations bring about more pessimistic mind sets.

Trust appears to be determined by a multi-layered set of elements, including outlook, sense of control and willingness to take risks. Trust in people and in institutions of governance are functions of personal circumstances, in which perceptions of opportunity (hope for the future) and of individual gain through effort play key roles. Trust and confidence in people and the ‘system’ translate into a strong civic culture because they create functional linkages among the population at non-state and non-institutional levels. In turn, a strong civil society translates into high social capital because these functional linkages bring about a stable social and political environment in which collectivities and individuals interact. When high social capital is in part determined by an individual’s perception of the state as the embodiment of the ‘social contract’ (as it is in Canada’s state-nation), it translates into a social form of citizenship that is shared by all. This commonality in turn reinforces social capital.

The linkages made throughout this study draw from this basic reasoning. The link between personal discontent and discontent directed at the system was made using indicators of social capital and confidence in political, social, and economic institutions. We found that those with more trusting attitudes were also those who scored higher on our constructed measures of personal well-being, thus supporting the theoretical literature that trust is strongly influenced by personal circumstances. In a "risk society", opportunities to realize one’s own economic and social expectations are more likely to bring about an increase in general trust levels, whereas perceived inequality and injustice are not. Those Canadians who felt better about themselves were also more willing to take risks and adopt a positive attitude to change. The findings suggest that those most likely to do something about their economic situations are those with higher levels of self-confidence, satisfaction and personal affect – a state of being that is more likely to be enjoyed by those who are economically, educationally, and psychologically equipped to cope with change, and who are more optimistic and more willing “to take a chance” on the future. These people are also more likely to trust each other and have confidence in institutions.

We believe that the “affluence effect” described in this study has resulted in increased anxiety among certain segments of the Canadian population. We found evidence of a recursive association between income, employment, personal domestic arrangements and levels of contentment among Canadians. Those who were older, employed, married and with higher incomes felt higher levels of satisfaction in all areas of life. Those expressing a lack of personal control over their lives, low levels of life and financial satisfaction and low confidence in the integrity of the ‘system’ were younger, unemployed, single, divorced or separated, and in lower income brackets. The latter group were also more likely to believe that the economic and political systems are ill-equipped to respond to changes in the global economy.

In general, this negative mood among certain segments of the Canadian public has been reflected in a decline in social capital. The existence of a consistently significant relationship between how Canadians feel and responses to trust and confidence questions in the surveys analyzed appears to suggest that feelings of insecurity are associated with distrust of government. Overall, criticism of the economic system appeared to be the most powerful predictor of cynicism about the integrity of the government. Those most inclined to say that government was run only for the benefit of a few big interests were also those most likely to say that the economic system needed fundamental changes. Those believing economic and political systems were ill-equipped to respond to changes in the global economy were also more likely to feel a lack of personal control over their lives, express low levels of life and financial satisfaction and feel least confident about the integrity of the system in general.

What might this erosion of social capital mean for public policy? First, there appears to be a segment of the Canadian population which is losing faith in the system. This segment tends to be the least equipped to deal with the effects of globalization on the Canadian economy and political system, and it has reacted by withdrawing its trust from public institutions and, to a lesser extent, from others in the community. Second, those who are well-educated, confident and satisfied with their lives are prepared to “go it alone”, but paradoxically, do not feel as compelled to withdraw their support for government and civil society. Third, those who are least equipped to function within the transforming economy are resentful, particularly of governments, which are seen as incompetent for not providing the types of traditional support that Canadians have expected from their “state nation”.

The mechanisms of state support in an post-industrial, as opposed to an industrial, economy may indeed be much different. However, it is clear that significant segments of the Canadian population do not understand or accept this reality and view public institutions as increasingly
ineffective and uncaring. If the state is to regain the confidence of Canadians, it will not only have to find ways to play its new role more effectively, but also to communicate better what that role – with all its benefits and limitations – might be. Discussions about a new social contract or a new social union should recognize that what is at stake is not simply jurisdictional arrangements. A battle for the “hearts and minds” of Canadians – or at least for their trust and confidence – will also be a significant element.

**Personal Well-being and Attachment to Canada**

If the nation-state is perceived to be incapable of responding to the changing needs of its citizens, and of achieving national goals, individuals may be more willing to reduce their attachment to it. This can be in the practical sense (i.e. by leaving the country) or in a more post-national sense (i.e. to seek out new non-state identities). We explored this theory by using the concepts of “push and pull” (localism vs. globalism) to explore attachment and belonging to Canada. We discovered that Canadians do not feel as close to their country as do citizens of other nations, notwithstanding high levels of pride in the country. Canadians' degree of attachment to both the nation and the continent was lower relative to other nations in the ISSP study, with one in four respondents saying that they would be willing to leave Canada and North America to improve their living and working conditions.

When this issue was explored, we found that those who were unemployed and the least content with their economic prospects were more likely to consider leaving the country. Willingness to move appears to be a function of educational attainment as well, with nearly 40% of those with some university education prepared to move, as compared to only 14% of those with only a high school education. At the level of personal affect, those who were the least confident tended to be less inclined to move and expressed a stronger identification with Canada than those with higher levels of confidence. These people were also more likely to express pessimism, cynicism, and lower levels of life and financial satisfaction. In turn, they were also more likely to find fault with the political, economic and social systems.

Such findings suggest that higher scores on measures of attachment or commitment to the country were more likely to be made by those who felt that they have no other choice, or for whom expectations had not been raised through education. The much-debated “brain drain” may in fact be a reality or a potential reality for those who are most comfortable with the effects of globalization. Our findings would also suggest that if citizens cannot realize their expectations in Canada, they will move abroad to improve their conditions.

Despite their willingness to move to improve materialist prospects, younger and more highly educated Canadians were, generally speaking, as attached to Canada as older and less highly educated Canadians. However, these people were more prepared to let their heads rule their hearts when considering the economic consequences of their physical ties to Canada. We have interpreted this as a sign that physical or state-based attachments to Canada are losing their power among this segment of the population, at least when measured against the pragmatic necessity of earning a living.

At face value, the public policy implications of our findings on attachment and belonging are troubling. The “best and brightest” appear to be most willing to leave. The most frustrated and least educated are the most likely to stay in and identify with Canada, but are also those who are most likely to express low levels of confidence and trust in public institutions. If one wished to be cynical, one could speculate that Canadians remain attached to Canada at the symbolic level despite the perceived failures of public policy. On a more positive note, when Canadians can
once again view the country as providing opportunity and hope for the future for all its inhabitants, the dissonance between attachment and belonging may disappear or at least diminish.

**Post-materialism, Individualism and Pride in Canada**

Our search for the “roots” of pride left us with almost as many questions as it did answers. In common with many other researchers, we found that language was the best predictor of pride, with English Canadians significantly prouder of Canada than French Canadians. Regionally, Ontarians and Atlantic Canadians were proudest of Canada and Quebecers were the least proud. Age was also another significant predictor of pride with Canadians over 65 more likely to say that they were very proud of Canada than Canadians under 65. But these results by themselves were not enough to explain variations in pride since 85% Quebecers and francophones still said that they were very or quite proud of Canada.

The concept of the ‘state nation’ is an important explanatory and linking concept in the study. Empirical tests have supported the thesis that Canada is a ‘state nation’. Ekos Research Associates found that when respondents in a survey were asked to rate both the most important values for society and for the federal government, the values chosen were basically identical. Our analysis of the World Values Survey and International Social Survey data also found that Canadian pride was at least partially based on collective values. Our comparative analysis showed that Canadians are relatively prouder of our collective social achievements than people in other parts of the world. They particularly value the way our democracy and social security system works, but are less proud of the political and economic systems. Globalization, while driven by economic imperatives, appears to be having an indirect impact on the social environment in Canada, as detected through growing personal anxiety and as reflected in growing concern about the health care and social safety net. Our analysis suggested that in general, social values were more rooted in the Canadian identity in 1990 than economic ones. If this continues to be the case, radical change in the social environment may well have implications for national pride and national identity since it strikes at the heart of the Canadian self-image.

That being said, erosion of social capital (defined as trust and confidence in the political system and in other Canadians) does not seem to translate into lower pride in Canada. The intuitive assumption that decreasing confidence and trust in government would be reflected in lower levels of pride was only slightly borne out by the statistical analysis. This was acknowledged reluctantly after most signs throughout the study pointed to a contrary conclusion. The fact that this relationship was, for the most part, statistically insignificant suggests a surprising disconnect between the political and the patriotic. In fact, it would appear that while social capital may be eroded by lack of trust, national pride may not be as greatly affected.

Our examination of the dynamics of value change within the population also suggested that pride in Canada may increasingly be influenced by individualism and post-materialism. Post-materialists appear to be the least attached to Canada and the least proud. Materialists, despite what one would intuitively think about their willingness to move to improve their economic prospects are, in fact, prouder of Canada and more attached to it.

Part of the answer to this conundrum appears to lie in the interplay of collective and individualistic values. While Canadians are relatively more proud of collective social achievements than people in other parts of the world, achievements by individual Canadians in the arts, in sports and in science also appear to play an important role in the construction of national pride. These individual achievements appear to reinforce both individualist orientations
(by boosting feelings of self-esteem based on association with a “winner”) and post-materialist orientations (by appealing to higher-order concerns related to belonging, self-esteem and quality of life). If the post-materialist segment of the population is growing, as suggested by other researchers, it can be expected that individual, as opposed to collective, achievements will play a larger role in generating national pride in the future.

A positive attitude toward life also coincided with a generally positive attitude toward Canada while those expressing a darker mood were also negative about the country. We continue to be puzzled by the source of this discontent, since it appears only slightly related to questions of trust. We have speculated that the “young, educated, and restless” may be ignoring emotional and cultural ties to their country in favour of increased material well-being. We are left, however, with the problem of explaining why this population, if it is so post-materialist, would consider moving for essentially materialist reasons. In the end, we have acknowledged that this paradox cannot be resolved in the context of this research paper.

Some final words

Our study suggests that in Canada trust, hope and national pride have a complex relationship. National pride and a strong national identity depend not only on symbolic attachments, but also on an economy and a welfare state which facilitate inclusion. We concur with Michael Ignatieff’s observation that “National identity is inseparable from the idea of justice. The economic system must be seen to be delivering - not equality of outcomes, but equality of opportunity and discernable reward for effort.”95 Those who were less confident in their own abilities, less satisfied with their lives and more pessimist in orientation were both the least supportive of the political and economic systems and the least proud of Canada.

Beyond materialist considerations, however, we have found that Canadians continue to have a deep-seated pride in their country that persists despite significant declines in confidence in public and economic institutions. This persistence is partially attributable to Canadians’ pride in their collective social achievements. It appears to be linked as well to a growing need to reinforce personal self-esteem and belonging through vicarious identification with the national achievements of others.

We believe that further research, particularly based on the 1999 World Values Survey, is required to either confirm or refute our conclusions. In the meantime, policy makers should not assume that Canadians’ emotional attachment to the country will continue to override what appears to be growing anxiety and erosion in social capital. Most of our research was based on pre-1995 data, which preceded major fiscal restructuring and down-sizing at all levels of government. Pride in our collective social achievements may have decreased as a result, since national identity is so closely tied to these accomplishments. If this is the case, social cohesion may also be at risk, since these achievements represent a significant portion of the “glue” that keeps Canadians from ‘drifting away’, both physically and psychologically.

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APPENDIX: METHODOLOGICAL AND TECHNICAL NOTES

The Data

The data used in the original analytical contributions of this paper were taken from two main sources: the 1990 World Values Survey (WVS) and the 1995 National Identity Study of the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP). Both are bodies of survey research available in the public domain. Cross-national comparisons of the WVS data involved 10 countries, while 14 were used from the ISSP database. Comparative data was also presented from two commercial sources. The Angus Reid Quality of Life/Hope for the Future study (1998) and selected Goldfarb data. Both are used with permission.

Selection of the Databases

The 1990 WVS was used as the primary data source for this study because the comprehensive approach in the research design ensured that many of the key indicators were contained within a single survey instrument. Beyond the simple presentation of data collected on chosen indicators, a single data set allowed for a targeted analytical design and the exploration of empirical linkages and attitude structures among predictive measures and dependent variables. The 1995 ISSP data set was chosen for its attachment and identification variables. The ISSP data also offered international comparisons. Overall however, the smaller number of variables relevant to the study was the principal reason for the more restricted use of the ISSP.

Limitations Posed by the Databases for the Analysis

The chosen databases limited the scope of the analysis for the following reasons:

- Not all key dependent variables in the research study were located within a single database. In particular, measures of attachment (e.g. willingness to move) were located exclusively within the ISSP study, preventing their comparison with other key independent and dependent variables used in the study. For this reason, most analytical evidence has remained descriptive rather than inferential in form.
- Scales to measure for income and educational attainment were not identical between the two databases. This limited the degree of comparability between the two surveys.

Choice of Variables

The analysis was approached in stages, such that findings from a previous section were applied to the analysis in subsequent stages. Indicators used as dependent variables in earlier discussions were later used as independent variables. In this way, analyses were overlapped and findings were assumed to be cumulative. As already noted, use of multiple databases impeded this approach in some cases.

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96 Sample sizes varied by survey and country.
1. Independent Variables

Due to the integrated and exploratory nature of the research design, a large number of independent and dependent variables were used in this study. Independent, or predictive, variables were divided into two groups.

Socio-demographics variables were chosen to examine the distribution of key attitudes and attributes across socio-demographic categories. These included the following:

**TABLE I: VARIABLES**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attribute</th>
<th>Indicators</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Household Income</td>
<td>Language</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>Employment Status</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sex</td>
<td>Region/Province of Residence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level of Education</td>
<td>Rural/Urban</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Place of Birth/Citizenship</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The second group of independent variables, comprising attitudinal measures such as confidence, satisfaction, trust, and attitudes toward risk, formed the core predictive attitudes used in the study. Table II presents these indicators in more detail:

**TABLE II: ATTITUDINAL PREDICTORS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attribute</th>
<th>Indicators</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Attitudes toward Risk and Adaptation to Change</td>
<td>Willingness to take risks (cautious vs. bold)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Perceived ability to adapt to change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sense of Control</td>
<td>Scale of Perceived Sense of Control Over One's Life</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Satisfaction</td>
<td>Life Satisfaction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Subjective Well-Being)</td>
<td>Financial Satisfaction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Job Satisfaction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Happiness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal Confidence</td>
<td>Computed Scale of 8 measures of Personal Confidence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-Perception</td>
<td>Factor Scale of 10 measures of Personal Mood</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutional Trust and Scepticism</td>
<td>Trust in Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cynicism about Democratic System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal Trust</td>
<td>General Trust in People</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Trust in Fellow Canadians</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Locus of Attachment</td>
<td>Expression of preferred attachment to geographical groups</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. Dependent Variables

As the research objective stated, the ultimate focus variable for the study was “Pride in Being Canadian”, located in the WVS. This variable asked the respondent to rate on a 4-point scale how proud they were to be Canadian. Possible responses were “Very Proud”, “Quite Proud”, “Not Very Proud”, and “Not at all Proud”.

Some independent variables also formed dependent variables in different stages of the analysis. The variables listed in Table II were also used as dependent variables, specifically those concerning trust, satisfaction, and control. As outlined earlier, this was done to establish the nature of empirical linkages among predictor variables before assessing the findings of the overall predictive model. As such, only in the latter stages of the analysis did the ‘pride’ indicator form the sole dependent variable.
Analytical Tools and Procedures

As the research framework indicated, the analysis was divided into four phases. The first section, entitled ‘Personal Outlook’ consisted of an exploration of and attitudinal breakdowns on the dependent and independent variables in the 1990 stand-alone set. The second section explored linkages among the predictive ‘outlook’ indicators and feelings of trust and confidence in people and institutions. The third section explored feelings of attachment, with reference to the cumulative findings. The final section drew together these findings in an effort to explore the impact of attitudes on pride in Canada and to attempt the construction of an explanatory model based on both socio-demographic and attitudinal predictors of pride.

The analysis involved the construction of several ‘computed’ variables, used to simplify the analysis by creating indicators more useful than stand-alone measures. The construction of these variables is described below.

The analysis employed several analytical tools and procedures:

- **Correlations, Cross-tabulations, and Comparison of Means**

  Descriptive statistics and simple correlative procedures formed the bulk of the analysis. Since these procedures provide tools to examine relationships between two variables, they allowed the study team to investigate the interactions between indicators, whether attitudinal or socio-demographic. Cross-tabulations provide for a tabular cross-referencing of dependent and independent variables, for either categorical or ordinal measures. Results from cross-tabular analysis are expressed in percentages.

  Correlations provide for a single measure description of a relationship between two variables. This number, ranging in value between 0 and ±1, describes the strength and direction of a relationship. A figure close to 0 indicates a weak relationship, while one closer to +1 or –1 indicates a stronger relationship. A positive number indicates that as the values of one variable increases, the value of the other variable also increases. A negative figure indicates that as one variable increases, the other decreases, and vice versa. Significance of correlations was measured at either the p<.05 or p<.01 levels.

  Comparison of means procedures were used in the place of cross-tabulations for variables containing several values (e.g. 10-point scales). This procedure provides the mean of the dependent variable for each value of the independent variable. Comparison of means is normally reserved for use with ordinal dependent variables and ordinal or categorical independent variables.

- **CHAID™ Segmentation Analysis**

  Many aspects of the analysis required that dependent variables be explored on the basis of attitudinal and socio-demographic characteristics. In order to explore the existence of statistically significant differences among Canadians on chosen variables, the study team chose to use ‘segmentation modeling’. Segmentation modeling is a statistical technique designed to determine if any segments within the sample population differ significantly on dependent variables with respect to selected independent predictors. Similar in principle to cluster analysis, the CHAID™ (Chi-Squared Automatic Interaction Detector from SPSS) procedure acts to divide a population into two or more distinct sub-groups, based on the best (most statistically
significant) predictor of the dependent variable.\textsuperscript{97} For the purposes of the analysis, statistical significance was set at $p<.05$. Initial breakdowns are then divided into further segments, based on the most statistically significant predictor of that sub-group. This process continues until no more statistically significant predictors are found, or until another ‘stop rule’ is reached. For this study, a stop-rule was established which ended the segmentation when size of sub-groups fell below 50 respondents.

*Principal Components Analysis (Factor Analysis)*

Principal components analysis is a statistical procedure used to determine whether underlying patterns of responses exist for a group of selected variables. The procedures identifies distinct groupings among variables (known as ‘factors’), rather than among responses. In order to be valid, variables used in the analysis must be constructed in the same way and designed for the same purpose. Factors are determined by analyzing the strength or ‘loading’ of each variable for each factor. Based on the pattern revealed by the loadings, factors are interpreted for meaning by the analyst, transformed into a useful variable and used as such in subsequent analyses. For the purposes of the analysis, the study team used two factor variables which had been converted into 5-point ordinal scales.

Specific use of the principal components procedure in the current analysis is described below.

**Sample Sizes**

**World Values Survey 1990**

- Canada 1730

**International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) 1995 National Identity Survey**

- Canada 1534
- United States 1367
- Italy 1094
- Japan 1256
- Sweden 1296
- Netherlands 2089
- West Germany 1282
- New Zealand 1043
- Norway 1527
- United Kingdom 1058

**Computed Measures**

*Confidence Index (WVS)*

This variable was constructed as an index from the following eight variables.

\textsuperscript{97} Statistical significance for sub-group eligibility was set at $p<0.05$. 
1. I usually count on being successful in everything I do
2. I enjoy convincing others of my opinion
3. I often notice that I serve as a model for others
4. I am good at getting what I want
5. I own many things that others envy me for
6. I like to assume responsibility
7. I am rarely unsure about how I should behave
8. I often give others advice

Respondents were asked for each question whether the statement applied to them; scores ranged from 1 through 8, with higher scores indicating higher personal confidence.

*Mood Factor Index*

The following 10 variables were used to assess the mood and self-perception of the respondents. Respondents were asked for each variable whether the statement applied to them.

1. Excited or interested in something
2. So restless that you couldn’t sit long in a chair
3. Proud because someone had complimented you on something you had done
4. Very lonely or remote from others
5. Pleased about having accomplished something
6. Bored
7. On top of the world/feeling that life is wonderful
8. Depressed or very unhappy
9. Feel that things are going your way
10. Upset because somebody criticized you

These variables were used in factor analysis to determine in what way variables grouped together based on response patterns. The factor analysis revealed the following underlying pattern:

**Group 1: Positive**

- Feel excited
- Feel proud
- Feel pleased
- Feel top of the world
- Feel things are going your way

**Group 2: Negative**

- Feel restless
- Feel lonely
- Feel bored
- Feel depressed
- Feel upset

These two groups were then transformed into 5-point scales, measuring the extent to which each respondent ascribed to these attitudes/moods.

*Materialism/Post-Materialism (WVS)*

An index of materialist/post-materialist values was created from the following variable. The question was asked in the form of a trade-off: respondents were asked to choose which goal should be the most important for the nation to pursue, followed by the next-most important.
Choose first and second goals for nation:

1. A stable economy (Materialist)
2. Progress toward a less impersonal and more humane society (Post-materialist)
3. Progress toward a society in which ideas count more than money (Post-materialist)
4. The fight against crime (Materialist)

First and second choice responses for each question set were cross-tabulated to establish the following groups:

1. Materialists (both first and second choices were materialist)
2. Mixed materialists (first choice materialist, second choice post-materialist)
3. Mixed post-materialists (first choice post-materialist, second choice materialist)
4. Post-materialists (both first and second choices were post-materialist)

The two new variables resulting from this manipulation were 4-point indexes, with lower scores indicating a higher level of materialist concerns.

Attitudes Toward Risk and Change

The following two 10-point scale variables were combined to produce a measure of respondents’ attitudes toward risk and change.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>One should be cautious about making changes in life</th>
<th>You will never achieve much unless you act boldly</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1………………………………………………………………………………………….10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>When changes occur in my life, I worry about the difficulties they may cause</th>
<th>When changes occur in my life, I welcome the possibility that something new is beginning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1………………………………………………………………………………………….10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The resulting scale ranged from 2 to 20, with a higher value representing a more open and optimistic attitude to risk and change.
BIBLIOGRAPHY


Graves, Frank and Derek Jansen.  *Identity and National Attachments in Contemporary Canada*.  (Draft deck presented at the Conference on the State of the Federation 1998, Queen’s University, February 21, 1998.)


Ignatieff, Michael.  “Belonging in the past”, *Prospect*, November 1996.  (Also at http://www.prospect-magazine.co.uk.)


